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Abstract: Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of
studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a
meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the
hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological
constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not
specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological
constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses.
Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain
regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting
brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during
emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.
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1. Introduction
William James framed the question of emotion–brain cor-
respondence when he wrote, “of two things concerning the
emotions, one must be true. Either separate and special
centres, affected to them alone, are their brain-seat, or
else they correspond to processes occurring in the motor
and sensory centres already assigned” (James 1890/1998,
p. 473). In this target article, we statistically summarize
the last 15 years of neuroimaging research on emotion in
an attempt to determine which of these alternatives is
correct. We examine the utility of two different models
of emotion that have each existed since the beginning of
psychology.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 35, 121–202
# Cambridge University Press 2012 0140-525X/12 $40.00 121
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11001531
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:25:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
2. A locationist account of the brain basis of
emotion
A locationist account of emotion assumes that the category
emotion and individual categories such as anger, disgust,
fear, happiness, sadness (and perhaps a few others) are
respected by the body and brain (see Barrett [2006a] for
a discussion). The guiding hypothesis of this natural kind
model (Barrett 2006a) or modal model (Barrett et al.
2007d) of emotion is that different emotion categories
refer to states with endowed motivational characteristics
that drive cognition and behavior. It is assumed that
these states are biologically basic and inherited, and
cannot be broken down into more basic psychological
components (Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Izard 2011; Pank-
sepp & Watt 2011). Despite these common assumptions,
there is variability in how different researchers define
emotions as natural kinds. Some theorists emphasize the
universal characteristics of emotion categories, suggesting
that each emotion category (e.g., anger) refers to a “family”
of states that share a distinctive universal signal (e.g., facial
behavior), physiology, antecedent events, subjective
experience, and accompanying thoughts and memories
(e.g., Ekman & Cordaro 2011). In this view, emotions
can be shaped by culture and learning, but all humans
possess the capacity to experience and perceive the same
core set of emotion categories.
Other theorists take a developmental approach and
argue that all infants are born with a set of “first order
emotions” that are evolutionarily given reactions (includ-
ing feelings, motivations and behaviors) to specific
stimuli (e.g., Izard 2011). First order emotions form the
core of the more elaborate “emotion schemas” that
develop with age and learning and consist of complex com-
binations of emotions, cognitions, and behaviors. Still
other theorists emphasize the evolutionary aspect of
emotion categories, and argue that emotions are specific
behavioral adaptations that are shared with other mamma-
lian species and passed down through phylogeny (e.g.,
Panksepp 1998; 2007; Panksepp & Watt 2011). Some
models taking an “appraisal” approach to emotion also
draw on natural kind assumptions about emotions (cf.
Barrett 2006a) by hypothesizing that dedicated cognitive
mechanisms automatically make meaning of a stimulus
and trigger the corresponding discrete emotion (e.g.,
Roseman 1984; Ellsworth & Scherer 2003). Relatively
little work from an appraisal perspective has investigated
the brain basis of emotion (although see Sander et al.
2003; 2007). Therefore, we do not discuss appraisal
models further in this article.
All natural kind models share the assumption that differ-
ent emotion categories have their roots in distinct mechan-
isms in the brain and body. The mechanisms underlying
discrete emotion categories have been discussed as resid-
ing within particular gross anatomical locations (e.g.,
Calder 2003; Ekman 1999) or networks (e.g., Izard 2011;
Panksepp 1998) in the brain. These models constitute a
locationist account of emotion because they hypothesize
that all mental states belonging to the same emotion cat-
egory (e.g., fear) are produced by activity that is consist-
ently and specifically associated with an architecturally
defined brain locale (see sections 5.1–5.4 further on)1 or
anatomically defined networks of locales that are inherited
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and shared with other mammalian species (Panksepp
1998; Panksepp & Watt 2011). Not all natural kind
models are locationist, however; for example, some
models propose that each discrete emotion is triggered
by an inherited mechanism (e.g., an “affect program”;
Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Tomkins 1962; 1963) that does
not necessarily correspond to a particular brain locale
but rather to a specific pattern of autonomic nervous
system activity. Much of the contemporary research on
emotion makes locationist assumptions; in this article we
focus on the models that hypothesize single brain
regions to be consistently and specifically associated with
different emotion categories, because they represent
the most frequent hypothesis that has been tested in the
cognitive neuroscience literature. We discuss specific
predictions of the locationist approach in section 5,
Testing Hypotheses of Brain–Emotion Correspondence
(also see Fig. 1).
3. A psychological constructionist account of the
brain basis of emotion
A psychological constructionist account of emotion
assumes that emotions are psychological events that
emerge out of more basic psychological operations that
are not specific to emotion. In this view, mental categories
such as anger, sadness, fear, et cetera, are not respected by
the brain (nor are emotion, perception, or cognition, for
that matter; Barrett 2009a; Duncan & Barrett 2007;
Pessoa 2008). A psychological constructionist approach
to emotion is as old as the locationist approach, at least
in its nascent form (e.g., Wundt, James, and other early
psychologists were psychological constructionists; see
Gendron & Barrett 2009). Our contemporary psychologi-
cal constructionist approach shares much in common with
cognitive neuroscience approaches arguing that basic
psychological operations are common across diverse task
domains (Cole & Schneider 2007; Dosenbach et al.
2006; Smith et al. 2009; van Snellenberg & Wager 2009;
Wager et al. 2005; Wager & Smith 2003). As in the
neural context hypothesis, it assumes that the psychologi-
cal function of individual brain regions is determined, in
part, by the network of brain regions it is firing with
(McIntosh 2004). It is also consistent with recent evidence
that large-scale networks intrinsic to the brain interact to
produce psychological events (Seeley et al. 2007; Smith
et al. 2009; Spreng et al. 2009; see Deco et al. [2011] for
a review). In philosophy of mind, it is consistent with
both a token identity and a supervenience approach to
mind–brain correspondence (Barrett 2011) and the
mental mechanisms approach (Bechtel 2008). We
discuss the psychological constructionist view in a bit
more detail because it is unfamiliar to many readers.
In our psychological constructionist model, called the
“conceptual act model,” emotions emerge when people
make meaning out of sensory input from the body and
from the world using knowledge of prior experiences.
Emotions are “situated conceptualizations” (cf. Barsalou
2003) because the emerging meaning is tailored to the
immediate environment and prepares the person to
respond to sensory input in a way that is tailored to the
situation (Barrett 2006b). “Conceptual acts” could also
be called “perceptual acts” because they are thought to
emerge in consciousness just as visual and auditory per-
cepts do when sensory input is automatically and effort-
lessly made meaningful using knowledge from prior
experience. The idea is that the brain makes an initial
prediction about the meaning of the sensory array in
context (Bar 2007), and the error between this initial
top-down prediction and the sensory activity is quickly
minimized (Friston 2010) to produce a unified conscious
field.
In psychological construction, all mental states, whether
they are experienced as an instance of a discrete emotion
category or not, are realized by more basic psychological
Figure 1. Locationist Hypotheses of Brain–Emotion Correspondence. A: Lateral view. B: Sagital view at the midline. C: Ventral view.
D: Coronal view. Brain regions hypothesized to be associated with emotion categories are depicted. Here we depict the most popular
locationist hypotheses, although other locationist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence exist (e.g., Panksepp, 1998).
Fear: amygdala (yellow);Disgust: insula (green); Anger:OFC (rust); Sadness: ACC (blue). A color version of this image can be viewed
in the online version of this target article at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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operations or “ingredients” of the mind. The goal of psy-
chology is to identify these psychological operations as
“psychological primitives,” or the most basic psychological
descriptions that cannot be further reduced to anything
else mental (because at that point they would describe bio-
logical mechanisms). These basic psychological operations
are not functionally specific to any discrete emotion cat-
egory, or even to the category emotion itself. Instead,
they are functionally selective for emotion on certain
occasions. Because our own model is relatively new, our
current model has not identified the most primitive level
of psychological description, and it is not yet possible to
definitively claim what the most basic psychological oper-
ations of the mind are. What we propose is a set of basic
domains of psychological function that are a first approxi-
mation in the trajectory of a longer research program to
identify psychological primitives. These will no doubt be
refined as research proceeds in the coming years.
One operation in all psychological constructionist models
of emotion is some form of sensory input from the body,
such as raw somatic, visceral, vascular, and motor cues
(James 1884), arousal (Duffy 1957; Mandler 1975; 1990;
Schachter & Singer 1962), or affect (Harlow & Stagner
1932; Hunt 1941; Wundt 1897/1998). In our psychological
constructionist view, we refer to this basic psychological
domain, as “core affect” (Barrett 2006b; Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau 2009; Russell 2003; Russell & Barrett 1999). In psy-
chology, the word “affect” is used to mean anything that is
emotional. Core affect, on the other hand, is a term used
to describe the mental representation of bodily changes
that are sometimes experienced as feelings of hedonic plea-
sure and displeasure with some degree of arousal (Barrett &
Bliss-Moreau 2009; Russell 2003; Russell & Barrett 1999).
Core affect is realized, in part, by visceral control systems
that help organisms deal with motivationally salient
stimuli in the environment. A functioning peripheral
nervous system is not necessary for a person to experience
a core affective state (e.g., Critchley et al. 2001) as long as
they have some prior experiences to provide them with
central nervous system representations of bodily states.
However, in healthy individuals, core affect is usually
accompanied by somatovisceral, kinesthetic, propriocep-
tive, and neurochemical fluctuations that take place within
the core of the body and are represented in the brain.
Changes in core affect are a homeostatic barometer – the
body’s way of representing whether objects in the environ-
ment are valuable or not in a given context. The concept of
core affect shares much in common with the idea that
bodily cues constitute a core ingredient in mental life
(e.g., the idea that being embodied is essential to conscious-
ness: Craig 2009; Damasio 1999; the idea that feelings are a
common currency for valuation of objects in the world:
Cabanac 2002). We assume that core affect is not psycholo-
gically meaningful unless it is attached to an object; it is
made meaningful via a second basic psychological oper-
ation, which we describe next.
All psychological constructionist models include a second
basic psychological operation by which internal sensory
cues or their associated affective feelings are automatically
and effortlessly made meaningful (i.e., experienced as
related to or caused by an event or object, usually in the
external surroundings). Candidates for this second psycho-
logical operation include ideas (Wundt 1897/1998), social
affiliation (Schachter & Singer 1962), attribution (Russell
2003), or, as we propose in our model, categorization as
situated conceptualization (Barrett 2006b). The process of
“conceptualization” (and the other operations that support
it, such as executive attention) links perceptions of
sensory input from the world with input from the body to
create a meaningful psychological moment. In our hypoth-
esis, people automatically make meaning of their core affec-
tive state by engaging in a situated conceptualization that
links it to an object or event. Conceptualization is the
process by which stored representations of prior experi-
ences (i.e., memories, knowledge) are used to make
meaning out of sensations in the moment (Wilson-Menden-
hall et al. 2011). A person can make the situated conceptu-
alization that core affect is a physical symptom (e.g., a racing
heart), a simple feeling (e.g., feeling tired or wound up), or
an instance of a discrete emotion category (e.g., anger vs.
fear). And at other times, core affect is perceived as part
of an object itself rather than one’s reaction to it. For
instance, a food is delicious or distasteful, a painting is beau-
tiful or garish, or a person is nice or nasty. Because we
hypothesize that people make meaning of their core affec-
tive states in context, experiencing them as a part of an
emotion, perception, belief, or judgment, a psychological
constructionist account does not simply reduce the category
of emotion to positive or negative affect (as is often claimed
in summaries of “dimensional models of emotion”; e.g.,
Fontaine et al. 2007; Keltner et al. 2003). Conceptualization
can be said to produce cognitive appraisals realizing
emotion (Barrett et al. 2007c), where such appraisals are
descriptions of the features or properties of emotional
experience (Clore & Ortony 2008). In many appraisal
models, the assumption is that the brain contains a series
of specific cognitive appraisal mechanisms (e.g., there is a
specific mechanism to appraise the novelty of an object,
or whether one’s goals are blocked) which, when configured
into a particular pattern, trigger discrete emotions. In our
model, we do not propose any new or unique mental pro-
cesses that cause emotion; instead, we propose a mechan-
ism (categorization) that has been well documented in the
psychological and cognitive neuroscience literature. Categ-
orization (or conceptualization) is a fundamental process in
the human brain that functions like a chisel, leading people
to attend to certain features in a sensory array and to ignore
others. Only some of the wavelengths of light striking our
retinas are transformed into seen objects, only some of
the changes in air pressure registered in our ears are
heard as words or music, and only some bodily changes
are experienced as emotion. To categorize something is to
render it meaningful. It then becomes possible to make
reasonable inferences about that thing, to predict what to
do with it, and to communicate our experience of it to
others. There are ongoing debates about how categorization
works, but the fact that it works is not in question.
In our model, categorization in the form of situated con-
ceptualization is realized in a set of brain regions that
reconstitutes prior experiences for use in the present.
This set of brain regions has also been called the “episodic
memory network” (e.g., Vincent et al. 2006) or the “default
network” (e.g., Raichle et al. 2001). It is active when
people recall the past (e.g., Buckner & Carroll 2007;
Schacter et al. 2007; see also, McDermott et al. [2009]
for a meta-analysis), imagine the future (e.g., Addis et al.
2007; see also, Hassabis & Maguire 2009; Moulton &
Kosslyn 2009; Schacter et al. 2007), make context-sensitive
Lindquist et al.: The brain basis of emotion
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predictions about others’ thoughts and feelings (e.g., as in
theory of mind; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003; see Mitchell
2009), or make meaning of exteroceptive sensations (e.g.,
context-sensitive visual perception; Bar et al. 2006; see
also, Bar 2009). In emotion, we hypothesize that this
psychological operation makes a prediction about what
caused core affective changes within one’s own body or
what caused the affective cues (e.g., facial actions, body
postures, or vocal acoustics) in another person, and this
prediction occurs in a context-sensitive way (with the
result that core affect in context is categorized as an
instance of anger, disgust, fear, etc.; Barrett 2006b;
2009b; see also, e.g., Barrett & Kensinger 2010; Lindquist
& Barrett 2008a; Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011). When
making meaning out of core affect, conceptualization
draws on prior experiences and perceptions of emotion
to realize the emotional gestalts that make up part of
what Edelman calls “the remembered present” (cf.
Edelman 1989; see Barrett et al. 2007c; Barrett 2009b).
Our model proposes two additional operations that are
important to the psychological construction of emotion.
We hypothesize that emotion words that anchor emotion
categories work hand in hand with conceptualization
(Barrett 2006b; Barrett et al. 2007b). Emotion words are
essential to our model because we assume that the
instances of any emotion category (e.g., anger) that are
created from affective feelings don’t have strong statistical
regularities in the real world or firm natural category
boundaries (for a discussion of the empirical evidence,
see Barrett 2006a; 2009; Barrett et al. 2007a). In our
view, emotion categories are abstract categories that are
socially constructed (Barrett 2009a). As with all abstract
categories, in the absence of strong perceptual statistical
regularities within a category, humans use words as the
glue that holds the category together (Barsalou &
Weimer-Hastings 2005). In fact, even infants routinely
use the phonological form of words to make conceptual
inferences about novel objects that share little perceptual
Definitions
Natural kind approach. A theoretical framework for understanding the ontology of emotions. The natural
kinds approach assumes that emotion categories such as anger, sadness, fear, et cetera, map on to biological
categories that are given by the brain and body, and cannot be reduced to more basic psychological parts.
Locationist approach. Many national kind models of emotion conform to a locationist approach in which dis-
crete emotion categories (e.g., anger) are assumed to be consistently and specifically localized to discrete brain
locales or anatomical networks.
Psychological constructionist approach. A theoretical framework for understanding the ontology of
emotions. The psychological constructionist approach assumes that emotion categories such as anger, sadness,
fear, and so forth, are common sense categories whose instances emerge from the combination of more basic
psychological operations that are the common ingredients of all mental states.
Core affect. The mental representation of bodily sensations that are sometimes (but not always) experienced as
feelings of hedonic pleasure and displeasure with some degree of arousal. Core affect is what allows an organism to
know if something in the environment has motivational salience (i.e., is good for it, bad for it, approachable, or
avoidable). Barring organic abnormality, core affect is accompanied by somatovisceral, kinesthetic, proprioceptive,
and neurochemical fluctuations that take place within the core of body and feed back to be represented in the
brain.
Conceptualization. The process by which sensations from the body or external world are made meaningful in a
given context using representations of prior experience. Conceptualization occurs in a situated fashion (as in “situ-
ated conceptualization”; see Barsalou 2003), drawing on the representations of prior experience that are activated
by the present physical and psychological situation.
Executive attention. The process by which some representations are selectively enhanced and others are
suppressed. This is also known as “endogenous,” “controlled,” or “goal-based” attention and can be exerted
both volitionally and without the conscious experience of volition. Executive attention can shape the activity in
other processes such as core affect, conceptualization, or language use. In the case of emotion, executive attention
foregrounds certain core affective feelings and exteroceptive sensory sensations in a moment, and guides which
situated conceptualizations are brought to bear to make meaning of those sensations in the given context.
Emotion words. The set of words that ground the abstract categories that humans experience and communi-
cate about. In the case of abstract categories like emotions, words are “essence placeholders” that help cohere
feelings, behaviors, and facial expressions together as instances of a meaningful category.
Neural reference space. The set of neurons that are probabilistically involved in realizing a class of mental
events (such as anger, or even emotion).
Functional selectivity. This occurs when a set of neurons show a consistent increase in activation for one
mental state (e.g., anger, disgust, emotion) or basic psychological operation (e.g., categorization, core affect)
more so than for others in a given instant. The neurons are not specific to any mental state, although they
might be more frequently activated in some than in others. Functional selectivity might occur because a brain
region supports a more basic psychological operation that helps to construct a certain mental state (e.g., the amyg-
dala supports detection of salient exteroceptive sensations and is functionally selective for perceptions of fear).
A brain area might be functionally selective for one mental state or even one basic psychological operation in
one instance, and for another state or operation in another instance (e.g., ventromedial prefrontal cortex helps
to realize both core affect and conceptualization).
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similarity (Dewar & Xu 2009; Ferry et al. 2010; Xu 2002),
and we believe that adults do the same thing. Because
words are in part represented via situated simulations of
prior experiences (e.g., Simmons et al. 2008), we expect
emotion words to work together with conceptualization
when perceivers make meaning of core affective states.
Executive attention is the fourth operation that is particu-
lar to our psychological constructionist approach (Barrett
2009a; Barrett et al. 2004). Executive attention helps
direct the combination of other psychological operations
to produce an emotional gestalt. At any point in time, the
brain is processing information from the body (core
affect), information from outside the body (exteroceptive
sensory information), and representations of prior experi-
ences (conceptualizations). For instance, many different
representations of the past might become active to make
meaning of a core affective state. We hypothesize that
executive attention helps determine which representations
are utilized to make meaning of that state, and which are
suppressed (cf. Barrett 2009b; see Barrett et al. 2004, for
a discussion). Executive attention can also control which
exteroceptive sensory representations are favored for
additional processing, or if core affect is consciously rep-
resented in awareness. Importantly, executive attention
need not be volitional or effortful and can operate well
before subjective experience is generated (Barrett et al.
2004). We acknowledge that additional operations are prob-
ably important to the construction of emotion and will be
incorporated into our model as research accrues.
In the past, most researchers who found brain correlates
of emotion assumed that their results were consistent with a
locationist approach (e.g., the basic emotion approach)
because these were the only models to map psychological
states to a biological level of analysis in a way that was
linked to evolution. Constructionist hypotheses (which
were typically social, rather than psychological) were
restricted to the psychological level in a manner divorced
from evolution. But this is an accident of history. In fact,
there are very clear brain hypotheses that develop from a
psychological constructionist view (Barrett 2006b), and
our psychological constructionist approach is the first that
attempts tomap basic psychological operations to brain net-
works that comprise instances of a psychological category
such as emotion, or to the subordinate categories of
anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and happiness (see also
Barrett 2006a; 2006b; 2009a; 2009b; Barrett et al. 2007a;
2007c; Kober et al. 2008). Our hypothesized psychological
operations, as they currently stand, are associated with
assemblies of neurons within distributed networks (rather
than a one-to-one mapping of ingredient to network).
We hypothesize that these networks combine and constrain
one another like ingredients in a recipe, influencing and
shaping one another in real time according to the principles
of constraint satisfaction (Barrett et al. 2007d). With more
research, it will be possible to identify the distributed
brain networks that are associated with the most basic
psychological operations of the mind.
Together, the functional networks that instantiate basic
psychological operations during emotion experiences and
perceptions form the “neural reference space for discrete
emotion.” According to Gerald Edelman (1989), a “neural
reference space” is made up of the neurons that are prob-
abilistically involved in realizing a class of mental events
(such as anger, or even emotion).2 The functions of distinct
brain areas within the neural reference space are best
understood within the context of the other brain areas to
which they are connected (either anatomically or because
of the timing and coordination of neural activity) and in
terms of the basic psychological operations they are func-
tionally selective for in a given instance. Unlike a locationist
approach, which hypothesizes that a single brain region will
be consistently and specifically activated across instances of
a single emotion category, a psychological constructionist
approach hypothesizes that the same brain areas will be
consistently activated across the instances from a range of
emotion categories (and, although it is beyond the scope
of this article, even in non-emotional states), meaning that
that brain region is not specific to any emotion category
(or even to emotion per se). We focus on the brain
regions that we believe are hubs in the networks corre-
sponding to basic psychological operations and discuss
specific predictions in section 5, “Testing Hypotheses of
Brain–Emotion Correspondence” (also see Fig. 2).
4. Meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies on
emotion
In this article, we report a meta-analysis of neuroimaging
studies on emotion to assess whether the data are more
consistent with a locationist or a psychological construc-
tionist account of emotion. In our meta-analysis, strong
evidence for a locationist account would be found if
instances of an emotion category (e.g., fear) are consist-
ently and specifically associated with increased activity in
a brain region (or a set of regions within an anatomically
inspired network) across published neuroimaging
studies. Consistency refers to the fact that a brain region
shows increased activity for every instance of an emotion
category (e.g., the amygdala shows increased activity
each time a person experiences an instance of the category
fear). Specificity refers to the fact that a given brain region
is active for instances of one (and only one) emotion cat-
egory (e.g., the amygdala does not show increased activity
when a person is experiencing an instance of anger,
disgust, happiness, or sadness). Support for a psychologi-
cal constructionist view, in contrast, would be found if
the same brain region(s) were involved in realizing
instances of several emotion categories – and, further-
more, if the brain region(s) are more generally important
to realizing a basic psychological operation (e.g., core
affect, conceptualization, language, or executive atten-
tion). From this perspective, we would not expect
instances of any emotion category to be specifically
related to increased activation in any single brain region
or set of regions. A brain region might be functionally
selective for a given emotion category in a given instance,
however, because it helps realize a more basic operation
that contributes to the emergent state.
In 2005, we began our meta-analytic project to probe
the brain basis of emotion. We have since published one
chapter (Wager et al. 2008) and two papers (Barrett
et al. 2007c; Kober et al. 2008) reporting our findings for
the neuroimaging studies of discrete emotion and affect
that came out between 1990 and 2005. Supporting a
psychological constructionist approach to emotion, we
found that the neural reference space for emotion and
affect could be inductively parsed into six distributed
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functional groups of brain regions (i.e., regions consist-
ently co-activated across studies) using a series of multidi-
mensional scaling and cluster analyses (Kober et al. 2008)
(See Fig. 3). These functional groups can be mapped to
the hypothesized psychological operations that we
derived from behavioral data (e.g., Barrett 2006).
4.1. Analysis strategy
In the present article, we expanded upon our initial meta-
analytic efforts to directly compare the locationist versus
the psychological constructionist approach for neuroima-
ging studies of discrete emotion. A detailed description
of our meta-analytic methods and Figure S1 are included
in the supplementary materials (available at: http://
www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs2012008). In comparing
these hypotheses, we are comparing a hypothesis with
very specific empirical requirements (i.e., evidence for
consistency and specificity in brain–emotion correspon-
dence) to a hypothesis with more flexible empirical
requirements (i.e., evidence of multiple operations
across multiple categories). Given the popularity of
Figure 2. Psychological Constructionist Hypotheses of Brain–Emotion Correspondence. A: Lateral view. B: Sagital view at the midline.
C: Ventral view. D: Coronal view.
Brain regions hypothesized to be associated with psychological operations are depicted. In some cases, we present only the key brain
regions within networks that have been empirically linked to our hypothesized psychological operations. In instances where the whole
brain network is not depicted, we point readers to relevant literature.
Core Affect (pink): amygdala, insula, mOFC (Bas 10m, 11m, 13a, b, 14r, c), lOFC (BAs 47, 12, 13l, m, 11l), ACC (Bas, 32, 24, 25),
thalamus, hypothalamus, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, basal forebrain, PAG. Conceptualization (purple): VMPFC (Bas 11, 25,
32, 34), DMPFC (BAs 9, 10p), medial temporal lobe∗ (hippocampus, entorhinal cortex, parahippocampal cortex), posterior cingulate
cortex/retrosplenial area (BA 23, 31). Language (green): VLPFC (Bas 44, 45, 46), anterior temporal lobe (BA 38); for additional
regions, see Vigneau et al. (2006). Executive Attention (orange): DLPFC (BAs 9, 10, 46), VLPFC (BAs 44, 45, 46); for additional
regions see Corbetta & Shulman, (2002); Dosenbach et al. (2006); Wager et al. (2004). (∗this structure is not visible in this view of the
brain). A color version of this image can be viewed in the online version of this target article at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
Figure 3. Kober et al.’s (2008) Functional Clusters. Kober et al.’s (2008) six functional clusters are consistent with the ingredients
hypothesized by our psychological constructionist model. The brain areas making up the “core limbic group” and “lateral paralimbic
group” are part of the network that helps to constitute core affect. Aspects of the “medial posterior group” and “medial PFC group”
are part of the network involved with conceptualization. Areas in the “cognitive/motor control group” are consistent with the
networks supporting language and executive attention. In addition, an “occipital/visual group” was also identified as part of the
neural reference space for emotion. Visual cortex has connectivity with areas involved in core affect (e.g., amygdala, orbitofrontal
cortex; Amaral & Price 1984; Barrett & Bar 2009; Pessoa & Adolphs 2010), and there is growing evidence that a person’s core
affective state modulates activity in primary visual cortex (Damaraju et al. 2009). Core affect even shapes aspects of visual
perception ranging from contrast sensitivity (Phelps et al. 2006) to visual awareness (Anderson et al. 2011). A color version of this
image can be viewed in the online version of this target article at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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locationist models of emotion, we made analysis choices
that favored a clear and unbiased test of the locationist
approach, even though it disadvantaged us in testing the
full scope and power of the psychological constructionist
approach. After updating our database to include papers
from 2006 and 2007, we exclusively sampled studies that
focused on discrete emotion experiences or perceptions
to increase the likelihood that we would find consistent
and specific brain localizations corresponding to these cat-
egories, should they exist (see Tables S1 and S2 in
supplementary materials for details on the inclusion
criteria and database; available at: http://www.journals.
cambridge.org/bbs2012008). We also conducted a
number of statistical analyses with the potential to yield
evidence in favor of a locationist account (outlined in the
next section).
4.1.1. The neural reference space for discrete emotion.
We began by estimating the neural reference space for dis-
crete emotion. This space refers to the brain regions that
show a consistent increase in activation for the experience
or perception of instances of anger, sadness, fear, disgust,
and happiness. A brain region might appear in this space
because its activation consistently increases in studies of
one discrete emotion category but not others, some cat-
egories but not others, or all categories of emotion. Alter-
natively, a brain region could appear in this space even
when it does not consistently have increased activation
during any discrete emotion category per se, but because
it has consistent increases during instances of the entire
category emotion (e.g., the brain region shows consistent
increases in activation in some but not all studies of
anger experience, anger perception, fear experience, fear
perception, and so forth, so that the region is consistently
activated across the category emotion, but is not specific to
any discrete emotion category). Our derived neural refer-
ence space for discrete emotion (Fig. 4; see also Table S3
in supplementary materials, available at: http://www.
journals.cambridge.org/bbs2012008) closely resembles
the one reported in Kober et al. (2008), even when limiting
our analysis to studies of discrete emotion and including
papers from 2006–2007. Next, we examined whether
any emotion categories were more likely to be associated
with increased activity in certain brain areas than in others.
4.1.2. Density analyses. Within the neural reference
space, we first searched over the brain for voxels with
more consistent activation (within 10 mm) for instances
of one emotion category than for all others (e.g., for
voxels that reached family-wise error-rate corrected sig-
nificance in the comparison [ fear perception vs. percep-
tion of other categories]). This analysis yielded a series
of statistical maps reflecting whether each voxel was
more frequently activated in studies of each emotion cat-
egory versus the average of the others, accounting for
the different numbers of studies in different categories
and the base-rate of background activation across the
brain for each emotion category. These analyses are stan-
dard for neuroimaging meta-analysis (see Wager et al.
2007) and are described in detail in the supplementary
materials. The density analyses speak to whether increases
in a brain region are consistently associated with the
experience or perception of instances of an emotion cat-
egory. This provides one kind of information about the
consistency and specificity of brain activity for particular
emotion categories by considering the activity in each
Figure 4. The Neural Reference Space for Discrete Emotion. The neural reference space (phrase coined by Edelman [1989]) is the
set of brain regions consistently activated across all studies assessing the experience or perception of anger, disgust, fear, happiness and
sadness (i.e. the superordinate category emotion). Brain regions in yellow exceeded the height threshold (p , 05) and regions in
orange exceeded the most stringent extent-based threshold (p , 001). Regions in pink and magenta correspond to lesser extent-
based thresholds and are not discussed in this article. Cortex is grey, the brainstem and nucleus accumbens are green, the amygdala
is blue and the cerebellum is purple. A color version of this image can be viewed in the online version of this target article at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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region, for each emotion type, relative to background acti-
vation levels across the brain.
4.1.3. x2 analyses.We next probed the voxels identified in
the density analysis further by asking whether there was
any absolute difference in the proportion of contrasts acti-
vating near those voxels (within 10 mm) for each emotion
category versus the others. This was accomplished using x2
analyses on the contingency table consisting of counts of
study contrasts showing activation in or around these
voxels compared to study contrasts without such acti-
vations for the target emotion category versus other cat-
egories. This analysis yielded a series of statistical maps
reflecting whether each voxel was more frequently acti-
vated in studies of each emotion category versus the
average of the others, irrespective of activations elsewhere
in the brain.
Both density and x2analyses speak to whether increased
activations in a set of voxels that are consistently associated
with the experience or perception of instances of an
emotion category are also functionally selective3 for that
emotion category. A region that is functionally selective
for instances of an emotion category would show voxels
that are significant in both the density analysis and x2
analysis. Functional specificity exists if voxels activated
selectively for instances of one emotion category also
never show increased activity during instances of any
other emotion categories. We did not find evidence for
functional specificity with respect to any emotion category
in our analyses (i.e., every region that was activated for one
emotion category was activated for at least one other cat-
egory). Therefore, our findings only speak to functional
selectivity.
4.1.3. Logistic regressions. Finally, in a third set of
analyses we used a series of stepwise logistic regressions
to ask which emotion categories and experimental
methods predicted increased activity in regions of inter-
est. We present the odds ratios for these regressions
(in Table S6 in the supplementary materials, available at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs2012008) or the
percent increase in odds that a variable predicted either
increased activity in a brain area or no increase in a
brain area (in Fig. 5).4 The logistic regressions speak to
both consistency and specificity of increased brain acti-
vation. Consistency is observed when any variable signifi-
cantly predicted increased activity in a given brain area.
Specificity is observed when one variable significantly
predicted increased activity in a given brain area but all
others significantly predicted no increase in activity. If
a variable was not a significant predictor, then it is
sometimes associated with increased activity, and is some-
times not.
5. Testing hypotheses of brain–emotion
correspondence
5.1. The amygdala
According to a locationist hypothesis, the amygdala (Fig. 1,
yellow) is either the brain locus of fear or is the most
important hub in a fear circuit. This amygdala-fear hypoth-
esis was most clearly popularized by behavioral neuro-
science work showing that the amygdala (in particular,
the central nucleus) supports the cardiovascular changes
that occur when rats freeze or startle in response to
tones previously paired with shock (called “fear learning”:
Figure 5. Logistic Regression Findings. Selected results from the logistic regressions are presented (for additional findings, see Table S6
in supplementary materials). Circles with positive values represent a 100% increase in the odds that a variable predicted an increase in
activity in that brain area. Circles with negative values represent a 100% increase in the odds that a variable predicted there would not
be an increase in activity in that brain area. Legend: Blue lines: left hemisphere; Green lines: right hemisphere. Arrowheads: % change
in odds is greater than values represented in this figure. Abbreviations: OFC: orbitofrontal cortex; DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex; ATL: anterior temporal lobe; VLPFC: ventrolateral prefrontal cortex; DMPFC: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; aMCC: anterior
mid-cingulate cortex; sAAC: subgenual ACC. A color version of this image can be viewed in the online version of this target article at
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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LeDoux et al. 1983; 1985; 1990; for reviews see Fanselow
& Poulous 2005; Fendt & Fanselow 1999; LeDoux 2007;
O¨hman 2009; and “fear potentiated startle”: Davis 1992;
Hitchcock & Davis 1986; 1987; see Davis et al. 2008;
Fendt & Fanselow 1999). Electrical stimulation of the
amygdala elicits defensive behavior in rats (e.g., retreat;
Maskati & Zbrozyna 1989) and enhances startle to acoustic
stimuli (Rosen & Davis 1988). The amygdala-fear hypoth-
esis was further strengthened by evidence that humans
show increased amygdala activity to neutral tones that
have been previously paired with noxious noise blasts
(i.e., “fear learning”; LaBar et al. 1998). Individuals with
amygdala lesions (LaBar et al. 1995) or atrophy (Bechara
et al. 1995) show impaired skin conductance responses
during “fear learning” and have difficulty perceiving
instances of fear in voices (Brierley et al. 2004; Scott
et al. 1997, but see, Adolphs & Tranel 1999; Anderson &
Phelps 1998), bodies (Sprengelmeyer et al. 1999; but
see, Atkinson et al. 2007), and startled faces with wide
eyes (e.g., Adolphs et al. 1994; 1995; 1999; although see,
Adolphs et al. 2005; Tsuchiya et al. 2009). An individual
with bilateral amygdala lesions failed to report fearful
experiences when placed in close contact with snakes,
spiders, or when startled (Feinstein et al. 2011; although
see, Anderson & Phelps 2002). Finally, the amygdala is
implicated in psychopathology involving the experience
of anxiety in humans (for a review, see Damsa et al.
2009; for a meta-analytic review, see Etkin &Wager 2007).
According to a psychological constructionist view, the
amygdala is part of the distributed network that helps to
realize core affect (Fig. 2, panel D, bright pink) because
it is involved in signaling whether exteroceptive sensory
information is motivationally salient (for similar views
see Adolphs 2008; 2009; Duncan & Barrett 2007; Pessoa
2010b; Pessoa & Adolphs 2010; Sander et al. 2003;
Whalen 2007; Whalen 1998). The amygdala is most
likely to be active when the rest of the brain cannot
easily predict what sensations mean, what to do about
them, or what value they hold in that context. Salient
objects or events influence an organism’s body state in a
way that can be experienced as core affective feelings
(Barrett & Bliss-Moreau 2009). They can also cause the
amygdala to signal to other parts of the brain to sustain
processing so that uncertainty about the stimulus can be
resolved (Whalen 2007). As a result, affect can be con-
sidered a source of attention in the brain (Barrett & Bar
2009; Duncan & Barrett 2007; Pessoa 2008; 2010b; Vuil-
leumier 2005; Vuilleumier & Driver 2007).
From a psychological constructionist point of view, fear-
inducing stimuli might fall into the class of uncertain and
therefore salient stimuli, but the amygdala is not specific
to the category fear. Consistent with this view, the amyg-
dala is routinely implicated in orienting responses to moti-
vationally relevant stimuli (Holland & Gallagher 1999).
Novel stimuli (e.g., Blackford et al. 2010; Breiter et al.
1996; Moriguchi et al. 2010; Schwartz et al. 2003; Weierich
et al. 2010; Wilson & Rolls 1993; Wright et al. 2003; 2006;
2008), uncertain stimuli (e.g., Herry et al. 2007), and
unusual stimuli (e.g., Blackford et al. 2010) robustly acti-
vate the amygdala and produce cardiovascular responses
associated with affective changes (Mendes et al. 2007).
Amygdala lesions disrupt normal responses to novelty
and uncertainty in mammals (e.g. Bliss-Moreau et al.
2010; Burns et al. 1996; Mason et al. 2006; Missilin &
Ropartz 1981; Nachman & Ashe 1974; for reviews, see
Knight & Grabowecky 1999; Petrides 2007). Individuals
with amygdala lesions do not automatically allocate atten-
tion to aversive stimuli (Anderson & Phelps 2001) and
socially relevant stimuli (Kennedy & Adolphs 2010), as
do individuals with intact amygdalae. Amygdala responses
habituate rapidly (Breiter et al. 1996; Bu¨chel et al. 1999;
Fischer et al. 2003; Whalen et al. 2004; Wright et al.
2001), suggesting that the amygdala is involved in attention
to salient stimuli, but calling into question the idea that the
amygdala is necessary to fear per se (for a similar point, see
Adolphs 2008; 2010; Pessoa & Adolphs 2010; Todd &
Anderson 2009; Whalen 2007).5
The amygdala’s role in detecting motivationally salient
stimuli would also explain why increased amygdala activity
is observed in instances that do not involve the experience
of fear, such as when stimuli are experienced as subjec-
tively arousing (e.g., Bradley et al. 2001; Weierich et al.
2010), intense (e.g., Bach et al. 2008), emotionally
“impactful” (e.g., Ewbank et al. 2009), or valuable
(Jenison et al. 2011). Moreover, not all instances of fear
are accompanied by increased amygdala activity (for a
review, see Suvak & Barrett 2011). For example, some
behaviors that rats perform in dangerous contexts are
not amygdala-dependent (e.g., avoiding the location of a
threat: Vazdarjanova & McGaugh 1998; “defensive tread-
ing,” where bedding is kicked in the direction of the
threat: Kopchia et al. 1992). In humans, threatening con-
texts devoid of salient visual stimuli (e.g., preparing to
give a speech in front of an audience), actually produce
deactivatations in the amygdala (Wager et al. 2009a;
2009b). Moreover, electrical stimulation to the amygdala
produces a range of experiences in humans, calling into
question the idea that the amygdala is specifically linked
to instances of fear (Bancaud et al. 1994; Gloor 1990;
Halgren et al. 1978).
Ourmeta-analytic findings were inconsistent with a loca-
tionist hypothesis of amygdala function but weremore con-
sistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis.
Our density analyses revealed that, as compared to other
brain regions, voxels within both amygdalae had more con-
sistent increases in activation during instances of fear per-
ception than during the perception of any other emotion
category (Table 1). These voxels were not functionally
specific for instances of perceiving fear, however. An insig-
nificant x2 analysis revealed that the voxels with consistent
increases in activation during instances of fear perception
were equally likely to have increased activity during
instances of other emotion categories (see Fig. 6 for the
proportion of study contrasts in the database for each
emotion category that are associated with increased activity
in right [R] amygdala; see Fig. S2 in the supplementary
material, available at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/
bbs2012008, for left [L] amygdala). Furthermore,
instances of fear experience did not show a consistent
increase in activation in either amygdala when compared
to what would be expected by chance in other regions of
the brain. Yet, as compared to other brain regions, voxels
within bilateral amygdala had more consistent increases
in activation during instances of disgust experience than
during the experience of other emotion categories
(Table 1). A x2 analysis revealed that these voxels were
functionally selective for of the experience of disgust, as
there was more likely to be increased activity in those
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Table 1. Brain Regions with a Consistent Increase in Activity Associated with the Experience or Perception of Discrete Emotion
Categories in Density Analyses
Coordinates (MNI)
Volume
(voxels)Region BA Threshold Contrast x y z
Amygdala-Fear Hypothesis
L. Amygdala Height Disgust experience 232 22 220 2
220 24 222 124
Fear perception 230 22 224 1
224 22 212 360
Sad perception 230 24 220 1
R. Amygdala Height Disgust experience 26 0 222 121
Fear perception 24 24 212 250
Insula-Disgust Hypothesis
L. a. insula Height Anger experience 242 22 22 2
Extent Disgust perception 226 22 212 252
R. a. insula/R. lOFC Height Disgust perception 38 20 4 37
OFC-Anger Hypothesis
L. lOFC 11 Height Disgust experience 230 36 218 167
ACC-Sadness Hypothesis
aMCC 24 Extent Fear perception 22 16 22 196
Conceptualization
L. dorsal entorhinal 34 Height Disgust experience 216 2 216 1
218 0 214 1
Height Sad experience 224 2 212 19
L. hippocampus Height Sad perception 228 210 220 1
R. dorsal entorhinal 34 Height Anger perception 18 212 216 27
Height Fear perception 14 26 212 1
DMPFC 9 Extent Happy experience 22 44 20 324
Height Sad experience 2 50 38 1
Executive control
R. VLPFC 44 Height Disgust perception 46 18 10 71
L. VLPFC 9 Height Anger perception 252 12 24 27
R. DLPFC 9 Height Anger perception 54 22 28 130
Exteroceptive Sensory Processing
R. parastriate 18 Height Anger perception 52 276 22 2
48 276 0 1
42 286 2 3
Height Fear experience 8 296 4 10
L. peristriate 19 Extent Anger perception 248 280 28 197
L. occipitotemporal 37 Height Disgust experience 244 258 212 7
Extent Anger perception 244 254 220 232
250 262 6 254
R. occipitotemporal 37 Height Anger perception 44 256 224 1
40 256 220 1
40 254 214 7
L. middle temporal 21 Height Fear experience 252 270 8 72
Extent Sad perception 266 248 8 323
R. middle temporal 21 Sad experience 52 210 216 2
Uncus Height Fear perception 230 4 222 5
Other
R. SMA 6 Height Anger perception 44 22 56 1
R. putamen Height Sad experience 26 4 24 1
28 8 22 3
22 4 22 1
PAG Height Sad experience 0 238 210 1
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voxels during instances of disgust experience than during
the experience of anger, fear, happiness or sadness
(Table 2). Those voxels were not functionally specific to
instances of disgust experience, however (Fig. 6; Fig. S2).
Finally, as compared to other brain regions, a voxel in
L. amygdala had more consistent increases in activation
during instances of sadness perception than during the per-
ception of other emotion categories (Table 1). An insignif-
icant x2 analysis revealed that this voxel was not
functionally selective for instances of sadness, however.
Our logistic regressions confirmed and expanded upon
our density and x2 findings. There was more likely to be
increased activity in the L. amygdala when participants
were perceiving instances of fear or experiencing instances
of disgust than when perceiving or experiencing any other
emotion categories (Fig. 5; Table S6). These findings are
consistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis
that the amygdala responds to salient perceptual stimuli
because contrasts in our database that assessed the percep-
tion of fear and experience of disgust tended to use visual
stimuli that are novel or unfamiliar to participants.6 Findings
for the R. amygdala also supported a psychological construc-
tionist view. Increases in activity in the R. amygdala were
likely when participants were experiencing or perceiving
instances of any highly arousing emotion category (i.e.,
anger, disgust, fear) (Fig. 5; Table S6). There was likely to
be no increase in activity in the L. amygdala when partici-
pants were focusing on their internal state (i.e., when
emotion experience was induced via recall of a personal
event and mental imagery; Fig. 5; Table S6). This finding
replicates prior meta-analytic evidence (Costafreda et al.
2008) and is consistent with our hypothesis that the amyg-
dala responds preferentially to salient exteroceptive
(vs. interoceptive) sensations.
5.2. The anterior insula
Locationist accounts hypothesize that the anterior insula
(Fig. 1, green) is the brain basis of disgust (e.g., Jabbi
et al. 2008; Wicker et al. 2003; for reviews, see
Calder et al. 2001; Calder 2003) based on the belief that
disgust evolved from a primitive food rejection reflex
(Rozin et al. 2000) or bodily aversion to disease-threat
(e.g., Curtis et al. 2004). Individuals with damage to the
anterior insula and basal ganglia have difficulty perceiving
instances of disgust in facial and vocal caricatures (Adolphs
et al. 2003; Calder et al. 2000). They also report experien-
cing less disgust in response to scenarios about body pro-
ducts, envelope violation, and animals that typically evoke
disgust in people with intact insulas (Calder et al. 2000).
Individuals with neurodegenerative diseases affecting the
insula and basal ganglia (such as Huntington’s and Parkin-
son’s disease) also show diminished experiences of disgust
to foul smelling odors (Mitchell et al. 2005) and have diffi-
culty perceiving instances of disgust in the faces of others
(e.g., Kipps et al. 2007; Sprenglemeyer et al. 1996; 1998;
Suzuki et al. 2006; see Calder et al. 2001; Sprengelmeyer
2007, for reviews), although the specificity of these findings
remains in question (e.g., Calder et al. 2010; Milders et al.
2003). Patients who received electrical stimulation to the
anterior insula reported visceral sensations consistent
with (but not specific to) the experience of disgust (e.g.,
Figure 6. Proportion of Study Contrasts with Increased Activation in Four Key Brain Areas. The y-axes plot the proportion of study
contrasts in our database that had increased activation within 10 mm of that brain area. The x-axes denote the contrast type separated by
experience (exp) and perception (per). All brain regions depicted are in the right hemisphere. See Figures S2 and S3 in supplementary
materials, available at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs2012008, for additional regions. A color version of this image can be
viewed in the online version of this target article at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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sensations in the stomach or throat, smelling or tasting
something bad, nausea; Penfield & Faulk 1955).
In a psychological constructionist hypothesis, the
anterior insula plays a key role in representing core affec-
tive feelings in awareness (Fig. 2, panel D, dark pink).
The anterior insula is thought to be involved in the aware-
ness of bodily sensations (Craig 2002) and affective feel-
ings (Craig 2009). Sometimes sensations from the body
are experienced as physical symptoms, but more often
they are experienced as states that have some hedonic
tone and level of arousal. Sometimes those affective
feelings are experienced as emotion. To the extent that
brain states corresponding to instances of disgust rep-
resent a stimulus’s consequence for the body, then the
anterior insula will show increased activation. Indeed, a
key ingredient in the mental states labeled “disgust” is
likely a representation of how an object will affect the
viscera. In support of a psychological constructionist
view, anterior insula activation is observed in a number
of tasks that involve awareness of body states, but not
disgust per se. The anterior insula shows increased acti-
vation during awareness of body movement (e.g., Tsakiris
Table 2. Brain Regions with a Consistent Increase in Activity Associated with the Experience or Perception of Discrete Emotion
Categories in x2 Analyses
Coordinates (MNI)
Volume
(voxels)Region BA Contrast x y z
Amygdala-Fear Hypothesis
L. Amygdala Disgust experience 220 26 224 50
232 22 220 2
R. Amygdala Disgust experience 26 2 220 59
Insula-Disgust
Hypothesis
L. a. insula Anger experience 244 20 22 1
R. a. insula Disgust perception 42 14 4 4
34 20 6 3
36 18 2 1
OFC-Anger Hypothesis
L. lOFC 11 Disgust experience 230 36 218 167
R. lOFC 47 Disgust perception 38 22 0 8
Other regions in the neural reference space
Conceptualization
L. entorhinal cortex 34 Disgust experience 226 26 220 1
Sad experience 224 2 212 10
R. entorhinal cortex 34 Anger perception 16 210 216 23
DMPFC 9 Sad experience 2 50 38 1
Executive attention
L. VLPFC 9 Anger perception 252 14 24 27
R. VLPFC 44 Disgust perception 46 20 10 66
R. DLPFC 9 Anger perception 54 22 28 130
Exteroceptive Sensory
Processing
R. parastriate 18 Anger perception 52 276 22 2
48 276 0 1
42 286 2 3
Fear experience 8 296 4 10
L. occipitotemporal 37 Disgust experience 246 258 214 1
242 258 210 1
R. occipitotemporal 37 Fear experience 48 272 2 127
Anger perception 44 256 224 1
38 252 214 6
L. middle temporal 21 Fear experience 252 270 8 72
R. middle temporal 21 Sad experience 52 210 216 2
Other
R. SMA 6 Anger perception 44 22 56 1
R. putamen Sad experience 26 4 24 1
28 8 22 3
22 4 22 1
PAG Sad experience 0 238 210 1
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et al. 2007), gastric distention (e.g., Wang et al. 2008), and
orgasm (e.g., Ortigue et al. 2007). Electrical stimulation of
the insula produces sensations consistent with the category
disgust, but it also produces a range of other visceral sen-
sations including feelings of movement, twitching, warmth
and tingling in the lips, tongue, teeth, arms, hands, and
fingers (Penfield & Falk 1955). Dorsal anterior insula is
also a hub in a large-scale network involved in what has
been called a ventral attention system (Corbetta &
Shulman 2002, Corbetta et al. 2008) that guides attention
allocation and orienting (e.g., Eckert et al. 2009). These
findings again point to the idea that body-based sensory
signals constitute a source of attention in the brain.
Ourmeta-analytic findingswere inconsistentwith the loca-
tionist account that the anterior insula is the brain seat of
disgust but were more consistent with the psychological con-
structionist account that insula activity is correlated with
interoception and the awareness of affective feelings. Our
density analyses revealed that as compared to other brain
regions, voxels within the right [R.] anterior insula had
more consistent increases in activation during instances of
disgust perception than during the perception of any other
emotion category (Table 1). Our x2 analysis revealed that
only four of the voxels identified in the density analysis
showed functional selectivity for instances of disgust percep-
tion (Table 2), however, and increased activity inR. insulawas
not specific to instances of disgust perception (Fig. 6). Our
logistic regressionfindings for theR. anterior insulawere con-
sistent with the psychological constructionist hypothesis that
the insula supports representation of core affective feelings.
Increased activity inR. anterior insulawas likelywhenpartici-
pants were explicitly evaluating their feelings and represent-
ing them in awareness (Fig. 5, Table S6). Instances of disgust
perception might consistently involve increased activation in
the insula because people are more likely to simulate visceral
states (such as those associated with the gut and food rejec-
tion) when perceiving facial behaviors characterized by a
wrinkled nose and curled lip (i.e., oral revulsion; Angyal
1941; see also, Rozin et al. 2008; von demHagen et al. 2009).
As compared to other brain regions, a greater spatial
extent of voxels within the left [L.] anterior insula had con-
sistent increases in activation during instances of disgust
experience than during the experience of any other
emotion category (Table 1). As compared to other brain
regions, two voxels in L. anterior insula also had more con-
sistent increases in activation during instances of anger
experience than during the experience of any other
emotion (Table 1; only one voxel showed functional selec-
tivity, see Table 2). Our logistic regressions replicated this
general finding. Increased activity in L. anterior insula was
more likely when participants were experiencing an
instance of anger than when they were experiencing any
other emotion category (Fig. 5; Table S6). These findings,
along with subsequent findings (see sect. 5.3 for the orbi-
tofrontal cortex, sect. 5.6 for the anterior temporal lobe
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and 5.7 for the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex) suggest that instances of anger
are associated with increased activity in a broad set of
areas in the left frontal and temporal lobes.
5.3. The orbitofrontal cortex
Locationist accounts link the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) to
anger (Fig. 1, rust), although the OFC is a large structure
and has admittedly been linked to many other psychologi-
cal phenomena. Primary support for the OFC-anger
hypothesis derives from prior meta-analytic reviews of
the neuroimaging literature (Murphy et al. 2003; Vytal &
Hamann 2010). Studies using electroencephalography
(EEG) also associate instances of anger with the prefrontal
cortex (PFC).7 Using EEG, activity in the left PFC is
associated with instances of anger experience in response
to an insult (Harmon-Jones & Sigelman 2001) and with
the personality disposition to experience angry feelings
(Harmon-Jones & Allen 1998). Other evidence for an
OFC-anger hypothesis is more circumstantial. For
instance, there is a body of evidence linking the OFC to
aggression. It is far from clear that aggression is an unam-
biguous index of the entire category of anger, however.
Nonhuman animals aggress in a number of different con-
texts (e.g., maternal aggression, sexual aggression, preda-
tory aggression, defensive aggression; Moyer 1968); only
some of which are associated with the concept called
“anger” in English. Humans do a number of things in
anger, only some of which constitute aggression. With
that caveat, there is certainly evidence linking increased
activity in the OFC to aggression. EEG activity in the
left PFC is associated with an increased tendency to retali-
ate towards another person following an insult (by allocat-
ing him or her a dose of unpleasant hot sauce in a putative
taste test; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman 2001). Aggressive
behavior in rats is associated with increased activity in
the ventral forebrain (including the OFC) (Ferris et al.
2008). Some lesion evidence is consistent with the idea
that the OFC produces aggression in monkeys, because
OFC lesions reduce aggression (towards humans: Butter
& Snyder 1972; Kamback 1973; towards other monkeys:
Raleigh et al. 1979). The majority of lesion studies find
that monkeys (e.g., Deets et al. 1970; Machado & Bache-
valier 2006; Raleigh et al. 1979) and rats (de Bruin et al.
1983) are more aggressive towards conspecifics following
OFC lesions, however. Similarly, electrical stimulation of
the lateral OFC (lOFC; in cats: Siegel et al. 1975) and
the medial OFC (mOFC; in cats: Siegel et al. 1974; and
in rats: de Bruin 1990) inhibits, rather than causes, aggres-
sive behavior. Humans with lesions in the ventromedial
PFC (which contains the OFC) become frustrated more
easily and engage in more verbal (but not physical) aggres-
sion than do neurologically intact subjects (Grafman et al.
1996). Psychopathy and antisocial disorder are marked by
increased aggression and correspond to structural (e.g.,
Raine et al. 2000) and functional (e.g., Glenn et al. 2009;
Harenski et al. 2009) changes to the mOFC (Yang &
Raine 2009). Fewer studies have linked the lOFC to
aggressive behavior in humans, but one study found that
individuals with borderline personality disorder who
have lowered baseline lOFC (BA 47) activity are more
likely to aggress against others (Goyer et al. 1994).
A psychological constructionist view hypothesizes that
portions of the OFC play a role in core affect as a site
that integrates exteroceptive and interoceptive sensory
information to guide behavior. Together, sensory infor-
mation from the world and sensory information from the
body guide an organism’s response to the environment
and allow it to engage in behavior that is well tuned to
the context (defined both by the external surroundings
and the organism’s goals). With the lOFC’s connections
to sensory modalities (e.g., Barbas 1988; Rolls 1999, see
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Kringelbach & Rolls 2004) and the mOFC’s connections to
areas involved in visceral control (e.g., Carmichael & Price
1995; Eblen & Graybiel 1995; Ongu¨r & Price 1998; 2000;
Rempel-Clower & Barbas 1998; see Kringelbach & Rolls
[2004] for a review), the OFC is anatomically well suited
to perform this role. We are not claiming that this is the
OFC’s specific function, but only that it is a brain region
that is important to realizing this function. Consistent
with the idea that the OFC unites internal and external
sensory information, the lOFC and the mOFC have been
linked to associative learning (Rolls et al. 1994; 1996)
decision making (e.g., Bechara et al. 1996; 2000; Koenigs
et al. 2007) and reversal learning, in which the reward
values associated with choice options are reversed and
animals must learn the current reward value (Chudasama
& Robbins 2003; Hornak et al. 2004; Rudebeck & Murray
2008). The inability to properly integrate exteroceptive
and interoceptive information will result in behavior that
is inappropriate to that context, explaining the altered
non-aggressive social behavior (e.g., Beer et al. 2003; Eslin-
ger & Damasio 1985; Saver & Damasio 1991; see Damasio
et al. 1990) and aggression (Grafman et al. 1996) observed
in individuals with OFC damage.
Our meta-analytic findings were inconsistent with the
locationist hypothesis that the OFC is the brain seat of
anger. As compared to voxels within other brain regions,
voxels within the OFC did not have more consistent
increases during instances of anger experience or percep-
tion than during any other emotion category. Rather, as
compared to voxels within other brain regions, voxels
within the left lOFC had more consistent increases in acti-
vation during instances of disgust experience than during
the experience of other emotion categories (Table 1).
Voxels within the right lOFC, as compared to voxels
within other brain regions, had more consistent increases
in activation during instances of disgust perception than
during the perception of other emotion categories
(Table 1). x2 analyses indicated that there was some func-
tional selectivity for instances of disgust experience and
perception in the voxels in the right and left lOFC that
were respectively identified in the density analysis. Activity
in the right and left lOFC was not specific to instances of
disgust experience or perception, however (Fig. 6;
Fig. S2). Our logistic regressions confirmed that when par-
ticipants were perceiving an instance of disgust, there was
more likely to be increased activity in the right lOFC than
when participants were perceiving instances of any other
emotion category (Fig. 5; Table S6).
Our logistic regressions revealed that increased activity
in the left lOFC was more likely when participants were
experiencing instances of anger than when experiencing
instances of any other emotion category (Fig. 5;
Table S6). Although in and of itself, this finding provides
partial support for the OFC-anger hypothesis, our other
meta-analytic findings indicate that increased activity in
the left hemisphere during instances of anger is not
restricted to the OFC, or even the prefrontal cortex (see
sect. 5.2, “The anterior insula,” sect. 5.6, “Anterior tem-
poral lobe and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex,” and sect.
5.7, “Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex”). Additionally, our
logistic regressions revealed that increased activity in the
left and right lOFC was likely when participants were
experiencing a range of exteroceptive (auditory stimuli,
visual pictures) and interoceptive (experience or
perception of high-arousal core affect) sensations (Fig. 5;
Table S6). This finding is consistent with the psychological
constructionist hypothesis that OFC plays a more general
role in integrating heteromodal sensations.
5.4. The anterior cingulate cortex
Locationist accounts hypothesize that pregenual anterior
cingulate cortex (pACC; BAs 24, 32) and subgenual
anterior cingulate cortex (sACC; BA 25) are the brain
basis of sadness (Fig. 1, blue). The pACC and sACC
have known affective function and are thought to instanti-
ate the visceromotor responses observed during classical
conditioning, pain, and affective behaviors (Devinksy
et al. 1995; Vogt 2005). The ACC-sadness hypothesis,
like the OFC-anger hypothesis, derives support from
prior meta-analyses of the neuroimaging literature (e.g.,
Murphy et al. 2003; Phan et al. 2002). In the behavioral
neuroscience literature, pACC has been linked to
sadness because of its role in producing the vocalizations
that infant animals make when separated from their
mother (e.g., MacLean & Newman 1988; see Panksepp
1998; 2007); the link between infant vocalizations and
unpleasant affect are in question, however (Blumberg &
Sokoloff 2001). One study in humans found that pACC
lesions (including lesions to dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex) produce hypersensitivity and an increased ten-
dency to cry at sad events (Hornak et al. 2003). If the
pACC were involved in instantiating instances of
sadness, then lesions to this structure should abolish the
tendency to cry at sad events. These findings are therefore
more consistent with the idea that pACC regulates
instances of sadness. Finally, pACC is implicated in pain,
perhaps because it supports the feeling of “suffering” (cf.
Vogt 2005). The sACC, on the other hand, has been
linked to sadness because of its role in depression. Clinical
depression is marked by structural and functional changes
in sACC (see Gotlib & Hamilton [2008] for a review),
although clinical depression involves many symptoms
above and beyond the experience of sadness (Coyne
1994). Electrical stimulation of the sACC relieves intract-
able depression by reducing feelings of apathy and anhe-
donia, normalizing sleep disturbances, and decreasing
gross motor impairments (e.g., Mayberg et al. 2005).
Our psychological constructionist hypothesis draws on
the neuroscience literature showing that pACC, sACC,
and the more dorsal anterior midcingulate cortex
(aMCC) (Vogt 1993; Vogt et al. 2003) take part in distinct
psychological operations related to realizing core affect. In
our view, the pACC and sACC (along with the adjacent
posterior mOFC) are cortical sites for visceral regulation
that help to realize a core affective state during motivated
action (Devinksy et al. 1995) (Fig. 2, panel B, light pinks).
We would therefore predict increased activation in pACC
and sACC across a variety of emotional instances. The
hypothesized role of sACC in regulating somatovisceral
states could explain why sACC is involved in the affective
changes that accompany both depression (e.g., Drevets
et al. 1992; see Gotlib & Hamilton 2008) and mania
(e.g., Fountoulakis et al. 2008), and why electrical stimu-
lation of this region helps to relieve chronic depression
(Mayberg, et al. 2005). The aMCC (Fig. 2, panel B,
dusty pink) is hypothesized to play a role in executive
attention and motor engagement during response
Lindquist et al.: The brain basis of emotion
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 35:3 135
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11001531
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:25:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
selection (Mansouri et al. 2009; Rushworth et al. 2007). In
this view, aMCC delivers sources of exteroceptive sensory
information (from thalamic projections; Barbas et al. 1991)
and internal sensory information (from the insula;
Mesulam & Mufson 1982) to direct attention and motor
responses (via projections to lateral PFC and the sup-
plementary motor area; e.g., Barbas & Pandya 1989; for
reviews, see Devinsky et al. 1995; Paus 2001). These ana-
tomical connections can explain why the aMCC is part of
an intrinsic brain network that shows increased activity
when stimuli in the environment are personally salient
(Seeley et al. 2007). They also explain why the aMCC is
responsible for resolving action selection during situations
involving conflicting sensory information (e.g., Grinband
et al. 2011; Milham et al. 2001; Nelson et al. 2003; see
Banich 2009; Shackman et al. 2011; van Snellenberg &
Wager 2009). By extension, as a visceromotor (i.e., auto-
nomic) control area sACC/pACC might be involved in
resolving which sensory inputs influence the body when
there are multiple sources of sensory input that can influ-
ence an organism’s body state.
Our meta-analytic evidence is inconsistent with the
locationist account that the ACC is the brain basis of
sadness, but more consistent with a psychological con-
structionist hypothesis of ACC function. As compared to
voxels within other brain regions, voxels within the
sACC, pACC and aMCC did not have more consistent
increases when participants were experiencing or perceiv-
ing instances of sadness than during any other emotion cat-
egory (Fig. 6). As compared to voxels within other brain
regions, a greater spatial extent of voxels within the
aMCC had consistent increases in activation during
instances of fear perception than the perception of any
other emotion category (Table 1). The amygdala, which
responds to motivationally salient exteroceptive sensory
stimuli (see sect. 5.1 “The amygdala”), projects to this
area of aMCC (Vogt & Pandya 1987), so it is possible
that increased activity here reflects response preparation
to salient stimuli in the environment.
Our logistic regressions revealed that increases in sACC
were likely when participants were engaged in cognitive
load (Fig. 5; Table S6). Cognitive load typically occurred
in studies where participants were asked to attend to
core affective feelings (e.g., focus on their feelings, rate
their feelings) or affective stimuli (e.g., focus on an affec-
tive stimulus, rate a stimulus’ emotional value) and so it
is possible that this finding is indicative of the sACC’s
role in instantiating core affective feelings. Increased
activity in the sACC was marginally (p , 0.09) likely
when participants were evaluating their feelings, again
consistent with this area’s role as a visceromotor regulation
site. Finally, consistent with a response selection hypoth-
esis of aMCC function, increased activity in the aMCC
was likely when participants were engaged in cognitive
load (Fig. 5; Table S6).
5.5. Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, medial temporal
lobe, and retrosplenial cortex/posterior cingulate
cortex
Our psychological constructionist approach hypothesizes
that a range of other brain regions are important to realiz-
ing instances of emotion experience and perception,
including dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC),
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), medial
temporal lobe (MTL), and retrosplenial cortex/posterior
cingulate cortex (PCC) (Fig. 2, panel B, purples), which
are associated with the psychological operation of concep-
tualization. As part of the process of making meaning out
of sensory cues, we hypothesize that these brain areas
use stored representations of prior experiences to make
meaning of core affective inputs that come from the self
or observing others. Locationist views do not hypothesize
specific roles for these brain regions in emotion because
they are usually considered to have a “cognitive” function,
insofar that they support memory (Vincent et al. 2006),
object perception (Bar 2009), and theory of mind (Mitch-
ell 2009). In our view, these brain regions should not
necessarily be more involved in instances of one category
of emotion than another, although we would expect
them to be part of the more general neural reference
space for discrete emotion.
As we predicted, our meta-analytic results revealed that
regions of the conceptualization network such as DMPFC,
MTL, and retrosplenial cortex (Buckner et al. 2008) were
part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion
(Fig. 4).8 Our findings indicate that the conceptualization
network is integral in the experience and perception of dis-
crete emotions, and are consistent with the hypothesis (in
Barrett 2006b; 2009a; 2009b) that prior episodic experi-
ence helps shape experienced or perceived affect into
meaningful instances of emotion.
Despite general involvement in emotion (Fig. 1;
Fig. S3), there was some functional selectivity for instances
of certain emotion categories in hubs within the conceptu-
alization network. For instance, across our density analyses
and logistic regressions, we found that instances of the
experience of sadness (Tables 1 & 2) and experience of
happiness (Table 1) were each associated with relatively
greater consistent increases in activation in areas of
DMPFC than other emotion categories. Consistent with
the role of conceptualization in simulating episodic experi-
ence (Schacter et al. 2007), our logistic regressions
revealed that increased activity in DMPFC was likely
when participants were engaging in emotion inductions
involving recall and films (Fig. 5). Increased activity in
some clusters of DMPFC was likely when participants
were perceiving emotion in faces, bodies or voices. This
finding is consistent with the psychological constructionist
hypothesis that the conceptualization network is brought
to bear when affective facial behaviors are perceived as
emotional. Other clusters of DMPFC showed an opposite
pattern: When participants were perceiving emotion,
increased activity in DMPFC was not likely (Table S6).
Just as perception of others and self-referential thinking
involve overlapping yet distinct aspects of DMPFC
(Ochsner et al. 2004a), some aspects of DMPFC might
be functionally selective for conceptualization during
emotion perception whereas others support conceptualiz-
ation during emotion experience.
Several emotion categories were also associated with
consistent increases in activation in the MTL (Tables 1
& 2; see Table S6). Our logistic regressions revealed
that, as in the DMPFC, increased activity in the right hip-
pocampus was likely to occur when participants perceived
any instance of emotion in a face, body, or voice. Increased
activity in the left hippocampus, on the other hand, was
likely to occur when participants perceived instances of
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fear (Table S6). This finding is more likely to be related to
the encoding of salient stimuli in memory than simulating
prior experiences, as the amygdala also had increased
activity during instances of fear perception and is known
to have functional connectivity with the hippocampus
during encoding of salient stimuli (Kensinger & Corkin
2004).
5.6. Anterior temporal lobe and ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex
According to a psychological constructionist account, net-
works supporting language (e.g., Vigneau et al. 2006)
should consistently show increased activity during
instances of emotion experience and perception as linguis-
tically-grounded concepts are brought to bear to make
meaning of core affective feelings. In locationist accounts,
language is thought to be epiphenomenal to discrete
emotion (Ekman & Cordaro 2011), although recent behav-
ioral studies show that categorical perception of discrete
emotion is supported by language (Fugate et al. 2010;
Roberson & Davidoff 2000; Roberson et al. 2007).
Consistent with the psychological constructionist view,
nodes within networks supporting language were part of
the neural reference space for discrete emotion (Fig. 4)
In particular, the anterior temporal lobe (ATL) and ven-
trolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC) (Fig. 2, Panels A, B,
C, green) had consistent increases in activity across
studies of discrete emotion. The ATL supports language
as a heteromodal association area involved in the represen-
tation of concepts (Lambon Ralph et al. 2009; Pobric et al.
2007; Rogers et al. 2004) and the right ATL has been
implicated in the representation of abstract social concepts
(e.g., Zahn et al. 2009). Patients with semantic dementia
have focal atrophy to the ATL, difficulty utilizing semantic
knowledge, and exhibit deficits in emotion perception
(Rosen et al. 2004) and empathy (Rankin et al. 2006).
Areas of the VLPFC, on the other hand, are implicated
in semantic processing tasks (e.g., Gitelman et al. 2005),
categorization of objects (e.g., Freedman et al. 2001), rep-
resentation of feature-based information for abstract
categories (e.g., Freedman et al. 2002; see Miller et al.
2002), selection amongst competing response represen-
tations (e.g., Badre & Wagner 2007; Schnur et al. 2009),
and inhibition of responses (Aaron et al. 2004). It is there-
fore not clear that the VLPFC’s role is functionally specific
to language, but it is certainly functionally selective for
language in certain instances. The VLPFC also helps com-
prise the ventral frontoparietal network that is thought to
be involved in directing attention to salient stimuli in the
environment (Corbetta & Shulman 2002; Corbetta et al.
2008), suggesting a more general role for this region in
executive attention.
As compared to other brain regions, voxels within the
ATL did not have more consistent increases during
instances of one emotion category than others (Fig. S3).
Our logistic regressions suggested that increased activity
in the left ATL was more likely when participants were
experiencing an instance of anger than any other
emotion category, however (Fig. 5; Table S6). Instances
of anger experience thus involve areas throughout the
left frontal and temporal lobes (see sect. 5.2, “The anterior
insula,” sect. 5.3, “The orbitofrontal cortex,” and sect. 5.7,
“Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex”). Increased activity in the
right ATL, on the other hand, was likely when participants
were evaluating a stimulus (i.e., determining the emotional
meaning of a face, voice, or picture; Table S6). This finding
is consistent with the hypothesis that language is brought
to bear when constructing emotional percepts from exter-
oceptive sensations.
Our density analyses revealed that as compared to
voxels within other brain regions, voxels within the right
VLPFC had more consistent increases during instances
of disgust perception than during the perception of any
other emotion category; these findings were confirmed
with a logistic regression (Table 1; Table S6). x2 analyses
revealed that a subset of the voxels identified in the
density analysis were functionally selective for instances
of disgust perception (Table 2), although they were not
specific to instances of disgust (Fig. S3). The most
common finding across our logistic regressions linked
increases in the left VLPFC to instances in which partici-
pants were explicitly paying attention to emotional infor-
mation (Fig. 5; Table S6). As in other left frontal and
temporal areas (see sects. 5.2, “The anterior insula,” 5.3,
“The orbitofrontal cortex,” 5.6, “Anterior temporal lobe
and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex”), increased activity in
the left VLPFC was likely when participants were experi-
encing or perceiving instances of anger.
5.7. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
According to a psychological constructionist account, net-
works supporting executive attention (see Miller & Cohen
2001; Petrides 2005; for a meta-analysis, see Wager &
Smith 2003) should consistently show increased activity
during instances of emotion experience and perception
because executive attention directs other psychological
operations during the construction of emotion. Locationist
accounts do not propose specific roles for these networks
in emotion, although they might allow that networks sup-
porting executive attention take part in regulation of
emotion after it is generated (as in Ochsner et al. 2004b;
Urry et al. 2006).9
Consistent with our psychological constructionist
hypothesis, nodes within networks supporting executive
attention were part of the neural reference space for dis-
crete emotion. In particular, the VLPFC and dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Fig. 2, Panel A, orange and
striped green/orange) had consistent increases in activity
across studies of discrete emotion. The DLPFC is part
of the dorsal frontoparietal network that is thought to be
involved in top-down, goal-directed selection for
responses (Corbetta & Shulman 2002; Corbetta et al.
2008). Consistent with this functional connectivity, bilat-
eral DLPFC is known to be involved in working memory
(e.g., Champod & Petrides 2007; Constantinidis et al.
2002) and in the goal-directed control of attention (e.g.,
Rainer et al. 1998; see Miller 2000).
We predicted that DLPFC would be part of the neural
reference space for emotion (Fig. 4) because these voxels
would be active during mental states in which participants
attended to emotional feelings or perceptions (i.e., when
participants had to hold affective information in mind in
order to categorize it). Consistent with this prediction,
increased activity in the right DLPFC was likely when par-
ticipants were explicitly evaluating stimuli (Fig. 5;
Table S6). Our density analyses also revealed that as
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compared to voxels within other brain regions, voxels in
the right DLPFC were more likely to have increased
activity during instances of anger perception than any
other emotion categories (Table 1). Our x2 analyses indi-
cated that some of these voxels were functionally selective
to perceiving instances of anger (Table 2), although they
were not specific to perceiving instances of anger (Fig. S3).
5.8. The periaqueducal gray
The periaqueducal gray (PAG) is involved in regulating
the autonomic substrates that allow for behavioral adap-
tations such as freezing, fleeing, vocalization, and repro-
ductive behavior (e.g., Carrive et al. 1989; Behbehani
1995; Gregg & Siegel 2001; Kim et al. 1993; Lovick
1992; Mobbs et al. 2007; Van der Horst & Holstege
1998) and also sends projections back to cortical sites
involved in the regulation of visceral activations in the
body (An et al. 1998; Mantyh 1983). It is believed that
certain adaptations are associated with certain emotion
categories (e.g., animals freeze in fear, aggress in anger)
but such links are far from empirically clear. Humans
(like other mammals) do many things during instances of
anger, for example. Sometimes humans yell, sometimes
they hit, sometimes they remain very still, and sometimes
they smile. Even rats do many things within a single
emotion category: In the face of a threat, rats can freeze
(e.g., LeDoux et al. 1990), flee (Vazdarjanova &
McGaugh 1998), or engage in “defensive treading,”
where they kick bedding in the direction of a known
threat (Reynolds & Berridge 2002; 2003; 2008). In all
these instances, PAG activity and the associated autonomic
states it produces, are yoked to the action, and not to the
emotion category. As a result, a psychological construction-
ist approach views PAG activity as nonspecifically involved
in instances of emotion. A locationist approach has linked
the PAG to distinct circuits corresponding to several
emotion categories: rage, fear, joy, distress, love and lust
(Panksepp 1998). In a psychological construction
approach, the assumption is that a given dedicated circuit
for a specific behavioral adaptation (e.g., withdrawal) will
be active across a range of emotion categories (e.g., a
person can withdraw in instances of both fear and anger),
and different dedicated circuits within the PAG (e.g.,
fight, flight) will be active within instances of a single
emotion category depending upon which behavioral adap-
tation is more relevant for the immediate context.
Testing any hypothesis about the specificity of a subcor-
tical region like the PAG is practically impossible, given
the spatial and temporal limitations of brain imaging.
Still, it is instructive to note that the PAG was consistently
activated within the neural reference space for discrete
emotion (even though subjects were lying still and not
engaging in any overt physical action; see Fig. S4 in the
supplementary materials, available at http://www.jour-
nals.cambridge.org/bbs2012008). Moreover, we did not
find evidence of functional specificity for the PAG in our
meta-analysis. It is possible that given the resolution pro-
blems, different circuits within the PAG were specifically
active for discrete emotions. That said, it is also entirely
plausible from the behavioral data that humans, like
animals, perform a range of actions within a single cat-
egory, and perform the same action at times across cat-
egories (even if it does not match our stereotypes of
emotion–action links). In this meta-analysis, increased
activity in the PAG did not correspond to any particular
emotion category more than another (although instances
of the experience of sadness were associated with consist-
ent increases in activation in one voxel within ventral PAG;
Tables 1 & 2). The logistic regressions demonstrated that
increased activity in the PAG was likely when participants
were experiencing or perceiving an instance of any high-
arousal emotion category (Table S6). Consistent with this
finding, activity in a separate cluster of PAG was likely
when participants were experiencing instances of fear
(Table S6). In a previous meta-analysis, we found that
the PAG was most likely to have increased activity
during unpleasant emotions (Wager et al. 2008). Since
all high-arousal emotion categories in our database were
unpleasant (e.g., fear, anger, disgust), our present findings
are consistent with Wager et al. (2008). Future research
should probe whether the PAG preferentially shows
increased activity during unpleasant states, highly
aroused states, or during states that are both unpleasant
and highly aroused.
5.9. Visual cortex
From our psychological construction approach, we would
not be surprised to observe that voxels within visual cortex
(or any sensory modality) show increased activation during
emotion. In its most basic form, our hypothesis is that
emotion emerges as a situated conceptualization of
internal sensations from the body and external sensations
from the world to create a unified conscious experience
of the self in context. In fact, regions of visual cortex
were some of the most frequent to appear in our meta-ana-
lytic findings (replicating several recent meta-analyses;
e.g., Fusar-Poli et al. 2009; Kober et al. 2008; Vytal &
Hamann 2010). It is beyond the scope of this article to
discuss these findings in detail, but we found that instances
of fear experience, anger perception, and disgust experi-
ence were consistently associated with increased activity
in regions of visual cortex ranging from V2 to visual associ-
ation cortex (Tables 1 & 2). Our logistic regressions
revealed that activation in visual cortex was not merely a
by-product of the methods used. Although increased
activity in visual cortex was likely when visual methods
were used (e.g., pictures, faces, studies of perception;
see Table S6), it was also likely in studies of unpleasant,
high-arousal emotions (e.g., fear, disgust, unpleasant
emotions more generally; Table S6). Together, these find-
ings indicate that experiences or perceptions of unpleasant
emotion categories are realized by brain states that include
increased activity in visual cortex. See Gendron et al. (in
preparation) for a discussion.
6. Conclusion
Over a century ago, William James wrote, “A science of the
relations of mind and brain must show how the elementary
ingredients of the former correspond to the elementary
functions of the latter,” (James 1890/1998, p. 28). James
believed that emotions, thoughts, and memories are cat-
egories derived from commonsense with instances that
do not require special brain centers. With respect to
emotion, he wrote, “sensational, associational, and motor
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elements are all that [the brain] need contain” to produce
the variety of mental states that correspond to our com-
monsense categories for emotion (cf. James 1890/1998,
p. 473). James’ view foreshadowed modern psychological
constructionist models of the mind and the findings of
our meta-analytic review, which are largely in agreement
with this approach. Our findings are consistent with the
idea that emotion categories are not natural kinds that
are respected by the brain. The fact that some of the
regions we report also appear in meta-analyses of other
task domains (e.g., action simulation and perception,
Grezes & Decety 2001; autobiographical memory,
Svoboda et al. 2006; decision making, Krain et al. 2006;
executive control, Owen et al. 2005; Wager & Smith
2003; Wager et al. 2004; language, Vigneau et al. 2006;
self-referential processing, Northoff 2006) means that
these regions are not specific to emotion per se, and are
also involved in constituting other cognitive and percep-
tual events (for a discussion of domain general networks,
see Dosenbach et al. 2006; Nelson et al. 2010; Spreng
et al. 2009; van Snellenberg & Wager 2009). Such findings
show that even categories like emotion, cognition, and per-
ception are not respected by the brain (Barrett 2009a;
Duncan & Barrett 2007; Pessoa 2008).
In keeping with James’ predictions, our meta-analytic
review did not find strong evidence for a locationist hypoth-
esis of brain–emotion correspondence (see Table 3 for a
summary of findings). In all instances where a brain
region showed consistent increases in activation during
instances of a discrete emotion category (e.g., the amygdala
in instances of fear perception), this increase was not
specific to that category, failing to support a key locationist
assumption. Some brain regions showed functional selec-
tivity for instances of certain emotion categories; these find-
ings perhaps point to differences in the contents of mental
states (e.g., instances of anger experience often involve
approach motivation, instances of disgust perception
often involve simulation of bodily activation, and instances
of fear perception often involve detection of unusual and
hence salient stimuli).
Our meta-analytic findings were relatively more consist-
ent with the psychological operations that we have con-
sidered ingredients of emotion here and in other papers
(e.g., Barrett 2006b; 2009; Barrett et al. 2007a; Kober
et al. 2008; Lindquist & Barrett 2008a; Wager et al.
2008). In Kober et al. (2008), we hinted at the existence
of basic psychological operations in the psychological con-
struction of emotion. In other theoretical discussions
(Barrett 2009) we explicitly hypothesized the need for
mid-level scientific categories that describe the most
basic psychological ingredients of the mind by referencing
both biology and folk psychology when explaining how
mental states like emotion experiences and perceptions
arise (for a similar view, see Cacioppo et al. 2008). This
target article is the first to investigate the extent to which
brain regions associated with basic psychological
domains show consistent increases in activation in neuroi-
maging studies of discrete emotion categories, despite a
range of methodological variables. Of course, more work
needs to be done to hone and refine our conceptions
of the operations that are most psychologically primitive
and to map them to networks in the brain, but this is a start.
Most notably, we observed consistent increases in acti-
vation in the brain regions implicated in conceptualization
Table 3. Summary of Brain Regions Showing Consistent
Increases in Activation During Mental States and Methodological
Manipulations
Variable Area
Mode Experience of
emotion
R. lOFC
Perception of
emotion
DMPFC/dACC
R. hippocampus
L. VLPFC
R. peristriate
R. occipitotemporal
Affect High arousal
emotions
R. amygdala
R. lOFC
PAG
Unpleasant
emotions
L. peristriate
Emotion Anger
experience
L a. ins.∗
L. a. ins.
L. lOFC
L. VLPFC
L. ATL
Anger
perception
L. VLFPC∗
R. entorhinal cortex
R. DLPFC
R. parastriate
R. occipitotemporal
R. supplementary motor
area
Disgust
experience
L. amygdala∗
R. amygdala
L. entorhinal cortex
R. lOFC
L. occipitotemporal∗
Disgust
perception
R. lOFC∗
R. a. ins
aMCC
L. VLPFC
R. VLPFC∗
R. peristriate
R. occipitotemporal
Fear experience PAG
R. peristriate
R. parastriate
R. occipitotemporal∗
L. middle temporal
Fear perception L. amygdala
L. entorhinal cortex
R. entorhinal cortex
L. hippocampus
R. middle temporal
Happiness
experience
L. peristriate
Sadness
experience
L. entorhinal cortex
DMPFC
R. middle temporal
R. putamen
(continued)
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(simulation of prior episodic experiences), language (rep-
resentation and retrieval of semantic concepts), and execu-
tive attention (volitional attention and working memory),
suggesting that these more “cognitive” functions play a
routine role in constructing experiences and perceptions
of emotion. For example, increased activation in the
DMPFC was observed when participants perceived
instances of emotion on others’ faces. Increased activation
in the ATL was observed when participants focused on
emotional stimuli. Increased activity in the VLPFC
occurred when participants focused on the affective
content of feelings or perceived instances of emotion on
another person’s face. Increased activity in the DLPFC
occurred when participants evaluated the emotional
content of a stimulus. One interpretation of these findings
is that they are merely the result of the types of psychologi-
cal tasks participants are asked to perform in the scanner
during neuroimaging studies of emotion (e.g., recall, label-
ing, response selection), and that because of the limits of
neuroimaging, these influences cannot be separated from
an emotion itself. Yet, all data in our meta-analysis were
derived from emotion versus neutral contrasts, meaning
that, regardless of the task at hand, activation in these
brain areas was greater when participants were experien-
cing or perceiving an emotion category than when they
were experiencing or perceiving in a neutral control
state. Activity in these brain regions is therefore integral
to producing instances of emotion.
Our findings suggested the need to refine and add
additional psychological operations to our model. Just as
executive attention has been parsed into a set of dis-
tinguishable networks (e.g., Corbetta & Shulman 2002;
Corbetta et al. 2008; Dosenbach et al. 2007; Seeley et al.
2007), we might further refine core affect into a set of
smaller networks that correspond to even more basic
mechanisms. For example, we might find separable net-
works corresponding to approach versus avoidance-
related states. Our findings hint that brain regions in the
left PFC might be candidates for a network involved in
approach motivation because regions in the left lateral
PFC (including the anterior and mid-insula, VLPFC,
DLPFC and OFC) were consistently observed during
instances of the experience of anger. This hypothesis is
consistent with a large body of EEG evidence associating
the left PFC with the experience of instances of anger
(Harmon-Jones & Allen 1997; Harmon-Jones & Sigelman
2001) and approach motivation more generally (Amodio,
et al. 2008; Fox 1991; Sutton & Davidson 1997). Future
meta-analytic investigations should investigate the degree
to which the left PFC and subcortical regions supporting
incentive salience (e.g., ventral tegmentum, amygdala,
and aspects of the nucleus accumbens and ventral palli-
dum; see Berridge & Robinson 2003) comprise a
network for approach-related affect within the operation
of core affect. We might also add ingredients for proces-
sing exteroceptive sensory sensations to our theoretical
framework since visual cortex was one of the most fre-
quently activated brain regions in our meta-analysis of dis-
crete emotions. Exteroceptive sensory sensations are also
important components of other types of mental states
(e.g., perception, memory, judgments).
6.1. Alternate interpretations
Of course, there are alternate explanations for why we did
not find strong evidence in support of a locationist frame-
work. First, it is possible that neuroimaging is not well
suited to yield evidence for functional specialization for
emotion in the brain because of its spatial limitations. It
therefore remains possible that scientists will find func-
tional specialization for emotion at a more refined level
of spatial analysis (e.g., at the level of smaller circuits or
even cortical columns of neurons). While this always
remains a possibility, it is important to note that even the
most highly specialized brain regions (e.g., primary visual
cortex) contain neurons that participate in different
neural assemblies associated with different functions
Table 3 (Continued)
Variable Area
PAG
Method Types Recall pACC
DMPFC/aMCC
Auditory R. lOFC
R. VLPFC
R. ATL
Imagery R. occipitotemporal
R. middle temporal
Visual R. peristriate
L. occipitotemporal
Stimuli Pictures L. lOFC
R. peristriate
R. occipitotemporal
Faces L. VLPFC
Films DMPFC/aMCC
L. peristriate
R. occipitotemporal
R. middle temporal
Other
Psychological
Variables
Evaluation of
feelings
R. a. ins
sACC
Evaluation of
stimulus
R. ATL
R. DLPFC
PAG
L. peristriate
L. occipitotemporal
Foregrounded
affect
L. VLPFC
L. peristriate
Cognitive load sACC
aMCC
Mental states include states related to experiencing vs. perceiving dis-
crete emotions, the experience and perception of affect, the experience
or perception of individual discrete emotion categories, and mental
states related to method types, stimulus types and other psychological
variables. Brain regions consistently associated with mental states
in the x2 analyses and logistic regressions are listed. Mental state-
brain associations observed in the x2 analyses are printed in
regular font. Logistic regression findings are in bold face font.
Mental state-brain region associations observed in both types of ana-
lyses are marked with an asterisk (∗).
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(e.g., Basole et al. 2003). This makes strong locationist
interpretations of brain function unlikely when such
interpretations attempt to find specificity for psychological
categories (particularly at the level of the cortical column).
Instead, the idea of neural re-use (e.g., Anderson 2010) is
consistent with the psychological constructionist model of
brain–emotion correspondence. Neuroimaging also has
temporal limitations. It takes a few seconds for a BOLD
response to materialize and we do not know whether
emotions are episodes that extend over many seconds or
are more instantaneous states that fire and resolve within
that time frame. It is possible that scientists might find
functional specialization for emotion at a more refined
level of temporal analysis (e.g., using single cell recording),
although such evidence has yet to be revealed. Moreover,
we find it unlikely that neuroimaging and single cell
recordings are measuring totally different phenomena.
More likely, they are methods that complement one
another (e.g., Horowitz 2005).
Second, it remains a possibility that we failed to locate a
specific brain basis for discrete emotion categories because
emotion categories are represented as anatomical networks
of brain regions. Some researchers hypothesize that
“resting state” analyses10 of the brain’s function, which
reveal the intrinsic anatomical networks that chronically
support the brain’s fundamental processes, are influenced
by anatomical connections (Deco et al. 2011). If emotion
categories were supported by anatomically given, inherited
networks, then there should be intrinsic networks that cor-
respond to the brain regions active during the experience
or perception of instances of anger, sadness, fear, and
other emotion categories. To date, however, no such intrin-
sic networks have been identified in broad inductive
studies of such brain organization (e.g., Smith et al.
2009). Instead, the intrinsic networks that have thus far
been identified bear resemblance to the psychological
domains that are hypothesized by a psychological construc-
tionist view (see functional groups in Kober et al. 2008).
For instance, the “default network” that is active when a
person is not probed by an external stimulus in fMRI
experiments (Buckner & Vincent 2007; Raichle et al.
2001) is not only important to constructing representations
of the past and the future, but also for constructing rep-
resentations of emotion experience and perception in the
moment. Portions of the intrinsic networks for “personal
salience” (e.g., Seeley et al. 2007) and “executive control”
(e.g., Corbetta & Shulman 2002; Seeley et al. 2007)
appear anatomically similar to brain regions that we
observed within our meta-analyses as well.
Of course, there is evidence for more limited brain cir-
cuits that correspond to specific behavioral adaptations in
mammals. There is well-documented evidence for the
anatomical circuitry underlying specific actions such as
vocalizations (Ju¨rgens 2009), maternal behavior (e.g.,
pup retrieval, grooming, nest building, and nursing;
Numan 2007), freezing (Fanselow & Poulos 2005),
startle (Davis et al. 2008; Lang et al. 2000), attack (Blan-
chard & Blanchard 2003) and appetitive behavior (Ber-
ridge & Kringelbach 2008; Shultz 2006), to name just a
few. In our view, these are just another set of basic oper-
ations and are not, in and of themselves, evidence that
there is distinct anatomical circuitry for complex psycho-
logical categories such as sadness, love, fear, anger, or
greed (each of which could contain instances of a range
of behaviors) (Barrett et al. 2007a). Animals produce
actions in a way to maximize their outcome in a specific
context, so many different behaviors can be associated
with a given discrete emotion category; there is variety
in the behaviors and the autonomics that populate any
given emotion category. Sometimes, to make their find-
ings more accessible, researchers will equate a specific
behavior and its circuitry (e.g., freezing in the face of
an uncertain danger) with an emotion category (e.g.,
fear). The problem with this logic is that it limits the defi-
nition of a complex psychological category to one or two
behaviors. If fear is defined by freezing, then is fear not
occurring at times when a rat flees, attacks, kicks
bedding at a predator, or avoids an unknown corner of
a maze? Or when humans avoid a dark alley, bungee
jump, remember the events of September 11th, lock
the door at night, or password-protect their bank
accounts? As each of these actions is associated with a
different neural network, which one is the fear
network? If they are all fear networks, then what is the
scientific value of the category fear for explaining
behavior?
If discrete emotion categories are not associated with a
specific brain locale, or even an anatomically inspired
network that can be inherited, it is still possible that a
pattern classification analysis on our meta-analytic data-
base might reveal that each emotion category is rep-
resented by a specific combination of brain regions that
co-activate together in time as a functional unit. We did
not test this hypothesis, although we are in the process
of developing these techniques for our software
package. To the extent that such patterns are widely dis-
tributed across the brain, however (as opposed to being
organized anatomically as inheritable units), such func-
tionally defined networks for emotion categories
(i.e., networks that only combine in a given context to
produce a given type of mental state) would be consistent
with a psychological constructionist (as opposed to a loca-
tionist) view.
It is possible that we failed to find evidence for the brain
basis of discrete emotions because the methods employed
in neuroimaging studies (or the laboratory for that matter)
do not reliably elicit the type of discrete emotion experi-
ences observed in the real world. After all, many scientists
believe that emotions involve action (or action tendencies),
and during scanning experiments participants must lie
very still. Although this always remains a possibility, we
do not believe it is a serious concern. First of all, even
when participants are asked to lie still in a scanner, we
still routinely observe increases in PAG activity in
emotion. The PAG is necessary for motivated action
patterns in animals, so these findings argue against the cri-
ticism that emotions invoked in the scanner are superficial.
Even studies in which people are asked to imagine an
emotional scenario probably create real experiences (as
anyone knows who has become immersed in a mental
reverie).
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, our observation
that common brain activations exist across emotion cat-
egories is echoed in the pattern of findings for other
(non-brain) measures of emotion. Since the beginning of
psychology, researchers have questioned the idea that dis-
crete emotion categories are each associated with a single,
diagnostic pattern of response in the brain and body (e.g.,
Lindquist et al.: The brain basis of emotion
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 35:3 141
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11001531
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:25:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Duffy 1934; Hunt 1941; James 1884; for a review of such
theories, see Gendron & Barrett 2009). More recently, a
number of empirical reviews (Barrett 2006a; Barrett
et al. 2007a; Mauss & Robinson 2009; Ortony & Turner
1990; Russell 2003) have highlighted the disconfirming
evidence: Different discrete emotion categories are not
distinguished by distinct patterns of peripheral physiology
(Cacioppo et al. 2000; Mauss & Robinson 2009), facial
muscle movements (Cacioppo et al. 2000; Russell, Bachor-
owski & Fernandez-Dols 2003), vocal acoustics (Bachor-
owski & Owren 1995; Barrett 2006a; Russell,
Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 2003) or by subcortical
circuits in the mammalian brain (Barrett 2006a; Barrett
et al. 2007a). The present meta-analytic review adds to
this literature by demonstrating that emotion categories
do not map to discrete brain locales in the human brain
either. Instead, evidence from our meta-analysis, as well
as studies of emotion that use psychophysiological
measures, objective measures of the face and voice, and
subjective experience of emotion, all point to the idea
that emotions emerge from a set of more basic operations
(cf. Barrett 2006b). As neuroscientific methodologies pro-
gress, it will become increasingly important for scientists
to formulate a viable conceptual framework for mapping
emotions to the brain. Our findings suggest that a psycho-
logical constructionist approach might offer just such a fra-
mework. Locationist views might be deeply entrenched in
commonsense, which makes the corresponding scientific
models particularly compelling, but they do not match
the scientific evidence in any measurement domain for
emotion.
6.2. Future directions in the search for the brain basis
of emotion
Despite the field’s emphasis on locationist views (that
inspired many of the experiments used in our meta-
analysis), we found that the bulk of the empirical evidence
is more consistent with the hypothesis that emotions
emerge from the interplay of more basic psychological
operations. We hypothesize that these operations and
their corresponding neural networks influence and con-
strain one another to produce a variety of brain states
that correspond to a variety of emotional states. To fully
explore the power of a psychological constructionist
approach in future research, researchers might combine
traditional neuroimaging techniques with methods that
make more network-based assumptions about brain func-
tion (e.g., Multivoxel Pattern Analysis: Haxby et al. 2001;
Multivariate Partial Least Squares Analysis: McIntosh
et al. 1996) (see Schienle & Schafer [2009] for additional
analysis approaches). Researchers might also utilize
resting state analysis to identify functional networks that
are intrinsic to the brain and compare those to the task-
related assemblies of brain areas found across neuroima-
ging experiments (e.g., Smith et al. 2009). Finally,
researchers must employ studies that capture and model
the variability inherent in the collection of instances that
form an emotion category like anger, disgust, fear, and
so forth (e.g., Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011). Most
studies in our database utilize stimuli and induction tech-
niques that invoke themost typical – and even caricatured
– instances of an emotion category. Yet, daily experience
tells us that there is great variability in the instances of
anger, disgust, fear, happiness and sadness that we experi-
ence, and research bears this out. For example, an instance
of disgust that occurs when watching others eat repulsive
food involves a different brain state than an instance of
disgust that occurs when watching surgical operations
(Harrison et al. 2010). Brain states that occur during
instances of fear and anger are best described by an inter-
action between the content of the experience (e.g.,
whether the state is labeled fear vs. anger) and the
context in which it occurred (e.g., a physical vs. social
context) (Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011).
7. Unifying the mind
A psychological constructionist approach is not only a
viable approach for understanding the brain basis of
emotion, but it might also offer a new psychological
ontology for a neuroscientific approach to understanding
the mind. If a psychological constructionist approach to
the mind is correct, then some of psychology’s time-
honored folk distinctions become phenomenological dis-
tinctions. This has implications for understanding a
range of psychological phenomena, including decision
making, attention, visual perception, mental illness, and
perhaps even consciousness more generally. Indeed,
similar efforts are emerging in other psychological
domains (Fuster 2006; Poldrack et al. 2009; Price &
Friston 2005; Warnick et al. 2010). According to a
psychological constructionist view of the mind, emotion
does not influence cognition during decision-making as
one pool ball exerts influence on another. Instead the
view suggests that core affect, conceptualization, and
executive attention (and perhaps other psychological
operations) cooperate to realize a behavioral outcome.
If this is the case, then we might not assume that
emotion and cognition battle it out in the brain when a
person makes the moral decision to sacrifice one life to
save many (e.g., Greene et al. 2004), or that consumer
decisions are predicated on competing affective and
rational representations (e.g., Knutson et al. 2007).
Instead, we might assume that affect and executive atten-
tion are merely different sources of attention in the
brain, rather than processes that differ in kind (Barrett
2009b; Vuilleumier & Driver 2007). Feeling and seeing
might not be as distinct as is typically assumed (Barrett
& Bar 2009; Duncan & Barrett 2007). Even conceptions
about “internal” versus “external” processing begin to
break down when we take into account the fact that
“internal” ingredients such as affect and conceptualiz-
ation shape the very way in which exteroceptive
sensory input is realized as perceptions by the brain
(Bar 2009; Barrett & Bar 2009). A psychological con-
structionist framework of the mind thus begins to
break down the most steadfast assumptions of our com-
monsense categories. In so doing, it charts a different
but exciting path forward for the science of the mind.
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NOTES
1. These hypotheses have been inspired, in large part, by be-
havioral neuroscience research in nonhuman animals that has
carefully mapped the circuitry for behavioral adaptations that
occur in response to specific environmental challenges (e.g.,
freezing, attack, vocalizations). One variant of a locationist view
focuses on the circuitry for behavioral adaptations such as freez-
ing, escaping, aggressing, and so on (e.g., LeDoux 2007; Pank-
sepp 1998), and assumes that one behavioral adaptation is at
the core of each discrete emotion category. However, this one-
to-one correspondence between a behavioral adaptation and a
discrete emotion category has been challenged on the basis of
existing research showing that mammals such as rats display a
variety of behaviors based on what is most effective in a given
context (for discussion, Barrett 2009a; Barrett et al. 2007a).
2. For example, because the neurons within the amygdala
are part of the neural reference space for discrete emotion,
we can say with some certainly that the amygdala is likely to
have increased activation when a person is experiencing or per-
ceiving any emotion. This does not mean that the amygdala is
necessary to each and every instance of emotion or even that
it is specific to emotion, however. These ideas distinguish our
approach from locationist accounts that assume that neurons
within a given brain area (e.g., the amygdala) are consistently
and specifically linked to a particular category of mental state
(e.g., “fear”).
3. Here we use the term “functionally selective” to mean that
a brain area can have some preference for certain mental states,
even if it is not specific to that mental state. Functional selectiv-
ity might occur because a brain area supports a more basic
psychological operation that helps to construct a certain
mental state (e.g., the amygdala supports detection of salient
exteroceptive sensations and is functionally selective for
instances of fear). Functional selectivity does not refer to speci-
ficity, however. A brain area might be functionally selective for
one mental state or even one basic psychological operation in
one instance, and another state or operation in another instance.
Functional selectivity is distinct from the concept of “selective
influence” (cf. Sternberg 2001), where a brain area being
involved in one mental state (e.g., an instance of fear) but not
another (e.g., an instance of anger) is taken as evidence of
modularity.
4. For example, given that there is an increase in activation in
the amygdala, the probability that a person is experiencing fear
might be 0.7. The probability that he or she is experiencing
another emotion (e.g., anger, disgust, happiness or sadness) is
12 0.7 ¼ 0.3. The odds ratio ¼ 0.7/0.3 ¼ 2.33. This means
that given increased amygdala activation, the odds are 2.33 to 1
that the person is experiencing fear. In this case, the experience
of fear is 113% more likely to predict increased activation in the
amygdala than any other emotion state.
5. These findings might explain the amgydala’s role in “fear
learning” without assuming that the amygdala is specific to
fear. In “fear learning,” for example, amygdala activity reflects
orienting responses that occur when an organism learns to
associate a neutral stimulus with an already salient stimulus.
The amygdala contributes to the production of the skin conduc-
tance responses (SCRs) (Laine et al. 2009) used to index “fear
learning.” Amygdala responses are associated with SCRs that
occur immediately following the onset of a conditioned stimu-
lus, suggesting that the amygdala is particularly involved in
attention during learning but perhaps not the formation of
associations (Cheng et al. 2007; also see Blakeslee [1979] and
Spinks et al. [1985] for evidence that SCRs covary with
changes in attention). This orienting account would also
explain why increased amygdala activity is observed when
animals learn to associate neutral stimuli with rewarding out-
comes (e.g., Paton et al. 2006; for a review see Murray 2007),
why amygdala activity corresponds to evaluative goals in the
presence of both positive and negative stimuli (e.g., Cunning-
ham et al. 2008; Paton et al. 2006), and why stimulation of the
amygdala facilitates orienting responses such as startle (Rosen
& Davis 1988). Together, these findings make it clear why the
amygdala is so ubiquitously involved in mammalian social be-
havior (i.e., male and female sexual behavior, maternal behav-
ior, aggression; see Newman 1999).
6. More than 90% (53/57) of study contrasts assessing fear per-
ception in our database used startled faces that are unfamiliar to
college students (who are typically participants in neuroimaging
studies of healthy samples) (Whalen et al. 2001) and are highly
arousing (e.g., Russell & Bullock 1986). Approximately 35% (15/
43) of study contrasts assessing the experience of disgust presented
participants with images that were novel (i.e., infrequently experi-
enced in the industrialized world) and highly arousing (i.e., con-
taining contamination, mutilated body parts, maggots, etc.).
7. EEG findings do not associate instances of anger with OFC
specifically, probably because EEG does not easily pick up
activity in the orbital sector.
8. The medial OFC (mOFC) and the sACC, which are more
generally part of VMPFC, were part of the neural reference
space and are reported in separate sections. Aspects of
VMPFC that do not include mOFC/sACC were part of the
neural reference space, but were not significant at the thresholds
we report in this article.
9. In some theoretical treatments of emotion, emotion regu-
lation is thought to be a separate psychological event from
emotion generation, with distinctive neural correlates; in a
psychological constructionist approach, however, the processes
are the same because there is no conceptual distinction
between generation and regulation (Gross & Barrett 2011).
10. “Resting state” or “default” networks are evidenced as cor-
relations between low-frequency signals in fMRI data that are
recorded when there is no external stimulus or task. These net-
works are thought to be intrinsic in the human brain. For a
review of intrinsic networks and their function, see Deco et al.
(2011).
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Abstract: Primary affects exist at an ecological-communicative level of
analysis, and therefore are not identifiable with specific brain regions.
The constructionist view favored in the target article, that emotions
emerge from “more basic psychological processes,” does not specify the
nature of these processes. These more basic processes may actually
involve specific neurochemical systems, that is, primary motivational-
emotional systems (primes), associated with specific feelings and
desires that combine to form the “cocktail” of experienced emotion.
Lindquist et al. offer an outstanding compilation, organization,
and presentation of the results of human neuroimaging studies
related to emotion. Their study is of great interest as a review
and summary of empirical data from this burgeoning area of
research. The interpretation of these data, however, is flawed.
It criticizes a so-called locationist model that specific brain
regions are consistently associated with specific emotion cat-
egories, and reports little evidence for such associations.
However, no one holds the simplistic view of brain–emotion
relationships illustrated in the target article’s Figure 1. It is a
“straw man.” Views such as those of Panksepp (1998) linking
specific emotion categories with brain networks are not inconsist-
ent with the pattern of results summarized in this article. Indeed,
the pattern illustrated in Figure 3 of the target article supports
the classic view of the brain and emotion dating from Papez
(1937) and MacLean (1993): richly interconnected limbic struc-
tures associated with subjective emotional experience, and con-
nected with many other brain areas. Indeed, the differentiation
of core limbic, lateral limbic, and medial prefrontal cortex
(PFC) subsystems in Figure 3 is not unlike MacLean’s differen-
tiation of subcortical-reptilian, selfish-paleomammalian, and
prosocial-paleomammalian subsystems.
The quest to find specific brain locations associated with the
primary affects – happiness, sadness, fear, anger, and disgust –
is off the mark because the primary affects exist at an ecological
rather than a bio/physiological level of analysis (Buck 1984;
2010). They are properly measured at the level of communi-
cation – display and pre-attunement – as they traditionally
have been in research on facial displays.
The favored alternative “psychological constructionist” view
assumes that emotions “emerge out of more basic psychological
operations that are not specific to emotion” (target article, sect.
3, para. 1). However, the nature of these mechanisms is
unclear. The notion of core affect, that all affect can be
reduced to dimensions of valence and arousal, is not helpful.
However, the conclusion that emotions emerge from more
basic processes may be on the mark. There are specific neuro-
chemical systems underlying primary motivational-emotional
systems or primes (Buck 1985; 1999). These include neurotrans-
mitter molecules and receptors that vary in number and sensi-
tivity. The activation of many primes is associated with
specific, subjectively experienced feelings and desires, as
demonstrated by the effects of psychoactive drugs on animals,
including humans (Buck 1999). Many such transmitter mol-
ecules are peptides, direct products of genes in sending
neurons. Specific peptides are associated with specific subjec-
tively experienced feelings and desires (Pert 1997), and as the
origin of the peptides is the genes, subjectively experienced
affects function as “voices of the genes.” The genes are always
murmuring and whispering, generating a complex background
of feelings and desires, but like the feel of our shoes on our
feet, we rarely pay attention. Of course, sometimes the genes
scream and shout, and our feelings and desires dominate con-
sciousness. The genes do not control us through these feelings
and desires, but they do cajole us.
Primes constitute modules, as it were, which, although dissoci-
able in principle, are highly interactive, and combine to contrib-
ute to complex subjective experiences such as those associated
with primary affects. For example, the subjective experience
associated with fear might be composed of a variable neuro-
chemical “cocktail” that might combine diazepam-binding inhibi-
tor (DBI: the “anxiety peptide”), corticotrophin-releasing
hormone (CRH: stress), cholecystokinin (CCK: panic), among
others (Buck 2010). Similarly, love is arguably a primary affect
at the ecological level, associated with intimate displays
(contact comfort, pheromones). The subjective experiences
associated with love may be associated with a neurochemical
cocktail including high endorphins (euphoria), gonadotropin-
releasing hormone (GnRH: eroticism), dopamine (DA: excite-
ment), oxytocin (OXY: nurturance); vasopressin (AVP: protec-
tiveness), CRH (stress); and low serotonin (5-HT: submission)
(see Ortigue et al. 2010; Panksepp 1998). Understanding of
these systems, their evolutionary and genetic bases, their
complex interrelationships, and their communicative role in
social interaction is proceeding apace.
Therefore, the contention that emotion requires a construc-
tionist account may be accurate, but it is a neurochemical, biomo-
lecular construction: arguably, “cocktail” is a better term. Also,
this version of the locationist position is squarely on the mark:
specifiable neurochemical systems, or primes, are constituent
elements of the affective cocktail.
There is a 500-pound gorilla lurking largely unacknowledged in
this article, and more generally in the literature on the brain and
emotion: that is, cerebral lateralization. Right- and left-sided
brain mechanisms are distinguished in the presentation of the
empirical results of Lindquist et al., and there are many such differ-
ences, including an apparently larger neural reference space associ-
ated with emotions in the right than in the left hemisphere in the
ventral view in their Figure 4. However, there is little discussion of
the meaning of these differences. The discussion of the amygdalae
and fear does not note evidence of amygdala lateralization, includ-
ing sex differences. Whereas the right amygdala has been particu-
larly associated with fear, there are suggestions that the left
amygdala may be involved in socio-emotional functioning. There
is evidence of left amygdala hypoactivation in Asperger Syndrome
(AS: Ashwin et al. 2007) and hyperactivation in Borderline Person-
ality Disorder (BPD:Donegan et al. 2003; Koenigsberg et al. 2009).
Although these conditions have, historically, rarely been compared
with one another, the evidence that they are related to the same
brain area highlights the fact that in many ways their symptoms
are opposite. Major AS symptoms include an obliviousness to
other persons: a lack of empathy and socio-emotional reciprocity,
and a preference for solitary activities. In contrast, BPD involves
a kind of socio-emotional hypervigilance, often including frantic
efforts to avoid real or imagined separation, rejection, or abandon-
ment. These findings are in turn consistent with the observed sex
differences: males tend to be emotionally oblivious and females
emotionally hypervigilant. Hence, “the battle of the sexes.”
This evidence, that the left amygdala is involved in the func-
tioning of what might be termed a “social brain,” is consistent
with suggestions that the left hemisphere is associated with pro-
social emotions (Buck 2002; Ross et al. 1994). The evidence in
the target article, that anger experience is often associated with
left-sided processing, is not inconsistent with this, as anger
often functions as a prosocial emotion.
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Abstract: We agree that conceptualisation is key in understanding
the brain basis of emotion. We argue that by conflating facial emotion
recognition with subjective emotion experience, Lindquist et al.
understate the importance of biological predisposition in emotion. We
use examples from the anxiety disorders to illustrate the distinction
between these two phenomena, emphasising the importance of both
emotional hardware and contextual learning.
Lindquist et al.’s meta-analysis convincingly disproves the strong
locationist account of the brain basis of emotion. Yet, one needs
look no further than the myriad different presentations of
anxiety disorders to see that the experience of emotions such
as fear is highly idiosyncratic. As behaviour originates in the
brain, this idiosyncrasy must be reflected at the neural level,
and we endorse Lindquist et al.’s emphasis on context and
prior learning in shaping emotional experience. This process,
referred to by Lindquist et al. as conceptualisation, has been
described extensively in cognitive models of psychiatric disorder
in terms of schema (e.g., Beck & Emery 1985). However, the
universality of facial emotion recognition and the cross-cultural
ubiquity of anxiety disorders, suggest that emotional hardware
is more important than Lindquist et al. suggest.
We agree that the basic emotions as described by Lindquist et al.
are unlikely to represent the most basic psychological emotional
processes in the brain. However, by combining facial emotion
recognition with subjective emotion experience, Lindquist et al.
understate the importance of biological hardware in facial recog-
nition. There is strong evidence that facial expressions are universal
social signals, and reading emotion expressions in others is con-
served across cultures (Ekman 1973), albeit with some cultural con-
straints (Elfenbein & Ambady 2002). Evidence suggests that
humans are biologically prepared for facial expression recognition.
Infants aged 5–7 months can reliably distinguish between most
facial emotion expressions, and are beginning to show adult-like
attentional preferences for threat emotions such as fear (for
review, see Leppa¨nen & Nelson 2009). Around this age infants
also show increased startle responses to acoustic probes in the pres-
ence of angry, relative to happy, faces (Balaban 1995).
Research by Schofield et al. (2007) replicated by ourselves (i.e.,
Button et al., unpublished results) has found that social anxiety is
not associated with differences in recognising facial expressions but
is associated with differences in attributions of personal cost to
those same expressions. Similar results have been found across
anxiety disorders; emotion recognition does not vary as a function
of anxiety, whereas other processes, such as attention, are selec-
tively enhanced for threat emotions such as anger (for review,
see Bar-Haim et al. 2007). These findings suggest that facial
expression recognition is relatively robust to the influences of
anxiety schema. Furthermore, they illustrate how different pat-
terns of neural responses may arise during simple face emotion
viewing tasks due to processes such as attribution and attention.
The universality of the clinical syndrome of anxiety disorders
(e.g., Horwath & Weissman 2000) suggests that emotional hard-
ware is also important in subjective emotion experience. Vulner-
ability to anxiety disorders is heritable (Hettema et al. 2001).
Evidence that non-phobic individuals report as many aversive
experiences with a fear-stimulus as do individuals who are
phobic of that stimulus (Ehlers et al. 1994; Merckelbach et al.
1992) suggests that factors other than contextual learning are
important in fear responses. However, compared to the relative
robustness of facial emotion recognition, subjective emotions are
strongly influenced by anxiety schema, as they have the broader
function of guiding perceptions of, and responses to, the environ-
ment (Cosmides & Tooby 2000; Damasio 1996).
Variations in the physiological responses which characterise
different anxiety disorders provide evidence for the influence of
anxiety schema on subjective emotion experience. Specific
phobias are characterised by relatively normal baseline autonomic
activity, with strong elevations in autonomic activity in the presence
of the phobic situation (e.g., Hofmann et al. 1995). This pattern of
activation is consistent with the specificity of the phobic schema
(e.g., spider fears) to the phobic stimulus (e.g., spiders).
By contrast, generalised anxiety and generalised social anxiety
are associated with elaborate schemas involving excessive worry
about worry and fears of social ridicule and rejection, respect-
ively. As such, a much wider array of stimuli and ruminative
thoughts can trigger anxiety, which is reflected in a generally
elevated baseline arousal observed in the hypothalamic–pitu-
itary–adrenal axis and sympathetic adrenal medullary activation
(for review, see Craske 2003). This increased baseline arousal
is associated with a hypervigilance for threat. However, responses
to acute stressors in generalised anxiety do not reliably differ
from controls, and chronic worriers actually show reduced varia-
bility in heart rate and skin conductance during psychological
stress (Hoehnsaric et al. 1989; 1995).
McNeil et al. (1993) found that shame and embarrassment
result in decreased cardiovascular activity, suggesting that
during times of social fear the parasympathetic shame response
competes with the sympathetic fearful response, resulting in an
attenuated heart rate increases in persons with social phobias.
These conflicting processes of shame and fear are likely to be
reflected in patterns of brain activity, illustrating the complexity
of subjective emotion experience.
Recognising facial expressions is highly conserved, and the
influence of anxiety schema on this process is relatively subtle.
By contrast, the experience of anxiety and fear is highly idiosyn-
cratic, reflecting much greater influence of contextual learning
and belief systems, referred to as schema. Given the idiosyncrasy
of fear experiences, reflected in the diversity of physiological
responses outlined above, we agree with Lindquist et al. that sub-
jective emotional experience is likely to be highly socially con-
structed. However, the evidence does not support Lindquist
et al.’s claim for the social construction of basic emotion recog-
nition, suggesting instead that humans are biologically prepared
for facial expression recognition.
The strong locationist model cannot account for the differences
observed in emotion recognition and subjective experience.
Neither can it account for the idiosyncrasy of emotional experience.
We agree with Lindquist et al. on the need to identify the basic
psychological processes underpinning emotion. However, in
attempting to encompass all the complexity of human emotion
into a single model, the result lacks predictive value. If we accept
that subjective emotion is socially constructed, then models which
address the question of what emotions are and how they are rep-
resented in the brain are unhelpful. A more fruitful approach to
establishing the brain basis of emotion (and cognition in general)
is perhaps to ask what a given brain region does, and why.
Overcoming the emotion experience/
expression dichotomy
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Abstract: We challenge the classic experience/expression dichotomous
account of emotions, according to which experiencing and expressing
an emotion are two independent processes. By endorsing Dewey’s and
Mead’s accounts of emotions, and capitalizing upon recent empirical
findings, we propose that expression is part of the emotional
experience. This proposal partly challenges the purely constructivist
approach endorsed by the authors of the target article.
An essential aspect of Lindquist et al.’s proposal in the target
article concerns the attack on the classic attempt to functionally
parcellate the brain, according to which, given a linguistically
described mental process, a specific brain area underpinning it
can be found. From the experimental point of view, the endorse-
ment of such a “one word-one area” account of the mental
domain has already shown its limits in the case of the classic cog-
nitivist description of the mental processes underlying social cog-
nition. According to this view, specific brain sites have been
postulated to underpin the attribution of mental states to
others by means of linguistic-like propositional attitudes, stimu-
lating the search for a theory of mind reading brain modules.
We do agree with the authors that such a transposition from
language to brain sites could hinder our understanding of the
brain, and we fully appreciate their view that words are
“essence placeholders” (target article, sect. 3, see “Definitions”),
helping to create categories in the absence of strong statistical
regularities. The fact that different words designate different
emotional states does not necessarily imply that such states can
be directly mapped within specific brain locations.
Lindquist et al. frame this criticism within the locationist–con-
structionist debate, supporting the view that single emotions are
not represented in specific brain regions, but rather are consti-
tuted by basic psychological operations common across different
emotional domains. Despite the intriguing view they propose,
however, the authors fail to describe what, according to a location-
ist approach, a cortical site for a given emotion is supposed to rep-
resent. This omission weakens the locationist approach, making it
easier to criticize it. Consider the case of the insula. The authors
claim that a locationist approach describes the insula as a region
where disgust is processed; this view is then compared to a con-
structionist approach, according to which the insula is involved
in “representing core affective feelings in awareness” (sect. 5.2.,
para. 2). Whereas the constructionist proposal is clearly explained,
it is not as comprehensible what, according to the locationist
approach, the insula is supposed to process (“perceiving instances
of disgust,” sect. 5.2., para. 1, italics in original).
In our view, this uncertainty is connected to the perspective
that having an emotion is a “perceptual act” (see sect. 3, para.
2) during which the emotion “emerges in consciousness.”
According to the classic perspective the authors seem to
endorse, experiencing a given emotion is similar to having a sen-
sation, that is, it means feeling something. However, in their
view, differently from sensations, emotions depend upon the
“internal” world or, to use the authors’ description, “core
affect.” It follows that experiencing and expressing a given
emotion are two different and independent processes. The
view that feeling emotions is a sensory activity, totally indepen-
dent from their motor expression, is an old idea among scholars
of emotions. In his seminal work, Darwin (1872) considered the
emotion as a feeling preceding the emotional expression, whereas
James (1884) considered the emotion as a feeling consequent to
the emotional expression. In both cases, the motor output is not
considered to be part of the emotion itself. The heritage of
Darwin’s and James’s views strongly influenced contemporary
neuroscientists, who mostly accept the experience/expression
dichotomy, considering the emotional experience as a specific
type of sensory activity (Craig 2002; Critchley et al. 2004;
Damasio 1999). This perspective is clearly endorsed also by the
authors of the target article.
An alternative perspective was offered, however, by Dewey
(1894) and Mead (1895; 1934). Both Dewey and Mead explicitly
criticized the experience/expression dichotomy by stressing the
lack of any proof of the previous existence of the emotions with
respect to the emotional response. In contrast, they suggested
that the behavior connected to a specific emotion is part of the
emotion itself. The sensory patterns directly trigger the motor
representations associated with that specific emotion and this
sensory–motor match is the emotion. The link between experi-
ence and expression has been partially recognized by recent neu-
roscientific studies. Botox injection in facial muscles decreases
the strength of emotional experience (Davis et al. 2010). Activity
in the left amygdala and in the brainstem is reduced during imi-
tation of angry facial expression, if Botox is injected into the
frown muscles (Hennenlotter et al. 2009). This effect likely
reduces both the sensory input and the visceromotor output con-
trolled by these structures. Even inducing the production of an
emotional expression, or posture, enhances the correspondent
emotional experience and influences the normal processing
of the emotional information (Niedenthal 2007).
Even more dramatic is the case of the insula, described by
Lindquist et al. as a region involved in the mental representation
of bodily sensations. Recently, we showed that two different
emotional behaviors can be evoked by the intracortical microsti-
mulation (ICMS) of two different sectors of the macaque monkey
insula (Caruana et al. 2011). ICMS of the anterior sector of the
insula evokes a complex disgust-related behavior, characterized
by a motor component (grimace of disgust) and a complex
context-dependent behavior (refusal of food during stimulation).
ICMS applied to a more posterior sector of the insula produces
an affiliative behavior (lip-smacking).
Given the correlative nature of brain imaging, this approach
hardly elucidates the possible causal role of a brain region in a
specific emotional behavior. The choice of the authors to restrict
their analysis only to neuroimaging, although done for practical
reasons, weakens the result of their proposal. In fact, past electro-
physiological studies showed that the stimulation of different
emotion-related brain regions produces different behaviors
related to specific emotions (for review, see Frijda 1986). It is
not clear how a purely constructivist perspective could account
for these data.
The locationist/constructionist debate could greatly benefit
from overcoming the emotion experience/expression distinction,
as has already happened in other fields of cognitive neuroscience,
such as in the case of the perceptual experience of objects, space,
and actions (see Gallese & Sinigaglia, in press). If a specific
sensory pattern directly matches with a motor output (facial
expression, visceromotor reaction), it makes sense to predict the
existence of specific brain sensory-motor representations related
to different emotional states. Is this locationist or constructivist?
A constructionist account of emotional
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. present a strong case for a constructionist
account of emotion. First, we elaborate on the ramifications that a
constructionist account of emotions might have for psychiatric
disorders with emotional disturbances as core elements. Second, we
reflect on similarities between Lindquist et al.’s model and recent
attempts at formulating psychiatric disorders as networks of causally
related symptoms.
Fear is not localized in the amygdala, nor does sadness exclusively
arise in the anterior cingulate cortex. Unfortunately for Gall (Gall
& Spurzheim 1835), and more recent proponents, who hypoth-
esized that single brain areas (later referred to as “particular cir-
cuits”; see Kandel & Squire 1992) correspond to single functions
(e.g., arithmetic skills), feelings (e.g., pride) or attitudes (e.g., reli-
giosity); locationist perspectives on such functions, feelings, and
attitudes and their hypothesized unique “signature” in the
brain increasingly turn out to be wrong (e.g., Bartholomew
2004; Poldrack 2006). Likewise, as Lindquist et al. convincingly
argue, emotions are not recognized by the brain as separate enti-
ties and, as such, do not each have their own seat and unique acti-
vation signature in the brain. Instead, Lindquist et al. present a
strong case for a constructionist perspective in which emotions
are comprised of multiple, more basic processes, which are
each associated with their own location and activation signature
in the brain. The combined outcomes of these processes result
in the individual experience of a particular emotion.
If Lindquist et al.’s constructionist perspective is an accurate
representation of the relation between emotions and the brain,
what ramifications might this have for those psychiatric disorders
that have emotional disturbances as core elements? Among other
processes, Lindquist et al. distinguish between core affect (i.e.,
mental representation of bodily representations) and conceptual-
ization (i.e., sensations from the body or external world that are
made meaningful). Major depression (MD) is a psychiatric dis-
order with “sadness” as one of the core elements, and it is well
known that, in many cases, an episode of MD is preceded by
stressful life events such as marital or health problems (e.g.,
Kendler et al. 1999). Although such life events are potentially
quite aversive in nature, most people do not develop an
episode of MD after experiencing them: So why are some
people so severely affected by a stressful life event whereas
most others are not? One explanation could be that in people
who develop an episode of MD after a stressful life event the
conceptualization process is dysfunctional; most people would
respond with some sadness after a quarrel with a spouse (i.e.,
“normal” core affect), but in people with MD, this event is
overly negatively conceptualized (“See, even my husband does
not love me”). Such a hypothesis is consistent with clinical
observations that patients with MD often engage in excessive
rumination about past events (e.g., Roelofs et al. 2008a; 2008b).
On the other hand, in disorders with “fear” as a core element,
the core affect process might have gone awry. Patients with a
specific phobia are extremely fearful of certain objects (e.g.,
hypodermic needles), situations (e.g., flying an airplane), or
animals (e.g., spiders) that do not elicit the same response in
most other people. When confronted with, for example, a
spider, patients with a phobia for that object will respond with
various bodily sensations (e.g., profuse sweating, heart palpita-
tions) to that object, whereas people without the phobia will
not experience such bodily sensations; in terms of the Lindquist
et al. perspective, specific phobia patients react with excessive
core affect to phobic objects compared to non-phobic patients.
Distinguishing emotional disorders in terms of Lindquist
et al.’s proposed processes might implicate a shift in clinical
neuroscience from searching for the dysfunctional brain area
causing a particular disorder to searching which brain areas do
not optimally work together in perceiving and interpreting exter-
nal stimuli (e.g., will we find that the conceptualization network is
overly active in patients with MD?). This implication of Lindquist
et al.’s work, that psychiatric disorders are not likely to be
explained in terms of one dysfunctional brain area, bears a
striking resemblance to recent attempts at formulating psychia-
tric disorders as networks of causally related symptoms (Bors-
boom 2008; Cramer et al. 2010; Kendler et al. 2011). In the
network approach, psychiatric disorders are hypothesized to
stem from direct interactions between symptoms (e.g., feeling
tired sleeping a lot concentration problems) instead of
from one underlying biological dysfunction (e.g., serotonin dys-
function causes all symptoms of MD). As such, each symptom
is an autonomous causal entity and it is unlikely that such entities
share the exact same etiological mechanisms: For example, symp-
toms such as insomnia and fatigue are likely governed by homeo-
static processes, whereas symptoms such as guilty feelings and
depressed mood are more likely regulated by cognitive processes
(e.g., rumination). This hypothesis also lies at the heart of a
theory in which psychiatric disorders are mechanistic property
clusters (MPCs): mutually reinforcing networks of causal mech-
anisms at multiple levels of explanation (e.g., symptoms, brain).
Each of these conceptualizations suggests that there are no
hard delineations between disorders, as the processes that
carry forward disturbances in a network are unlikely to be con-
fined to a single set of symptoms (i.e., have a transdiagnostic
character).
Thus, Lindquist et al.’s constructionist account is suggestive
of mutually reinforcing networks at the brain level that, when
working optimally, result in the subjective experience of an
appropriate particular emotion (e.g., fear when confronted with
an angry grizzly bear). However, if one or more of those networks
do not optimally work together, the result can be an inappropri-
ate emotion (e.g., excessive fear when confronted with a spider).
Subsequently, the network approach (i.e., mutually reinforcing
networks at the symptom level) explains why, for example, a dys-
functional core affect process does not result in a specific phobia
but results in excessive fear of a particular object or situation:
other symptoms of a specific phobia, for example avoiding the
feared object or situation, are a result of the excessive fear (i.e.,
one symptom causing the other). One way to investigate this
hypothesis is by gathering intensive time-series data with which
one can accurately monitor the development of symptoms (and
interactions among them) over time. This approach can be com-
bined with frequent fMRI scans in order to link, for example,
excessive activation of the conceptualization network, to the
subsequent development of MD symptoms.
Emotions as mind organs
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001695
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Abstract: In matters of the mind, the opposition between what is mind-
made or inside and natural or outside the mind is bound to misfire.
Lindquist et al. build their analysis on a strong contrast between
naturalism, which they reject, and psychologism, which they endorse.
We challenge this opposition and indicate how adopting psychologism
to combat a naturalistic view of emotional mind/brain areas is
self-defeating. We briefly develop the alternative view of emotions as
mental organs.
Lindquist et al. challenge the view that the most familiar emotion
words and the linguistically expressed emotion experiences are
ultimately the natural kinds found in the brain/mind, referred
to as “naturalism” for short. Naturalism traditionally refers to
the view that some of the entities the mind reasons with and
decides about exist outside of and independent from these
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mental operations. Let us label this physicalist naturalism.
However, when naturalism is used to refer to putative entities
in the mind/brain, the situation is much more complex. Menta-
listic naturalism as opposed to physicalist naturalism, seems to
postulate that there are entities in the mind that are not mind-
made. As Lindquist et al. present it, for naturalism basic emotions
are such mind-independent entities. Emotions, in the naturalistic
view the authors challenge, stand for mind-independent or for
biological categories, which are essentially present in the mind-
brain. Psychologism, by contrast, does not build on anything
given other than its own operations, which are the same whatever
the subject matter.
Interestingly, the description of the alternative view Lindquist
et al. endorse, psychological constructivism, consists of entirely
content-general mental operations that operate over inputs that
are not necessarily emotional. So, other aspects aside, the con-
trast the authors set up is between emotional determinism and
emotional indeterminism of the mind’s building blocks.
The inherent contradictions of an area-focused meta-
analysis. Lindquist et al. are rightfully critical of the approach
that has been prominent in the majority of brain imaging
studies aspiring to localize the neurofunctional basis of each
single emotion in a dedicated brain area. For example, the amyg-
dala was the fear area, the insula was the disgust area, and so
forth. Meta-analyses inherit the weak points of still less-than-
perfect brain imaging techniques and cannot but endorse and
amplify them. fMRI studies vary widely in scanner properties,
in settings, in designs, and in tasks, including the involvement
of attention, awareness, and contrast stimuli or conditions. The
meta-analysis exploits the very procedures under attack by
using positive activation levels of isolated brain areas themselves
obtained in a wide variety of studies. The meta-analytic con-
clusion that some areas play or do not play their anticipated
role, does not invalidate their role, and this role may or may
not show up in fMRI analysis. For example, the amygdala was
repeatedly shown to play a role in processing of emotional
stimuli, and brain imaging studies of autism are consistent with
this. However, patients with Urbach-Wiethe syndrome have a
major deficit of the basolateral amygdala, yet show no signs of
autistic behavior. There are many more examples illustrating
that there is no rigid link between a brain area and a functional
deficit. But the suggestion of attributing functions to a network
rather that to a single area is likely to beg the question.
Another approach to emotions is needed. It must be possible
to avoid naive naturalism and extreme psychologism.
Emotions are mind organs. Emotions are mind/body adap-
tations, evolved in natural and social contexts (in a partly
species-specific way). As emotions serve different goals, they
have evolved next to each other and inhabit brain/body resources
in different ways to fit their goals (Panksepp 1998). Yet in contrast
to many approaches, different emotions are interdependent and
interrelated. We do not believe that emotions must await neuroa-
natomical dissection to prove that they operate as cooperating
distinct entities, even if functional distinctions can be made
and appear in clinical symptoms. We know that this is unrealistic
with current functional neuroimaging techniques. For example,
different emotions produce different facial expressions in a pre-
dictable way, although we can reasonably assume that we are
unable at the moment to distinguish between motor activity
associated with angry versus fearful expressions. In the very
same way, the visceral activation and the associated feeling will
be different between disgust and anger, but it is unlikely that
these emotional experiences can be disentangled spatially by
their cortical somatosensory responses. In our view, emotions
entail a distributed neural system, and focusing on its com-
ponents, whether from a locationist or from a psychological con-
structionist perspective, is equally and inherently reductionist.
First, psychological constructivism reduces emotions to a sum
of parts, ignoring that a particular neural component exerts its
function in relation to and sometimes driven by the other
components of the individual emotion system (e.g., Benuzzi
et al. 2009; Liang et al. 2009). This emotion-specific connectivity
pattern is an essential and mandatory characteristic of emotions.
Second, by attributing a specific psychological operation to a
gross anatomical component, the degrees of freedom of the func-
tional contribution of this component to a particular emotional
state are reduced. For example, the amygdala may signal motiva-
tional salience in some instances but may critically contribute to
the fear response in others. Patients with epilepsy caused by
sclerosis of the amygdala, for example, may experience intense
fear during their seizures, in the absence of any relevant object
(Van Paesschen et al. 2001). Third, emotion-specific activation
at the cellular level in monkey studies (Kuraoka & Nakamura
2007) somewhat contradicts the postulation of generic regional
operations that is made by psychological constructivism.
Just as organs have different functions in the body, emotions
serve different functions in the mind. The traditional terminology
of basic emotions as states is indeed inappropriate to catch these
functions. They encompass not just a network of brain areas, as
these activation peaks are the tip of the iceberg. Beneath the neu-
rofunctional facts revealed by brain imaging studies of neurotypi-
cal subjects, are structural facts, inhibitory and excitatory
modulations in dynamic networks, endocrinological signatures,
behavioral engrams laid down by phylogenetic and ontogenetic
experience, and so on. Most importantly in this context, the func-
tion of an organ, in this case the minds’ emotions, needs to be
understood in relation to the others and of the whole. Just as
the body cannot be reduced to a collection of independent
organs, the emotions operate in concert, and whether in health
or in sickness, they need to be considered together. Balanced
or unbalanced, the interaction between the emotion organs
makes and breaks the self. One may still call this “psychologism,”
but then any view on emotions is “psychologism.”
A rigorous approach for testing the
constructionist hypotheses of brain function
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Abstract: Although the target article provides strong evidence against the
locationist view, evidence for the constructionist view is inconclusive,
because co-activation of brain regions does not necessarily imply
connectivity between them. We propose a rigorous approach wherein
connectivity between co-activated regions is first modeled using
exploratory Granger causality, and then confirmed using dynamic
causal modeling or Bayesian modeling.
Lindquist et al. seek to distinguish between locationist and con-
structionist models of emotion by performing a meta-analysis of
brain activations during various types of emotional stimuli. Meth-
odologically speaking, the discovery of activated brain areas using
the general linear model is primarily geared towards the
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locationist framework because it is a univariate method, which
assumes that each voxel time series is independent of others.
However, interaction between voxel time series from different
brain regions is imperative for the constructionist model to
work. Consequently, any evidence for the constructionist
model from an analysis of activations is tenuous and indirect.
Therefore, in our opinion, although this target article provides
strong evidence against the locationist view, the evidence for
the constructionist view is not conclusive. The authors do offer
the future possibility of pattern classification of the meta-analytic
database showing associations between emotional category and a
set of co-activated brain regions. This might be a step forward,
but it still does not directly model the interactions between
brain regions.
Here we present a rigorous approach for testing the construc-
tionist view. If a set of brain regions co-activate in response to an
external stimulus of emotional value, then there must be signifi-
cant information transfer between the co-activated regions.
For example, a fearful stimulus may first activate the sensory
regions, which transmit that information to the amygdala,
which determines the stimulus to be motivationally salient. The
insula may encode the visceral reaction to it and then transmit
it to the orbitofrontal cortex. The visceral information from the
insula, the salience information from the amygdala, and executive
attention from the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, may all con-
verge in the orbitofrontal cortex (or some other prefrontal area)
and be integrated to create the experience of fear (or any other
emotion). The constructionist hypothesis predicts that different
regions encode some basic psychological operations, which,
when integrated, “feels” like different emotions. In the aforemen-
tioned example, the co-activation of a set of brain regions is only a
necessary condition for the constructionist view, but is not suffi-
cient. Only a model which can capture and quantify the task-
associated connectivity between regions can provide sufficient
evidence for the constructionist hypothesis. We will now describe
how such models could be used for directly testing the construc-
tionist hypothesis.
Granger causality analysis (GCA) is based on the principle that
if the past activity of region A can predict the present and future
activity of region B, then A must have a causal influence on
B. Traditionally, GC is obtained from the vector autoregressive
model wherein GC from time series j to time series i is given
by the ijth element of coefficient matrix (Deshpande et al.
2009). GCA is completely data-driven, accommodating a large
number of time series in the model, and is primarily an explora-
tory technique. Many refinements to GCA have been proposed,
such as correlation-purged/dynamic/nonlinear GC (Deshpande
et al. 2010; Marinazzo et al. 2008; Sato et al. 2006) and hemody-
namic deconvolution (Havlicek et al. 2011; Ryali et al. 2011),
which have increased the applicability of GCA to fMRI. On the
other hand, dynamic causal modeling relies on modeling under-
lying neuronal causality using state-space equations and Bayesian
inference for comparing model evidence. Although dynamic
causal modeling is restricted by the number of time series (up
to 8), it is a robust confirmatory technique. We propose com-
bined use of GCA and dynamic causal modeling for testing the
constructionist hypothesis. First, GCA could be employed on
time series from a large number of nodes, similar to the
number used in the target article, provided there are enough sub-
jects for such an analysis to be adequately powered. Using an
iterative network reduction procedure we have previously pro-
posed (Deshpande et al. 2008), the large exploratory network
could be reduced to a smaller network by removing network
redundancies, which could then be confirmed by either
dynamic causal modeling (if the reduced network has fewer
than 8 nodes) or other methods such as Patel’s tau (t) (Sathian
et al. 2011), which are not based on autoregressive principles
but rather on Bayesian inference. In this way, converging evi-
dence can be obtained from multiple and distinct methodologies
for quantifying the magnitude and direction of connectivity
between co-activated brain regions. Such an analysis could
provide sufficient evidence for the constructionist hypothesis.
In section 6.1 of the target article, paragraph 2, the authors
suggest that studies of resting states will be useful in determining
if there are “intrinsic” functional networks corresponding to
emotion categories or basic psychological operations underlying
them. Here we address some pertinent methodological advances
in fMRI research in this direction. While most neuroimaging
studies of resting state networks have concentrated on functional
connectivity based on instantaneous correlation (which is a non-
directional influence) in a single network, we investigated both
functional connectivity and effective connectivity (which is a
directional influence) of four different resting state networks
using a single multivariate model (Deshpande et al. 2011). This
enabled an explanation of the basic psychological operations
during the resting state, such as episodic memory, self-referential
processing, and cognitive integration in terms of significant path-
ways in the network. We believe that this study will provide sig-
nificant insights for testing the constructionist hypothesis using
resting-state data.
Emotional participation in musical and
non-musical behaviors
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001506
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Abstract: Existence of similarities of overall brain activation, specifically
during emotional and other common psychological operations (discussed
by Lindquist et al.), supports a proposal that emotion participates
continuously in dynamic adjustment of behavior. The proposed
participation can clarify the relationship of emotion to musical
experience. Music, in turn, can help explore such participation.
Lindquist et al.’s data analysis in the target article can support
continuous rather than episodic involvement of emotion in
“mental engagement” (Gardiner 2008c), my terminology for the
functional action of the brain that generates behavior.
Study of the emotional components of musical experience
(Gardiner 2003; 2008b; Juslin & Vastfjall 2008) can help to
develop our understanding of emotional participation in mental
engagement, once we enlarge theoretical orientation towards
musical evidence. Juslin and Vastfjall and others search for
specific features within heard music that evoke emotion. But to
account for much of the richness, variety, and subtlety of
emotion within musical experience (Dewey 1934/1980), we
should view emotion as most generally generated by integral
participation in, rather than response to, music.
Emotion (Damasio 1999) is related to an adjustment of body
physiology and brain activation and restoration that maintains
overall homeostatic equilibrium while also addressing the behav-
ioral needs of an organism. Body and brain activities are mar-
shaled for fleeing, fighting, or pursuing a mate, with restoration
taking place during relaxation and rest. But activation and restor-
ation must be addressed and balanced throughout every behav-
ioral state, as the recovery of every nerve after firing illustrates.
At least in humans, conscious awareness concerning emotion
(Damasio 1999) must have a role as well. Emotion and feeling
reflect (James & Lange 1922) and influence (Cannon 1929)
adjustments of body and brain physiology, but the details of
how this occurs are still not fully resolved.
Emotions include not only primary emotions of happiness,
sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust (Damasio 1999), but
also social emotions such as embarrassment, jealousy, guilt, and
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pride, and background emotions such as well-being, malaise,
calm, and tension. Emotion and feeling thus concern not just
shorter term physiological adjustments, but also have influence
on longer term adjustments of behavior. Variety, mixtures, and
fluctuation of experienced states can frustrate verbal classification,
but normal experience shows no breaks in emotion and feeling.
Detection of specific sensory stimuli signaling a critical need
for action can trigger almost immediate emotional response
(Damasio 1999; LeDoux 1996), but, especially in humans,
emotional reaction to most stimuli depends greatly on context.
Consider now the calm, peace, and admiration of beauty one
can experience while walking quietly through a beautiful forest.
Similar emotional components can be experienced during what
Dewey terms the musical experience (Dewey 1934/1980),
produced as one progresses at a slow rhythmical-walking
(“andante”) pace through listening to music at the beginning of
the “andante” of Mozart’s Piano Sonata K.V. 283, while admiring
its beauty, or still more, if one is able to move easily through the
activity of playing this music while conscious of its beauty.
Here, similarity in sensory stimuli reaching one during these
non-musical and musical activities cannot account for any simi-
larity of experienced emotion. But both the non-musical and
musical activities involve progression through activity at a
similar rhythmic and “andante” rate to which body and brain
may well make similar physiological adjustment. Both activities
involve awareness of and emotional reaction to the enjoyment
of beauty. And both may well involve emotion registering and
interacting with the ease and lack of impediment with which be-
havior progresses. As this example illustrates, the involvement of
emotion in non-musical behaviors can help us understand its
involvement in musical behaviors as well.
The growing evidence relating emotion to adjustment of physi-
ology to maintain homeostasis (Damasio 1999) should direct us
towards further developing our understanding of connections
between details of mental engagement and emotion. Every act
of mental engagement, whether it produces motor behavior or
not, depends upon and may well also affect physiology of brain
and body. I propose that accumulating evidence implies that
much of mental engagement involves interaction within complexes
that incorporate interconnected levels of engagement (see also,
Chase & Simon 1973; DeGroot 1965). Higher-order motor acts,
such as the utterance of a verbal phrase or the playing of a
melodic phrase, are built from lower-level motor acts that generate
the utterances of phonemes, or the playing of individual musical
notes. Listening acts involving speech or music are as much acts
of mental engagement as are acts that produce motor conse-
quences such as talking or singing. The dynamic structure of
these acts of composite engagement make continuous demands
on brain and body physiology. If indeed emotion is intimately
related to adjustment to demands on physiology, as work for
more than a century implies, then it would be very useful for
humans and other creatures to have evolved not only the large-
scale emotion-related adjustments that are already increasingly
well understood, but also as deep an involvement of emotion-
related detailed physiological adjustment interacting with mental
engagement at all its levels, about which far less is known so far.
The influence on and interaction with emotion plausibly comes,
I propose, at every level of the mental engagement that compo-
sitely generates behavior – this including the highest levels of
engagement that generate coordinated activity over significant
periods of time, such as, in the example discussed, walking
through a forest, or playing a piece of music (see also Clynes 1977).
Detailed involvement of emotion at all levels of mental engage-
ment is of course extremely difficult to explore. Here I believe that
music in its rich connection to emotional experience can give us
many important windows of opportunity. As an example, consider
the extent to which seemingly subtle changes in music can lead to
striking shifts from positive to negative emotional experiences. The
positive emotions experienced while engaged in listening to or
playing the beginning of the Mozart Piano Sonata K.V. 283
andante written in the key of C Major can shift immediately to
negative emotions of brooding sadness if one plays this music, or
listens to it played, instead in the key of C Minor, even if all
other features of the performance remain unchanged. The
musical change involves only a small difference in certain critical
musical notes, in particular every E lowered to E flat. An opposite
effect can be demonstrated with the opening of the Mozart Piano
Sonata K.V. 310 in AMinor, where the experience of intense grief
– related, I suspect, to the death of Mozart’s mother – is immedi-
ately changed to a sense of triumph and exhilaration if the piece is
played in A Major. I trace such differences in emotion to differ-
ences in the musical scales, which affect tensions and their
release within melodies and associated harmonies, major scales
promoting a sense of forward and upward movement, and minor
ones pushing rather down and against forward movement. Nega-
tive emotions such as sadness or grief may then reflect, in part,
the sense of continuous obstruction to movement that the music
illustrates.
Humanity may well have developed music (see Gardiner 2000;
2003; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; Gardner et al. 1996) to produce
experiences that further exploited to its own benefit its evolved
capabilities for mental engagement importantly including
engagement involving emotion. We should continue to use our
musical creations to further study ourselves.
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tell us about the nature of emotion?
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Abstract: In Vytal and Hamann (2010) we reported a neuroimaging
meta-analysis that found that basic emotions can be distinguished by
their brain activation correlates, in marked contrast to Lindquist et al.’s
conclusions in the target article. Here, I discuss implications of these
findings for understanding emotion, outline limitations of using meta-
analyses and neuroimaging as the sole basis for deciding between
emotion views, and suggest that these views are essentially compatible
and could be adapted and combined into an integrated emotion
framework.
Lindquist et al. present an innovative answer to the question of
how the human brain generates emotions, in the form of their
conceptual act model (CAM). This model combines embodied
cognition, psychological construction, and other approaches
into an impressive and sweeping theoretical framework, which
provides a fascinating counterpoint to more established models.
The CAM offers a fresh perspective and will surely generate
much-needed debate and discussion that will foster new theoreti-
cal development and empirical studies in this area.
I would like to distinguish here between the merits of the CAM
and the particular meta-analytic approach taken to demonstrate
support for it in the target article. In this commentary, I focus
on the latter and outline how our recent meta-analysis (Vytal &
Hamann 2010), which found results supporting the basic
emotion view, suggests important limitations for using meta-ana-
lyses as evidence to decide between emotion views. Next, I
suggest that to properly evaluate different emotion views, neuroi-
maging evidence alone is not sufficient and needs to be sup-
plemented by methods which can identify functionally essential
regions. Finally, I suggest how these views, which are often
Commentary/Lindquist et al.: The brain basis of emotion
150 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 35:3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11001531
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:25:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
cast as incompatible, could potentially be combined into an inte-
grated emotion framework.
Meta-analyses conﬂict over support for basic emotions. Our
meta-analysis, using a different but related method (Laird et al.
2005), supported the conclusion that basic emotions have consist-
ent and discriminable (specific) brain correlates (Vytal &
Hamann 2010). These findings, summarized in Figure 1 of this
commentary, showed that each pair of basic emotions (e.g., hap-
piness vs. fear`) could be distinguished by differences in regional
brain activation likelihood (see Vytal & Hamann 2010 for details).
In marked contrast, Lindquist et al.’s meta-analysis found no
evidence for specificity.
What are the implications of these discordant findings? One
implication is that results of meta-analyses can be strongly influ-
enced by initial assumptions, analysis choices, and decision cri-
teria, and that caution should be taken when relying on only
one approach. For example, to address specificity, we used a
standard approach to establish discrimination ability by statisti-
cally contrasting activation maps for each possible pair of
emotions. In their most comparable analysis, Lindquist et al.
used a different but equally acceptable approach, contrasting
individual emotions with the average of all other emotions.
These different decision criteria will necessarily lead to different
conclusions in some cases. Although the authors include other
analyses, these derive from the same density analysis. The fact
that different meta-analyses that use standard methods can lead
to opposite conclusions suggests that it may be premature to con-
clude that CAM is supported by neuroimaging meta-analysis.
Different criteria and deﬁnitions complicate comparison of
views. Beyond the issue of meta-analysis methods lies another
basic problem for comparing emotion views: widely differing
criteria. The criteria for supporting basic emotions are strict
and highly specific, whereas those for CAM are lenient and
very flexible. The authors acknowledge these issues and take
steps to counter this bias where possible. Critically, however,
no evidence is provided to confirm that these steps are actually
effective. Without such evidence, it would again seem premature
to draw firm conclusions.
A related issue concerns how basic emotion (locationist) views
are defined. The target article focuses exclusively on testing the
most limited version: single brain regions uniquely associated
with specific basic emotions. However, the recent literature
suggests that most neuroimaging researchers acknowledge that
emotions arise from networks of two or more regions. For
example, amygdala activity increases along with increasing
emotional arousal across a wide range of emotions, both pleasant
and unpleasant (Hamann et al. 2002).
Given this well-known counterevidence, it seems unlikely that
most well-informed neuroimaging researchers would contend
that the amygdala is only responsive to fear, or that amygdala acti-
vation would not be associated with other emotions. The fact that
Lindquist et al.’s conclusions do not apply to basic emotion views
that postulate network implementations significantly limits the
scope of the target article’s conclusions, relative to current
debates. Indeed, the target article leaves open the possibility
that basic emotions may be based on brain networks.
Considering converging evidence from other methods is
essential. A final consideration is that neuroimaging can only
establish associations between emotions and regions of brain acti-
vation, not whether these regions are functionally essential for an
emotion as opposed to being inessential, merely co-activated
regions. Because the focus of the emotion debate is on the
Figure 1 (Hamann). Summary of brain regions whose activity discriminated between each pair of basic emotions in our previous
meta-analysis. (Results adapted from Vytal & Hamann 2010.) Each colored region shows brain regions where a direct statistical
meta-analytic contrast of activation likelihood significantly distinguished between pairs of basic emotions. Colors are superimposed
on a standard anatomical MRI brain image in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space, with the right of the images showing
the right hemisphere. Blue numbers indicate inferior-superior level (z). Where colors overlap they combine additively; for example,
red and blue overlap to equal purple). For clarity, the 10 pairwise contrasts are displayed in three separate groupings. Top panel:
Red: happiness vs. disgust; Green: happiness vs. sadness; Blue: happiness vs. anger. Middle panel: Red: sadness vs. anger; Green:
fear vs. disgust; Blue: fear vs. happiness. Lower panel: Red: sadness vs. disgust; Green: fear vs. anger; Blue: anger vs. disgust;
Gold: fear vs. sadness. A color version of this image can be viewed in the online version of this target article at http://
www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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brain processes essential for generating emotions, it follows that
to properly evaluate the evidence for different emotion views, it
will be critical to consider converging evidence from methods
that can establish whether brain regions are functionally essential
for emotion. Such methods include studies of patients with brain
lesions, and stimulation methods such as intracranial brain
stimulation.
Summary. The foregoing points suggest that Lindquist et al.’s
meta-analysis has some important limitations. These limitations
raise concerns about interpreting the meta-analysis conclusions
as supporting the CAM and as constituting evidence against
basic emotion views. The two emotion views in the target
article have been frequently cast as mutually incompatible, com-
peting views. However, an alternative approach might be to
explore how elements of both views can be combined, creating
a hybrid view that would combine key advantages of both. A
synthesis seems possible. If Lindquist et al.’s meta-analysis had
supported the existence of one basic emotion, for example,
fear, it is likely that this could be accommodated within the flex-
ible CAM. If core affect is proposed to be an inborn ability “given
by nature” (Barrett et al. 2007a), and core affect may evolve to
include other distinctions such as approach/avoidance, it is con-
ceivable that other distinctions, perhaps some resembling basic
emotions, could be encompassed within core affect.
In conclusion, the highlights of this thoughtful and intriguing
article are its elaboration of the CAM and its discussion of
neural mechanisms of emotion. The CAM is an important contri-
bution to longstanding debates on the nature of emotion, inde-
pendent of potential concerns about supporting evidence in the
target article. The interplay between such models and other
views will help spark the evolution of new neuroscientific theories
about how the human brain generates emotions.
Psychological constructionism and cultural
neuroscience
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. argue that emotional categories do not map onto
distinct regions within the brain, but rather, arise from basic psychological
processes, including conceptualization, executive attention, and core
affect. Here, we use examples from cultural neuroscience to argue that
psychological constructionism, not locationism, captures the essential
role of emotion in the social and cultural brain.
Strikingly, several regions reviewed by Lindquist et al. are not
only involved in the perception and experience of emotions,
but are the very same neural regions most often implicated in
social behaviors. Here, we argue that culture as the broadest
form of social behavior depends upon – and evolved along
with – general neural mechanisms underlying emotion. Specifi-
cally, we use cultural neuroscience findings on emotional vigi-
lance and empathy to illustrate that general mechanisms, rather
than specific emotional modules, support how we think, feel,
and behave in our social worlds.
Implicating the basic processes of executive attention and core
affect in social contexts, cultural neuroscience research reveals a
relationship between collectivism and emotional vigilance.
Specifically, participants primed with collectivistic values
responded more quickly to fear-relevant stimuli in a dot-probe
task (Chiao & Lee 2011). This is further supported by a cross-
cultural study of Japanese, Japanese-American, and Caucasian-
American participants, demonstrating that Japanese, relative to
Americans of either race, show heightened amygdala activity in
response to negative emotional stimuli (Chiao et al. 2011). Fur-
thermore, bicultural Asian-Americans primed with collectivistic
values show increased amygdala response to negative emotional
stimuli, indicating that being in either an individualistic or collec-
tivistic cultural mindset elicits a culturally congruent emotional
effect (Hechtman et al. 2011).
We interpret these findings as suggesting that collectivism
necessitates increased emotional vigilance (in a constructionist’s
framework, core affect and executive attention). For example,
collectivistic nations have historically had higher levels of
environmental threat, such as increased pathogen prevalence,
which may require vigilance for survival (Fincher et al. 2008).
Furthermore, collectivistic cultures typically place a strong
emphasis on group membership and hierarchy (Fincher et al.
2008). These tight constraints on appropriate social behavior
may require increased attention to negative cues in one’s
environment, in order to correct one’s behavior and bring behav-
ior into line with social norms. Building on this evolutionary
perspective, genetic factors may parallel and support culture’s
influence on emotion. For instance, recent evidence suggests
that the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR) – known to
regulate neurotransmission within the amygadala and other
regions supporting emotional vigilance (Munafo et al. 2008) –
may have co-evolved along with cultural values of individual-
ism–collectivism (Chiao & Blizinsky 2010). Specifically, collecti-
vistic nations have larger proportions of individuals who carry the
S compared to the L allele of the 5-HTTLPR (Chiao & Blizinsky
2010). S-allele carriers show increased amygdala response to
negative stimuli (Hariri et al. 2002), paralleling the cultural
effects. We therefore propose that genetic and cultural factors
have exerted mutual evolutionary influence on neural systems
underlying attention and core affect.
As implied by this culture-gene coevolutionary view, the afore-
mentioned findings on amygdala and associated genes can be
interpreted as mechanisms tuning people’s basic emotional pro-
cesses. This is consistent with a view of the amygdala as not
merely supporting a discrete emotion category, but as a center
that modulates other regions to create a nonspecific state of
emotional vigilance (Davis & Whalen 2001). Similarly, since
the amygdala typically serves an important social function
(Adolphs 2010), its activity likely enables appropriate cultural
behaviors based on environmental context. Altogether, the amyg-
dala functions as a modulator of emotional and attentional
processes. A locationist view of emotion therefore fails to
account for how the brain evolved and how it carries out its
responses to sociocultural and environmental demands.
Besides moderating emotional vigilance, culture shapes other
social cognitive processes involving core affect and conceptualiz-
ation. Particularly, culture influences neural mechanisms under-
lying group coordination and helping behaviors, such as empathy
and pro-sociality (Boyd & Richerson 2009). When empathizing
with others’ feelings, people recruit the bilateral insula, the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and somatosensory cortices
during both perception and experience of others’ emotional
states (Lamm et al. 2011). Additionally, neural response is
enhanced within brain regions associated with mentalizing,
such as the medial prefrontal cortex, which likely reflects the
recruitment of self-related processes for understanding and
sharing the emotional states of others (Frith & Frith 2006).
Neural response within the empathic brain is modulated by a
number of sociocultural factors, including social dominance
orientation (SDO) (Chiao et al. 2009), implicit racial attitudes
(IAT; Avenanti et al. 2010; Bruneau & Saxe 2010), racial identi-
fication (MEIM; Mathur et al. 2010), and modern racism (MR;
Gutsell & Inzlicht, in press). Specifically, people with strong
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social hierarchy preference (i.e., high SDO) show less ACC and
insula activity when empathizing with others’ pain. Additionally,
people with stronger racial IAT biases show reduced sensorimo-
tor response to out-group members (Avenanti et al. 2010).
Beyond ACC and insula activity, MEIM predicts extraordinary
in-group empathy in African-Americans, indexed by increased
activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) (Mathur et al.
2010). Furthermore, MEIM is associated with default-mode
network activity within cortical midline structures (Mathur
et al., in press). Finally, Gutsell and Inzlicht (in press) demon-
strate the association between MR and prefrontal asymmetry.
Similar to the proposed roles of the amygdala, neural mechan-
isms underlying empathy can be interpreted from an evolution-
ary perspective. In constructionist terms, processes of core
affect (e.g., in the ACC and insula) and conceptualization (e.g.,
in the MPFC) give rise to empathy, which channels people’s
emotion towards others through re-experience of their feelings.
Empathic processes, then, may have evolved to support pro-
social behaviors in groups and, in turn, may have coevolved
with intricate sociocultural structures. For example, sociocultural
constraints on empathic feeling (e.g., SDO, racial IAT, MEIM,
and MR) likely create (and are enabled by) differential feelings
for others based on group and/or status. Here the modulation
of various processes (e.g., core affect and conceptualization) sup-
ports both differential feelings towards, and differential concepts
about, other people. Localist views of emotion cannot account for
the multiple converging, socially shaped processes crucially
involved in empathic feeling.
In sum, using cultural neuroscience work on emotional vigi-
lance and empathy, we illustrate that both social and emotional
behaviors are products of basic processes that are culturally
and environmentally shaped. This process view, assuming evol-
utionary development of fundamental psychological building
blocks, accounts for the vast overlap in social and emotional
brain regions. Together, cultural neuroscience research, account-
ing for the evolution of culturally appropriate forms of emotion,
supports constructionist, but not localist, views on emotion.
Further routes to psychological
constructionism
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Abstract: In this commentary, we do two things. First, we sketch two
further routes to psychological constructionism. They are complementary
to Lindquist et al.’s meta-analyses and have potential to add new
evidence. Second, we look at a challenging kind of case for
constructionism, namely, emotional anomalies where there are correlated,
and probably relevant, brain anomalies. Psychopaths are our example.
Lindquist et al. demonstrate that there is little evidence for a
locationist approach to emotion. We, too, think that the evidence
points toward psychological constructionism, the view that
emotions of a certain kind are constructed out of more general
brain structures whose function is not specific to emotions of
that kind, or even to emotions at all. There is not much evidence
that emotions are localized in specific, unique regions of the
brain dedicated to a particular kind of emotion alone and no
other cognitive function. There is even less evidence for the mod-
ularity that has often accompanied the localization hypothesis.
This commentary aims to add two things. First, we suggest that
there are other routes to the same constructionist conclusion. We
sketch two. They are complementary to the meta-analyses of
Lindquist et al. and have the potential to add a considerable
amount of new evidence. Second, we look at what is perhaps
the most challenging type of case for constructionism, namely,
the existence of emotional anomalies where there is evidence
for specific, highly correlated, and probably relevant brain
anomalies. We have chosen psychopaths as our example.
One additional route to evidence concerning constructionism
would be to look at “task specifics,” that is, the specifics of the
context of individual occurrences of a kind of emotion. Consider
anger. Anger can be produced by many input modes: seeing,
hearing, recalling, being told. Some situations leading to anger
are more difficult to understand than others (i.e., they impose a
greater cognitive load; Lindquist et al. touch on this issue in
section 5.4, para. 4). At the output end, the manner in which
anger is expressed varies enormously from case to case, especially
across cultures, genders, and socio-economic groups (Ekman
1993; Cheng et al. 2005). Sometimes anger expresses itself in
physical aggression, sometimes in verbal aggression, sometimes
in contempt (of which there are in turn many forms), sometimes
in passivity, sometimes in deliberately blunted affect (“cold-
ness”). (Lindquist et al. touch on this as well [sect. 6.1, para. 3],
but do nothing with the observation. Indeed, it is not even
clear whether for them expression is part of emotion.) Therefore,
our question is: Since these different ways of expressing anger are
almost certainly associated with widely different regions in the
brain, are there any regions or sub-regions activated throughout
the different kinds and contexts of anger? If no region or sub-
region is activated across all the differences of input, cognitive
demand, and output, that would be important further evidence
for constructionism.
One could use task specifics in a number of other ways. For
example, one could look at cases where expression is roughly con-
stant across occurrences but underlain by very different
emotions. Or one could try to factor out differences in brain
activation associated with different reasons for a given kind of
emotion, or differences resulting from personality type or
psychological disorder.
Another way to generate data relevant to constructionism
would be to look at cases in which a stimulus generates a judg-
ment about an emotion rather than the emotion itself; for
example, where a face is interpreted as expressing anger but
does not make the subject feel angry. In the relatively unemo-
tional judgment about the stimulus, are the same areas activated
as when the subject actually feels angry?
In the same vein, there are cases where we would expect a face
to be interpreted as expressing anger, but some subjects interpret
it instead as expressing pain. Would the same areas be activated
as when subjects interpreted faces in line with our expectations as
expressing anger? And what about activation associated with
differences of experimental protocol (reaction time or decoding,
masking or no masking, variations in the emotional intensity of
the stimulus, and/or differences among different kinds of stimu-
lus set, visual modality [seeing vs. hearing], and level of cognitive
load)? The research questions behind task specific studies are: (1)
Concerning a given emotion, what are the activation patterns for
different patterns of vision, cognition, and expression? And, (2)
Do these patterns lend any support to the localization
hypothesis?
Psychopaths, in whom striking emotional anomalies are
strongly correlated with specific brain anomalies, appear to chal-
lenge constructionism. The emotional anomalies associated with
psychopathy include callousness or lack of empathy, lack of
remorse and guilt, and shallow affect (Cleckley 1982; Hare
1991). Turning to task specifics, psychopaths often react differ-
ently from non-psychopaths to emotionally laden stimuli. The
emotional anomalies in psychopaths are usually specific to fear
(Blair et al. 2001). They show little startle reaction in fear situ-
ations (Patrick et al. 1993) and poor decoding of fearful facial
expressions (Blair et al. 2004) in comparison to non-psychopaths.
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They also present with a distorted ability to allocate attention in a
way that reflects the emotional content of stimuli (Lorenz &
Newman 2002; Newman et al. 2010). (The latter already points
to constructionism.)
What about the underlying, correlated brain activation? While
the anomalies suggest amygdala dysfunction and there is indeed
evidence for this (Blair 2005; 2008), the behavioral evidence
strongly supports constructionism – indeed, more than Lind-
quist et al. fully recognize. They associate the psychopath’s
aggression with anger (sect. 5.3, para. 1). In fact, there is far
more variability in psychopaths than this. In psychopaths, aggres-
sion tends to play an instrumental role as opposed to the reactive
role that it usually plays in non-psychopaths (Hart & Hare 1996).
Aggression appears to be how psychopaths respond to a wide
variety of situations about which they have a wide variety of feel-
ings. If this is true, aggression in them is likely to be associated
with a wide range of emotions, not just anger. This conclusion
supports constructionism.
Thus, not only does psychopathy not threaten psychological
constructionism, it offers support for the view. We expect that
the same will be true for other syndromes that have seemed to
some to offer evidence for localization.
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Abstract:We suggest that, in animals, the core-affect system is linked to
partially assimilated behavioral dispositions that act as developmental
scaffolds for the ontogenetic construction of emotions. We also propose
that in humans the evolution of language altered the control of
emotions, leading to categories that can be adequately captured only by
emotion-words.
We are in sympathy with the constructionist view of emotions put
forward in the target article, “The brain basis of emotion: A meta-
analytic review.” The results of Lindquist et al.’s meta-analysis are
consistent with other comparative imaging studies, and with what
is known about the inherently plastic exploration–stabilization
processes that occur in the nervous system during development
and learning. More generally, the results are in line with the
growing evidence that commonalities at high levels of organization
are underlain by variable networks that have only family resem-
blance with each other: The components of the networks
provide facilitating rather than necessary or sufficient conditions
for macro-level properties. We want to suggest two ways in
which the authors’ interpretation of the data can be supplemented.
First, we suggest adding to their model a factor that helps to
explain what Barrett (2006b) has called the “emotion paradox” –
the discrepancy between the perceived similarity that subjects
and observers find among instances of “basic emotions” and the
extreme variability among the neural and physiological correlates
of such instances. Second, we expand on the role of language in
the construction of human emotional categories.
We think that Lindquist et al.’s model does not provide a full
solution to the emotional paradox. The analogy with color cat-
egories, which are also constructed categories, is not convincing
because the biological affordances in this visual system – specific
receptors for different wavelengths – do not have a counterpart
in the model the authors describe. We believe that such a
counterpart does exist, and that it is what James referred to as
“instinct”: evolved behavioral dispositions, which, when the be-
havior they drive is first elicited, are the developmental scaffolds
for constructing habitual motor behaviors and emotions (James
1890/1950, Ch. 24). We regard Jamesian “instincts” as partially
genetically assimilated behavioral dispositions that evolved in
ways that make their typical behavioral manifestations require
relatively little (initial) learning.
Examples in mammals are freezing, appetitive behavior, and so
on. In normal animals such behaviors, as they are practiced, are
constituted by specific coordinated motor reactions that have
feedback relations with bound visceral sensations – with bodily
experiences. In other words, initially, stereotypic behavior pat-
terns inevitably have more or less stereotypic affective corre-
lates – “first-time-feelings,” which are, for example, the feelings
that arise as a mouse freezes for the first time, or as a hen first
sits on an egg (see James 1890/1950, Chs. 24 and 25). First-
time feelings are not emotional categories, and, although
similar, they are not identical among individuals of a species
(because of the nature of early development). We think that
they act as scaffolds for what, on the basis of ontogenetic experi-
ence and learning, later become a particular emotional category
(e.g., freezing-fear). According to our view, an experienced,
mature mouse has more than a general initial core affect; it has
developmentally constructed emotional categories, although
these categories are much narrower than those of humans, and
are not adequately described in terms of human emotion-words
(such as fear or love). They are better described in terms
linked to the stereotypic responses, so a mouse might be said
to have a freezing-emotion, or a maternal-care-emotion. These
emotional categories are usually similar to but never identical
to first-time feelings: The specific first-time feeling of freezing
becomes enriched and fine-tuned during the ontogeny of each
mouse as it interacts with predators (Ginsburg & Jablonka
2007a; 2007b; 2010a). In some cases the emotion associated
with such scaffolds may be changed beyond recognition: for
example, a male dog can be conditioned to react with an avoid-
ance reaction to a bitch in heat (Gottlieb 1992), but in nonhuman
animals this usually happens only under extreme or atypical
conditions.
We therefore agree with Lindquist et al. that the emotions of
nonhuman animals, like those of humans, are constructed during
ontogeny from the stream of constantly evaluated homeostatic feel-
ings (core-affect). These are what Lamarck called “inner feelings”
(Lamarck 1809/1914, Book III, pp. 333–34), and we believe
they appeared very early in the evolution of animals (Ginsburg &
Jablonka 2010a; 2010b). However, we think that as the feelings
that are the consequence of the activities occurring as “instinctive”
responses are generated, they form one of the inputs that construct
emotional categories. These initial affective dynamic states form
only a developmental scaffold, but the “structures” built on this
scaffold usually have sufficient family-resemblance to be recog-
nized as belonging to a particular emotional category. Taking
them into account renders the “emotion paradox” less paradoxical.
Although inborn predispositions may help in explaining
the canalization of non-symbolically mediated stereotypic
expressions of emotions, we share Lindquist et al.’s view that
the tokens covered by emotional categories constructed by
language, which include a very wide spectrum of behaviors and
subjective states, may have very little in common with each
other except for their symbolic references. We would like to
expand on this point from an evolutionary point of view. The
evolution of language, which led to the ability to communicate
about the not-here and the not-now, engendered profound
alterations in the emotional profile of humans. This was the con-
sequence of, first, the expanding breadth of an individual’s
experiences brought about by sharing the experiences of others
through linguistic communication; second, the accompanying
development of personal autobiographies, which increased the
coherence and specificity of individual experiences; third, the
formation of social values and new social emotions; and fourth,
the control (often the inhibition) of the affective triggers of
action, of affect-related drives through linguistic communication.
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Although the control of drives has ancient roots related to the
evolution of episodic memory, tool use, and recall-for-planning,
the human ability to communicate about the imagined necessi-
tated an increase in this inhibitory capacity and in its regulation,
and allowed the metaphorical transfer of symbols, creating new
categories in all domains of human experience. All these led
to emotional categories, which, as Lindquist et al. convincingly
argue, are held together by emotion-words, and can be captured
adequately only by symbols.
The sleeping brain and the neural basis of
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Abstract: In addition to active wake, emotions are generated and
experienced in a variety of functionally different states such as those of
sleep, during which external stimulation and cognitive control are lacking.
The neural basis of emotions can be specified by regarding the multitude
of emotion-related brain states, as well as the distinct neuro- and
psychodynamic stages (generation and regulation) of emotional experience.
According to the “conceptual act model,” emotional experience is
a result of a complex psychological operation termed “situated
conceptualization,” which gives a meaningful context to a basic
core affect. Conceptualization is guided by fundamental cogni-
tive processes such as retrieval of stored memory representations
and executive attention. Accordingly, the neural basis of emotion
processing is stated to be represented by a variety of interacting
brain regions, which are traditionally associated with both basic
psychological operations and emotional experience. In substan-
tiating the role of conceptualization, the model accounts for the
active states of the waking human brain, during which goal-
directed behaviors induce a relevant context.
Critically, emotion categories can be generated during brain
states which essentially differ from active wake in that goal-
directed executive control networks are not active. Neuroimaging
studies have demonstrated that brain areas including the dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortices (DLPFC), parietal cortices, precuneus,
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and primary visual cortex, all of
which support higher cognitive functions and executive control
(Fuster 2006), are suppressed during rapid eye movement
(REM) sleep compared with wake; whereas the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), amygdaloid com-
plexes, pontine tegmentum, parahippocampal cortex, and
extrastriate visual cortices are more active in REM sleep than
in wake and non-REM sleep (Braun et al. 1997; 1998; Maquet
et al. 1996; Nofzinger et al. 1997) (see our Figure1a). Yet, inten-
sive emotional experience does exist during REM sleep, and the
emotional categories of REM sleep do not differ from those
experienced during wake (Fosse et al. 2004; Hobson et al.
2000; McNamara et al. 2010; Stickgold et al. 2001; Walker &
van der Helm 2009). Importantly, in REM sleep, emotions
emerge out of goal-directed behavioral context and under a
lack of external input. Also, their conceptualization and goal-
directed reference are elusive (Fosse et al. 2004; Hobson 1999;
2009; Hobson et al. 2000) as implied by the strong DLFC sup-
pression during REM sleep.
In non-REM sleep, and particularly in slow wave sleep (SWS),
the activity of all these brain areas is suppressed (Braun et al.
1997; Maquet et al. 1996; Nofzinger et al. 1997) and mental experi-
ence is extremely scarce (Hobson & Pace-Schott 2002). Nonethe-
less, although reports from non-REM sleep are often thought-
like (Hobson 1999; Hobson et al. 2000), signs of emotions reflecting
an individual’s current concerns can be detected (Foulkes 1962;
Hobson et al. 2000). Moreover, night terrors (pavor nocturnos)
characterized by a general feeling of fear accompanied by intense
autonomic discharge, typically occur during the deepest stage 4
of SWS (Gastaut & Broughton 1964; Gottesmann 2010). Thus, sub-
stantially different brain states such as those of wake, and non-REM
and REM sleep – characterized also by dramatic differences in
mentality, neurochemistry, connectivity, and neuroelectric signal-
ing (Gottesmann 1999; Hobson & Pace-Schott 2002; Hobson
et al. 2000; Stickgold et al. 2001; Tononi & Koch 2008) – can all
provide a neural basis for the experience of distinct emotional cat-
egories. Further, in a variety of dysfunctional wake states associated
with psychopathological and neurological deficits, sleep alterations
(e.g., Benca et al. 1992) or sleep deprivation (Van der Helm et al.
2010; Yoo et al. 2007), in which critical brain regions and/or
their connections are functionally altered (over-activated or de-
activated), emotion generation is preserved, although subjective
emotional experience can be modulated (Walker 2009).
State-related, in particular sleep-related, emotions can be
viewed in the context of two existing concepts regarding the dis-
tinction between conscious and non-conscious processing of
emotions, and the neurodynamics of emotional perception: (1)
Increasing evidence is provided for the coexistence of two distinct
neural systems in the waking brain, which subserve conscious and
non-conscious processing of emotions (Morris et al. 1998; Vuilleu-
mier et al. 2001). Non-conscious perception of emotional stimuli
has been associated with the functional integrity of a subcortical
network including the pulvinar, amygdala, nucleus accumbens,
periaqueductal gray, and locus coeruleus (Morris et al. 1999;
Tamietto & de Gelder 2010; Williams et al. 2006) (see our
Figure 1b), which may function independently of cortical areas.
It is proposed that this network incorporating also the ACC and
OFC (Fig. 1b) is genetically established and phylogenetically
adaptive, and can, through rapid feed-forward influences,
enhance the pre-attentive processing of emotional signals
during goal-directed behavior. It is only during wake that an
executive cortical feedback is suggested to exert inhibitory modu-
lation over emotion-related subcortical areas (Tamietto & de
Gelder 2010). It is notable that major components of the non-
conscious emotional system are overactivated during REM sleep
relative to wake (ACC, OFC, and amygdala – see Fig. 1) implying
enhanced emotion processing within this system due to the lack of
inhibitory modulation from cognitive cortical areas. (2) Emotion
perception is proposed to be underlain by three neurophysiologi-
cal stages: (i) identification of emotional significance of infor-
mation; (ii) production of affective state including the generation
of autonomic, neuroendocrine, and neuromuscular responses
and subjective responses of emotional experience; and (iii) regu-
lation of the affective state (Phillips et al. 2003).
Within these concepts, physiological and subjective experience
markers indicate that affective states are generated during sleep
(Hobson & Pace-Schott 2002), but they are not regulated by cor-
tical regions (Fig. 1). Emotion generation during sleep is entirely
driven by internal information, being unaffected by operations
subserving the interaction with the external environment
(Hobson 1999). Thus, the emerging emotional categories may
not be an online integrative product of ongoing context appraisal
(as Lindquist et al. suggest in the target article). Rather, emotional
dream experience reflects the functioning of local (Tononi &Koch
2008) or primary consciousness (protoconsciousness) defined as
simple awareness of perception and emotions (Hobson 2009).
Weargue that emotions emerge in a variety of distinct brain states.
The neural mechanisms of emotion generation are different from
the neural mechanisms of emotional regulation, with the latter
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being able to modulate emotion production only during conscious
processing. We suggest that the neural substrate of emotional cat-
egories canbe identifiedadequatelybyexploringdifferent functional
brain states, in which emotion generation may not be dominated by
the executive controlmechanisms. Thus,models of thebrain basis of
emotion would demarcate the neural substrates of emotion gener-
ation, emotional experience, and emotional regulation.
Emotion and personality factors influence the
neural response to emotional stimuli
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. assess the neural evidence for locationist versus
psychological construction accounts of human emotion. A wealth of
experimental and clinical investigations show that individual differences
in emotion and personality influence emotion processing. These factors
may also influence the brain’s response to emotional stimuli. A
synthesis of the relevant neuroimaging data must therefore take these
factors into consideration.
Lindquist et al. address the long-standing debate concerning the
representation of emotion at a neural level. They have used soph-
isticated meta-analytic techniques to determine the extent to
which the brain honours locationist versus psychological con-
structionist accounts of emotion. Their analysis includes studies
of emotion perception and experience that rely on a range of
different stimuli, modalities, and cognitive processes, focusing
on those studies that target discrete, or basic, emotions: anger,
disgust, fear, sadness, and happiness. They conclude that the
data show promise with respect to psychological construction
accounts of emotion while providing little evidence for any con-
sistent or specific correspondence between discrete emotion cat-
egories and distinct brain regions or networks.
The authors have contributed the largest meta-analysis of neu-
roimaging studies of emotion to date, and a psychological con-
struction framework offers a valuable perspective on the
affective neuroscience literature. In particular, it offers the poten-
tial for fruitful crossover with existing theoretical models in the
cognition and emotion literature that emphasise the presence of
multiple functional-level routes to the generation of emotion,
such as schematic, propositional, analogical, and associative rep-
resentational systems (SPAARS) (Power & Dalgleish 2008) and
interacting cognitive subsystems (ICS) (Teasdale & Barnard 1993).
Nonetheless, we feel that despite the wealth of neuroimaging
studies dedicated to delineating the brain basis of emotion, it is pre-
mature to conclude that particular brain areas do not have a prefer-
ential role in coding particular emotional attributes. Before
accepting this position, alternative explanations for the absence of
locationist evidence must receive careful consideration. Lindquist
et al. raise several possibilities themselves – that functional neuroi-
maging has spatial and temporal limitations, that discrete emotion
categories may be represented in networks (rather than specific
brain regions) not identified by the current analyses, or that the
methods used to target emotion in individual studies may not
capture the full complexity or phenomenology of emotional pro-
cesses and experience in real life. It should also be considered
that rather than reflecting the absolute response within a network
of regions, different emotional processes may depend on inter-
actions (or changes in connectivity) between these regions.
To this, we would like to add that while neuroimaging can
establish associations between activation of certain brain
regions or networks and particular emotional or cognitive func-
tions, it cannot establish the necessity of those brain regions for
particular functions. Demonstration of the latter requires, for
example, targeted neuropsychological studies of patients with
sustained brain injury to focal neural regions. This perspective
has significant implications for the interpretation of the neuroi-
maging data. Even where neuroimaging shows little specificity
of function for a given brain region or network, it could still be
the case that lesion studies support a locationist view by demon-
strating that a given region is particularly important for one
Figure 1 (Kirov). Regional activation patterns: (A) Blue (white numbers) and red (black numbers) areas indicate regions showing
deactivation and hyperactivation, respectively, during REM sleep compared to wake (modification of Hobson 2009). (B) System of
non-conscious emotion processing (modification of Tamietto & de Gelder 2010). ACC: anterior cingulate cortex; OFC: orbitofrontal
cortex; Parahipp.: parahippocampal; DLPFC: dorsolateral prefrontal cortices; PCC: posterior cingulate cortex; Prim.: primary; NA:
nucleus accumbens; PAG: periaqueductal gray; LC: locus coeruleus. A color version of this image can be viewed at http://
www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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emotion category. For this reason, neuroimaging evidence on its
own cannot resolve this issue and must be considered in conjunc-
tion with corresponding human and animal lesion studies.
Finally, the vast majority of neuroimaging studies have studied
neural responses to emotional stimuli in healthy individuals who
are not preselected according to any specific criteria. However,
there is tremendous variability in the extent to which healthy
individuals vary in their experience of particular emotions or
action tendencies, such as anxiety or behavioural activation. A
wealth of cognitive and behavioural research has demonstrated
that individual differences in relevant mood and personality
dimensions influence the manner in which individuals process
emotional stimuli. For example, behavioural studies in clinical
and non-clinical populations show that individual differences in
anxiety determine the behavioural response to emotional
stimuli conveying threat (Bar-Haim et al. 2007).
Individual variation has received little consideration in the neu-
roimaging literature. However, it has been suggested that account-
ing for individual differences in relevant mood and personality
dimensions may reveal aspects of neural function not readily
apparent in studies that adopt standard group-based subtraction
contrasts (Calder et al. 2011). To illustrate, functional neuroima-
ging studies have shown that anxiety levels in non-clinical popu-
lations correlate positively with the amygdala response to fearful
faces, particularly when these stimuli are unattended or presented
outside conscious awareness (Bishop et al. 2004). Moreover,
although approximately 40% of studies in previous neuroimaging
meta-analyses fail to find an amygdala response to fearful facial
expressions (Murphy et al. 2003; Phan et al. 2002), a recent
review showed that all studies investigating anxiety’s influence
on the brain response to fearful faces identified the amygdaloid
area, regardless of whether the study showed an amygdala
response (fear minus neutral contrast) across the entire group
(Calder et al. 2011). Anxiety also influences the amygdala response
to viewing facial signals of anger (Ewbank et al. 2010). Crucially,
this effect is found only when angry faces are gazing towards,
but not away from, the observer, suggesting that amygdala activity
is not related to a specific facial expression but to the degree of
perceived threat. A relationship has also been found between
the ventral anterior insula response to pictures of disgusting
foods and trait variation in disgust sensitivity (Calder et al. 2007).
These results do not necessitate that the amygdala or insula or,
indeed, other regions, are associated with threat and disgust
specifically. Rather, these regions may be associated with more
abstract emotional attributes on which these emotions weigh
heavily but not exclusively (Calder et al. 2007). To this extent,
we do not disagree with Lindquist et al.’s conclusion that the
brain may not respect discrete emotion categories per se. None-
theless, we think it would be premature on the basis of neuroima-
ging data alone to say that the amygdala, for example, does not
play a preferential role in coding a particular emotional attribute.
Studies such as those highlighted here suggest that the apparent
inconsistencies observed in the literature may be attributable to
variation in psychological dimensions that are meaningful and rel-
evant to the particular emotion under consideration. The role
played by these individual difference factors must therefore
receive careful scrutiny and consideration before we can conclude
that emotion categories are not natural kinds that are respected by
the brain.
Emotions of “higher” cognition1
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001555
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Abstract: The target article by Lindquist et al. considers discrete
emotions. This commentary argues that these are but a minor part of
human emotional abilities, unifying us with animals. Uniquely human
emotions are aesthetic emotions related to the need for the knowledge
of “high” cognition, including emotions of the beautiful, cognitive
dissonances, and musical emotions. This commentary touches on their
cognitive functions and origins.
The target article by Lindquist et al. contributes a wealth of infor-
mation to studies of emotions, and to psychology in general.
However, I would expect such an in-depth article on emotions
to address specifically human, “higher” cognitive emotions.
Whereas in the past emotions were often considered irrelevant
or opposite to cognition, recent research emphasizes closed
relations between the two (Adolphs et al. 2002; Bechara &
Damasio 2002; Bradley et al. 2001; Damasio 1995; Duncan &
Barrett 2007; Grossberg & Levine 1987; Mayer et al. 2008;
Ochsner & Phelps 2007; Perlovsky 2006c). Discrete emotions dis-
cussed in the article are limited in number and thus represent only
a minor part of human emotional abilities. Specifically human
emotions are related to “high” cognition. As discussed later, their
number is very large, and this is why they are called “continuous.”
Musical emotions (Juslin & Va¨stfja¨ll 2008) are an example of “con-
tinuous” emotions that set humans apart from the animal kingdom.
Yet, the entire target article is devoted exclusively to discrete
emotions that appear in the perception of concrete objects.
Here are a few quotes from the article to support this point:
“Emotions emerge when people make meaning out of sensory input
from the body and from the world.” (sect. 3, para. 2)
“Emotions are ‘situated conceptualizations’. . . because the emerging
meaning is tailored to the immediate environment.” (sect. 3, para. 2)
“Core affect. . . is a term used to describe the mental representation of
bodily changes.” (sect. 3, para. 4)
These statements might almost equally refer to animals or
humans. The target article does not consider emotions related
to abstract concepts. No emotion of pleasure from understanding
is discussed; for example, that understanding an object to be food
might be emotionally pleasant for a hungry animal or human. But
understanding is also pleasant in itself, otherwise there would be
no motivation to understand abstract concepts. Understanding
the meaning of one’s life is emotionally pleasant; a simplified
reason is that this is necessary for concentrating one’s efforts
on the most important goals. This emotion, according to Kant
(1790), is related to emotions of the beautiful. Kant explained
that aesthetic emotions are related to knowledge.
Specifically human “higher” cognitive emotions, especially
musical emotions, have been called “mysterious” by thinkers
from Aristotle to Darwin and by contemporary evolutionary psy-
chologists (Aristotle 1995; Ball 2008; Darwin 1871; Masataka
2008). Yet, “higher” cognitive emotions have been studied by
many authors. I will mention just a few references: emotions of
cognitive dissonance (Cabanac et al., in press; Festinger 1957;
Haidt 2001; Levine 2009; Levine & Perlovsky 2010; van Veen
et al. 2009), musical emotions (Cross & Morley 2008; Juslin &
Va¨stfja¨ll 2008; Levitin 2006; Panksepp & Bernatzky 2002; Patel
2008; Perlovsky 2010d; 2010c; Purwins et al. 2008; Sloboda &
Juslin 2001; Trainor 2008 ), and emotions of language prosody
(Buchanan et al. 2000; Davis et al. 1996; Deacon 1989; Perlovsky
2006a; 2006b; 2009b).
Even when discussing emotions in voices, Lindquist et al. do not
recognize them as possibly different from discrete emotions. Yet
the voice of human languages carries a significant emotional load
different from that of discrete emotions. Emotions in language
sounds are similar to emotions in poetry and songs, and (among
other things) motivate us to relate language sounds to their mean-
ings (Perlovsky 2009b; 2010c). Animals relate sounds of voice to
meanings automatically; in an animal’s mind the sounds of voice
are inseparable from the meanings. Humans have to be motivated
to do this (Deacon 1989; Seyfarth & Cheney 2003a). Emotions
related to knowledge of abstract concepts have been discussed
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in Cacioppo et al. (1996), Levine and Perlovsky (2008; 2010), Per-
lovsky (2009b; 2010c), and Perlovsky et al. (2010), and emotions
related to creativity discussed in Levine and Perlovsky (2010),
Lubart and Getz (1997), and Pfenninger and Shubik (2001).
“Emotions of the beautiful” are discussed in Biederman and
Vessel (2006), Dorfman et al. (2006), Perlovsky (2002; 2006c;
2010b; 2010a), Tooby and Cosmides (2001), and in Silvia (2005).
Yet the “beautiful” is mentioned only once in the target article:
“A painting is beautiful” (sect. 3, para. 5). Emotions pertaining
to the beautiful are not mentioned.
In the Perlovsky studies cited above, I have discussed evidence
and other studies relating “emotions of the beautiful,” as discussed
by Kant, to the need for knowledge; aesthetic emotional mechan-
isms are essential in every act of perception and cognition; at the
level of perception they are autonomous and below the threshold
of consciousness, at “higher” levels of cognition they could be
experienced as conscious emotions; they are in complicated inter-
action with cultural discussions of these emotions in language
(which usually are more conscious). The origin of aesthetic
emotional mechanisms is in the need to adapt mental represen-
tations to concrete conditions around us. Contradictions between
basic drives and knowledge, as well as within the system of knowl-
edge, cause emotions of cognitive dissonances. A need to resolve
these contradictions emotionally is related to the origin of music.
(These emotions are usually “continuous” because the number of
contradictions, and therefore the number of emotions, is combina-
torially large; Spinoza [1677/2005] was the first one to mention that
emotions differ depending on the object of reference.)
Lindquist et al. mention in conclusion that emotions and cog-
nition might be a unified process:
[W]e might not assume that emotion and cognition battle it out in the
brain . . . or that consumer decisions are predicated on competing affec-
tive and rational representations . . .. Instead, we might assume that
affect and executive attention are merely different sources of attention
in the brain . . .. Feeling and seeing might not be as distinct as is typi-
cally assumed. (target article, sect. 7, para. 1)
But no discussion was devoted to emotions related to cognition
“above” perception of concrete objects. An opportunity to study
specifically human “high” cognitive emotions has been lost.
NOTE
1. This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to
copyright protection in the United States.
Beyond brain regions: Network perspective of
cognition–emotion interactions
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. provide a convincing case against what they call
the locationist account of emotion. Their quantitative approach elegantly
illustrates the shortcomings of this still-entrenched viewpoint. Here, I
discuss how a network perspective will advance our understanding of
structure-function mappings in general, and the relationship between
emotion and cognition in the brain.
The simplest way to conceptualize the mapping between brain area
and behavior is to assume a one-to-one mapping between an area
and its function (e.g., amygdala ,–. fear). It is readily apparent,
however, that brain regions are involved in many functions, and
that functions are carried out by many regions. More generally,
therefore, themapping between structure and function is both plur-
ipotent (one-to-many) and degenerate (many-to-one). The combi-
nation of the two indicates that there are no “necessary and
sufficient” brain regions. Based on these notions, I have argued
elsewhere that a network perspective is needed for the understand-
ing of the interactions between emotion, motivation, perception,
and cognition (Pessoa 2008; 2009; 2010a; Pessoa & Engelmann
2010). Briefly, networks of brain regions collectively support beha-
viors (Fig. 1). Hence, the network itself is the unit, not the brain
region. Processes P that support behavior are not implemented
by an individual area, but rather by the interaction of multiple
areas, which are dynamically recruited intomulti-region assemblies.
I use the term “process” instead of “function” or “computation”
because a process emerges from the interactions between regions,
as in “emergent property” (Bressler & Menon 2010). Further-
more, a process is viewed as a useful external description of the
functioning of the network, and not necessarily as a fixed internal
computation implemented by the network (Thompson 2007;
Thompson & Varela 2001). In this context, the suggestion by Lind-
quist et al. of psychological primitives is problematic, as the mind
should not be viewed as constructed of atomic constituents in the
manner that physicists conceive of matter, for instance.
Whereas a network perspective is needed for a fuller character-
ization of the mind-brain, it should not be viewed as a panacea. For
one, the challenges posed by the many-to-many mapping between
regions and functions is not dissolved by the network perspective.
Indeed, one should not anticipate a one-to-one mapping when the
network approach is adopted – counter to the recent trend of
labeling networks with specific functions; see examples in Bressler
andMenon (2010). Additionally, decomposition of brain regions in
terms of meaningful clusters, such as the ones generated by com-
munity-finding algorithms (Newman 2010), does not by itself
reveal “true” sub-networks. Given the heterarchical and multi-
relational relationship among regions, multiple decompositions
will offer different “slices” of the overall connectivity space. In
what follows, I briefly discuss some repercussions of a network
perspective to the understanding of the relationship between
emotion and cognition.
First, given the extensive interactions among brain regions, the
emphasis shifts from attempting to understand the brain one
region at a time, to understanding how coalitions of regions
support the mind-brain. Insofar as brain regions are not the unit
of interest, they should not be viewed as “cognitive” or “emotion-
al.” Traditionally, however, regions whose function involves
homeostatic processes and/or bodily representations have been
frequently viewed as “emotional,” whereas regions whose function
is less aligned with such processes have been viewed as “cognitive.”
Figure 1 (Pessoa). Structure-function mapping. Networks are
dynamically formed when areas (A1, AN, Az) coalesce into
temporally stable groupings. Area AN (in black) is part of
multiple networks. Pi, Pj ¼ processes (see text).
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Second, the architectural features of the brain are such that
they provide massive opportunity for cognitive-emotional inter-
actions (Modha & Singh 2010). These interactions are suggested
to involve all brain territories. For example, extensive communi-
cation between the amygdala and visual cortex exists, and efferent
amygdala projections reach nearly all levels of the visual cortex
(Amaral et al. 2003). Thus, visual processing takes place within
a context that is defined by signals occurring in the amygdala
(as well as the orbitofrontal cortex, pulvinar, and other
regions), including those linked to affective significance (Pessoa
& Adolphs 2010). Therefore, vision is never pure vision, but is
affective vision – even at the level of primary visual cortex
(Damaraju et al. 2009; Padmala & Pessoa 2008). Cognitive-
emotional interactions also abound in the prefrontal cortex,
which is thought to be involved in abstract computations that
are farthest from the sensory periphery. More generally, given
inter-region interactivity, and the fact that networks intermingle
signals of diverse origin, although a characterization of brain
function in terms of networks is needed, the networks themselves
are best conceptualized as neither “cognitive” nor “emotional.”
Third, regions that are important for affective processing
appear to be exceedingly well connected (e.g., Petrovich et al.
2001; Swanson 2000). This suggests that these regions have
important “quasi-global” roles and that this is an important
feature of this class of region. However, regions traditionally
described as “emotional” are not the only ones that are highly
connected. Highly connected regions are encountered through-
out the brain, including in the occipital, temporal, parietal, and
frontal lobes, in addition to the insula, cingulate, thalamus, and
regions at the base of the brain (Modha & Singh 2010).
Fourth, emphasizing only interactions between brain regions
that are supported by direct, robust structural connections is mis-
leading. For one, the strength of functional connectivity is equally
important, and at times will deviate from the strength of the struc-
tural connection (Honey et al. 2007). Architectural features guaran-
tee the rapid integration of information even when robust structural
connections are not present, and support functional interactions
that are strongly context dependent. This is illustrated, for
example, by the “one-step” property of amygdala–prefrontal con-
nectivity – amygdala signals reach nearly all prefrontal regions
within a single connectivity step (see Averbeck & Seo 2008).
Fifth, taken together, these considerations suggest that the
mind-brain is not decomposable in terms of emotion and cogni-
tion. In other words, the neural basis of emotion and cognition
should be viewed as governed less by properties that are intrinsic
to specific sites and more by interactions among multiple brain
regions. In this sense, emotion and cognition are functionally inte-
grated systems, namely, they more or less continuously impact
each other’s operations (Bechtel & Richardson 2010). As
suggested by Bechtel and Richardson, “The problem is then not
one of isolating the localized mechanisms, but of exhibiting the
organization and the constituent functions. . . [A]n explanation in
terms of organization supplants direct localization” (p. 151).
The construction of emotional experience
requires the integration of implicit and explicit
emotional processes
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Abstract: Although we agree that a constructivist approach to emotional
experience makes sense, we propose that implicit (visceromotor and
somatomotor) emotional processes are dissociable from explicit
(attention and reflection) emotional processes, and that the conscious
experience of emotion requires an integration of the two. Assessments
of implicit emotion and emotional awareness can be helpful in the
neuroscientific investigation of emotion.
Lindquist et al. are to be commended for meticulously integrat-
ing comprehensive reviews of basic emotion theory with detailed
meta-analyses from the neuroimaging of emotion literature.
Using the extant neuroimaging literature, they cogently argue
that neuroimaging evidence does not support the locationist
view that specific brain circuits underlie specific emotional
experiences or perceptions. Although this conclusion is not
necessarily the final word on the question, as acknowledged by
the authors, given the early state of brain imaging technology,
the target article makes a convincing case that alternative formu-
lations of the neural basis of emotion and emotional experience
are needed.
In general we agree with Lindquist et al. that a constructivist
approach to emotional experience makes sense. Indeed, in
1987 one of us described a constructivist model of emotional
experience driven by language (Lane & Schwartz 1987). Where
we disagree, however, is in the specific content of the constructi-
vist model that is proposed. Throughout their article, Lindquist
et al. assume that emotion must, at a minimum, be associated
with the conscious experience or mental representation of
emotion (“core affect”) that is valenced and associated with
some degree of arousal. The authors also hold that further differ-
entiation of experience results from linguistically determined cat-
egories of specific emotion that do not have any real existence in
nature. While we agree that the differentiated experience of
emotion is largely language-driven, our primary concern is that
the nature of the process of the construction of emotional experi-
ence is, in our view, more complex than Lindquist et al. assert.
With the discovery that the vast majority of cognition does not
occur consciously, and that each of the steps in the generation
and unfolding of an emotional response involves information pro-
cessing of some kind, one of us has argued that the distinction
between implicit and explicit processes, a cornerstone of
modern cognitive neuroscience, also applies to emotion (Lane
& Nadel 2000). According to this perspective, the visceromotor
and somatomotor manifestations of emotion may occur in the
absence of emotional experience, and constitute implicit
emotional responses.
There is now a considerable literature supporting this view. In
a comprehensive review on emotional experience, Lambie and
Marcel (2002) concluded that a two-level model of emotional
experience is needed that can account for unconscious
emotion, that is, emotional responses without conscious experi-
ence or awareness (see also Kihlstrom et al. 2000; Lane 2008;
LeDoux 1996). Over the past 25 years or so, academic research
has been conducted on implicit affect, that is, spontaneous affec-
tive reactions associated with changes in peripheral physiology
and/or behavior that are not associated with conscious emotional
experiences (cf. Quirin et al. 2009a; Winkielman & Berridge
2004; Zajonc 2000). Lindquist et al. do not discuss the potential
relevance of this distinction between implicit and explicit
emotion processing for the analysis of neural correlates of
emotion.
Furthermore, many decades of research preceding the
modern era of neuroimaging demonstrated the evocation of visc-
eral and somatomotor expressions of emotion in brainstem stimu-
lation studies of laboratory animals (LeDoux 1996). Although
these phenomena cannot be scientifically linked to reportable
experiences, they nevertheless are the bodily expression of
emotion. We believe that implicit emotion, consisting of the vis-
ceromotor and somatomotor expressions of emotion, which may
or may not be valenced, constitute the foundation upon which
more differentiated emotional experience is built. Moreover,
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subcortical structures including the thalamus, hypothalamus,
amygdala, and periaqueductal gray likely do contribute to the
generation of undifferentiated emotional responses that are not
associated with emotional experiences (Lane 2008). Many brain-
stem structures are not well-visualized using modern imaging
techniques, which may help to explain the under-emphasis of
these phenomena by Lindquist et al.
According to this alternative perspective, the conscious experi-
ence of emotion (which could include core affect) requires com-
munication between subcortical and cortical structures, both
paralimbic (anterior cingulate, insula, orbitofrontal cortex) and
neocortical (medial prefrontal cortex). During attentional aware-
ness, when individuals explicitly focus on their affective reactions,
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is active (see Phan et al.
[2004] for a meta-analysis), Furthermore, three different
imaging studies have demonstrated that healthy individuals
who are more emotionally aware engage the anterior cingulate
cortex, particularly the dorsal portion, to a greater extent
during emotional arousal (Frewen et al. 2008; Lane et al. 1998;
McRae et al. 2008). In addition, reflective awareness of
emotion involves the creation and integration of conceptual rep-
resentations of emotional experiences that will affect the
interpretation of future emotional experiences. Reflective aware-
ness typically requires participation of structures in the paracin-
gulate sulcus including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex
(Gusnard et al. 2001; Lane et al. 1997; Ochsner et al. 2004a).
These two levels of explicit processing are superimposed upon
and integrated with implicit affective processes. In this sense,
conscious emotional experiencing is a constructive process that
integrates implicit and explicit affect.
We propose that the investigation of how elementary affective
processes develop to become full-blown emotional experiences
may provide additional insight into the degree to which emotions
are constructed psychologically. In this context, relating implicit
measures of emotion such as the Implicit Positive and Negative
Affect Test (Quirin et al. 2009a) to brain activity might be prom-
ising. Notably, the factor structure of this reliable indirect test
divides into two types of implicit affect, positive and negative
(see also Cacioppo et al. 1999; Gray & McNaughton 2000;
Watson et al. 1999), suggesting that valence becomes part of
emotional responses prior to the construction of emotional
experience (see Quirin et al. [2009b] for relationships of implicit
but not explicit affect with cortisol; also see Zajonc 2000). Fur-
thermore, the neural correlates of emotional responses can be
investigated as a function of individual differences in emotional
awareness (Lane et al. 1990). Such approaches may contribute
to the disentangling of the functional components of emotion,
including somatic processes (peripheral physiological arousal
and action tendencies), specific emotional experiences of a
single type, blends of emotional experience, as well as regulation
processes, all of which are typically implicated in affective
responses and their neural correlates.
A systems approach to the brain basis of
emotion also needs developmental and
locationist views – the case of Tourette’s
Syndrome
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Abstract: The closeness of somatosensory phenomena and emotional
states can be critically extended into a clinical perspective by referring
to Tourette’s Syndrome (TS). Two examples are discussed in this
commentary: (1) the neurodevelopmental approach to the pre- and
post-tic sensorimotor urges, and (2) the TS treatment with deep brain
stimulation. It is shown that in TS, both views (locationist and
constructionist) need to be combined along the lifespan in order to get
a more realistic picture of the brain basis of emotion.
Lindquist et al. touch upon the closeness of and the interaction
between somatosensory phenomena and emotional states (see
target article, sect. 5.2). They refer to the anterior insula as a
body-based, affectively guided attentional system, and thus
present the insula as an integrational area for certain aspects of
emotion, cognition, andmovement, supporting their constructionist
view. I would like to critically extend this aspect into a clinical per-
spective using data from research in Tourette’s Syndrome (TS), a
complex developmental neuropsychiatric disorder with motor and
vocal tics as core symptoms (Cath et al. 2011; Mu¨ller-Vahl et al.
2011; Roessner et al. 2011a; 2011b; Verdellen et al. 2011).
Besides its overt tics, TS shows a covert drumbeat of sensori-
motor phenomena such as unpleasant inner urges, with the con-
sequence of acting out a tic in order to reach a “just right”
somatosensory feeling for the patient´s own bodily well-being.
So far, it is assumed that the insula (in concert with the sup-
plementary motor area and anterior cingulum) plays a central
role in this respect (Mu¨nchau et al. 2011). This fits with the
fact that electrical stimulation to the anterior insula may lead to
visceral sensations such as feelings of movement, tension, twitch-
ing, and tingling (see sect. 5.2 of the target article), which may be
reported by patients with TS as an announcement of a tic. It is
likely that in TS the insula represents the pathophysiological
link between the disturbance of the “sensorimotor-loop”
related to the sensorimotor dissonance, which TS patients may
realize around their tics, and the “affect-loop” related to cogni-
tive-emotional dissonance in obsessive-compulsive behavior/dis-
order (Rothenberger et al. 2007), thus explaining why the “just-
right” procedure in TS, although it mimics ritualized-compulsive
behavior, prevails without any anxiety.
The general pre-tic body signal awareness in TS appears around
the age of 10 years (i.e., several years after tic-onset), closely fol-
lowed over time by the specific awareness of inner pre- and
post-tic sensorimotor phenomena (including urges). There is no
relationship between these phenomena and the duration of TS.
Hence, usual cognitive brain development is the most important
factor in order to explain this observation (Banaschewski et al.
2003). This highlights that one could optimize the constructionist
hypothesis while using a neurodevelopmental approach. One
should consider that local brain systems are sequentially more
and more coordinated in order to finally form high-functioning,
flexible constructionistic brain networks without losing locationist
accounts. This view can be represented best by looking at the brain
as an oscillatory system (Rothenberger 2009).
A further example of TS may show how locationist and con-
structionist approaches need each other. “In 1999 for the first
time (thalamic) deep brain stimulation (DBS) was suggested as
an alternative therapeutic option for treatment resistant, severely
affected patients with TS” (Mu¨ller-Vahl et al. 2011). The different
local targets used (e.g., globus pallidus internus, nucleus accum-
bens) lead to more or less similar clinical results. This is probably
because all selected targets belong to the ventral striatal-thalamo-
cortical circuitries, which are thought to be the basic dysfunc-
tional system in TS. The DBS story elucidates that certain local
“nodes” or “areas” may be essential for certain brain systems,
suggesting a locationist view within a constructionist approach.
In sum, the case of TS, with its complex neurobiology and be-
havior, underlines that both views (locationist and construction-
ist) need to be combined along the lifespan in order to get a
more realistic picture of the brain basis of emotions, cognitions,
and movements. In this respect, I agree with the authors that,
in addition to these considerations, the actual context is also
very important, as even subliminal contextual features can
unconsciously bias the biology of brain systems at work
(Banaschewski et al. 2008).
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The role of the amygdala in the appraising
brain
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that the brain implements
psychological operations that are constitutive of emotion rather than
modules subserving discrete emotions. However, the nature of such
psychological operations is open to debate. I argue that considering
appraisal theories may provide alternative interpretations of the
neuroimaging data with respect to the psychological operations involved.
Affective neuroscience has considerably extended our knowledge
of the emotional brain during the last two decades. Most of the
work in this domain has consisted of searching for discrete dedi-
cated brain systems underlying each basic emotion, using as evi-
dence either neuropsychological dissociations (see Calder et al.
2001) or brain imaging results (see Vytal & Hamann 2010).
Although this approach has extended our knowledge of the
emotional brain, it has been strongly challenged by both empiri-
cal results and conceptual analyses (for details, see Sander, in
press). Given that research on the brain basis of emotion has
only rarely been explicitly considered in relation to psychological
theories of emotion, the general aim of the current target article
by Lindquist et al. is very beneficial to emotion research.
Lindquist et al. convincingly argue that we need to consider
how the brain implements psychological operations that are con-
stitutive of emotion rather than modules subserving discrete
emotions. However, the nature of such psychological operations
is open to debate. The authors only oppose their psychological
constructionist view to the locationist view. Here, I argue that
appraisal theories provide alternative interpretations to those
offered by both the basic emotions perspective and by the
authors. Lindquist et al. do not consider what can be seen as
the third major research tradition in addition to “basic emotion”
models and “core affect” models: namely, appraisal models. As a
justification, the authors argue that: “Relatively little work from
an appraisal perspective has investigated the brain basis of
emotion (although see Sander et al. 2003; 2007). Therefore, we
do not discuss appraisal models further in this article” (sect. 2,
para. 2). I feel that, although an affective neuroscience approach
to appraisal mechanisms is relatively recent (see Sander et al.
2005), many appraisal mechanisms (e.g., novelty detection, intrin-
sic pleasantness, or goal-relevance) have in fact been the focus of
intense empirical research in cognitive and affective neuro-
science, but typically without links being made directly to
emotion elicitation (see Sander, in press). In addition, some
studies have explicitly tested appraisal-driven hypotheses (e.g.,
Grandjean & Scherer 2008). As described below, conceptual ana-
lyses and empirical research have also pointed to a role of particu-
lar brain structures (e.g., the amygdala) in specific appraisal
mechanisms (e.g., relevance detection).
Where Lindquist et al. do consider alternative interpretations
of their results (sect. 6.1), they consider alternative methodologi-
cal interpretations of the absence of findings supporting basic
emotions theories, but they do not consider alternative conceptual
interpretations of the presence of their meta-analytical findings.
Consider the authors’ conclusion concerning the brain region
that has most clearly been associated with emotion in the litera-
ture: the amygdala. The authors write that their meta-analytical
finding “is consistent with our hypothesis that the amygdala
responds preferentially to salient exteroceptive (vs. interoceptive)
sensations” (sect. 5.1, para. 6). Attributing a key role to the amyg-
dala in processing saliency of exteroceptive stimuli indeed
characterizes this brain structure with respect to a specific
psychological operation, rather than to a basic emotion. Histori-
cally, the amygdala was typically associated with one emotion:
fear. Associating a basic emotion to a specific brain system was
consistent with basic emotion models (see Ekman 1999, p. 50).
A common view has been that the amygdala is central to a “fear
system,” or even a “fear module” (O¨hman & Mineka 2001).
However, the lack of empirical evidence to conclude that the
amygdala is specific to fear led scholars such as Kringelbach
and Berridge (2009) to consider that equating the amygdala
with fear is one of those “overly simple equations between neuro-
biology and psychology that merge into myth” (p. 481).
In the framework of appraisal theories of emotion, Sander and
colleagues have argued that the computational profile of the amyg-
dala is best characterized as default detection of stimuli appraised
as relevant, given the individual’s current concerns, such as goals,
needs, and values (Sander et al. 2003; see also, Sander, in press).
The idea that the amygdala is critical for relevance detection is
grounded in appraisal models of emotion (see Frijda 1986,
p. 390; Sander et al. 2005). Therefore, an alternative interpretation
of the function of the amygdala that does not advocate a specific
role of the amygdala for fear can be offered from an appraisal per-
spective. I believe that there is an interesting distinction between
our analysis of the function of the amygdala and the authors’ sug-
gestion that the amygdala is associated with the psychological oper-
ation of “core affect” (see Figure 2 of the target article). Indeed,
Lindquist et al. define “core affect” as the mental representation
of bodily sensations that can be experienced as feelings of
hedonic pleasure and displeasure with some degree of arousal.
However, the very notion that a bodily sensation is mentally rep-
resented implies that a bodily response has been elicited before
interoception could possibly lead to experienced feelings. In our
account, relevance detection is supposed to be primary to the
mental representation of bodily sensations because it is supposed
to be involved in the elicitation of the emotional response, includ-
ing the generation of bodily sensations. When considering concep-
tualization/categorization, Lindquist et al. “hypothesize that this
psychological operation makes a prediction about what caused
core affective changes within one’s own body or what caused the
affective cues (e.g., facial actions, body postures, or vocal acoustics)
in another person” (sect. 3, para. 6). By contrast, appraisal theories
are not typically concerned with how an individual predicts the
cause of an affective change, but rather, with how a relevant
event actually causes an affective change (see Moors 2009;
Scherer & Ellsworth 2009). When the authors attribute a saliency
processing function to the amygdala, it makes a critical theoretical
difference whether they consider the role of saliency in (1) categor-
izing an external event as being a potential cause of an already
present core affect, or rather in (2) the context-sensitive evaluation
of an event as a function of the current concerns of the individual,
which causes a change in the affective response, the latter being
very much in line with appraisal theories of emotion.
Functional specialization does not require a
one-to-one mapping between brain regions
and emotions
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001749
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. have assumed that functional specialization
requires a one-to-one mapping between brain regions and discrete
emotions. This assumption is in tension with the fact that regions can
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have multiple functions in the context of different, possibly distributed,
networks. Once we open the door to other forms of functional
specialization, neuroimaging data no longer favor constructionist
models over natural kind models.
According to natural kind models, discrete emotions “exist in the
brain or body and cause changes in sensory, perceptual, motor,
and physiological outputs” (Barrett 2005, p. 257). According to
psychological constructionist models, discrete emotions lack
neural and bodily signatures, and “do not have ontological status
as causal entities” (Barrett 2006a, p. 46). Lindquist et al.’s specific
proposal is that emotions emerge when a more basic state of core
affect – a blend of hedonic and arousal values – is conceptualized
as an instance of a discrete emotion category such as fear or anger.
The two models make different predictions concerning the
relation between brain and emotions. Natural kind models
posit functionally specialized brain systems responsible for the
production of the outputs of distinct discrete emotions. Con-
structionist models do not posit such functionally specialized
brain systems, assuming that emotions emerge from brain
systems dedicated to more basic psychological processes (e.g.,
core affect, categorization).
Lindquist et al. take neuroimaging data to favor constructionist
models over natural kind models. This is because they consider
the latter to be committed to what I call radical locationism,
the hypothesis that discrete emotions consistently and specifically
correspond to distinct brain regions. A brain region corresponds
to an emotion consistently just in case it shows increased acti-
vation for every instance of that emotion, and specifically just
in case it shows increased activation only for instances of that
emotion. This amounts to positing a one-to-one mapping
between single brain regions and discrete emotion categories.
Lindquist et al. have argued that there is no one-to-one
mapping between single brain regions and discrete emotions
such as fear, disgust, anger, and so on. For instance, the amydgala
does not show increased activation in all and only cases of fear; the
anterior insula does not show increased activation in all and only
cases of disgust; the orbitofrontal cortex does not show increased
activation in all and only cases of anger; the pregenual anterior
cingulate cortex and subgenual anterior cingulate cortex do not
show increased activation in all and only cases of sadness. At
the same time, brain regions can be functionally selective for
certain discrete emotions: they can occur preferentially – rather
than exclusively – when a particular discrete emotion occurs.
I agree that radical locationism is false, and that regions con-
sistently activated by discrete emotions are, at best, functionally
selective for them. But I do not consider this to be a fatal strike
against natural kind models, and a reason to become a construc-
tivist. Natural kind models can endorse hypotheses about func-
tional specialization other than radical locationism which are
compatible with the neuroimaging data.
My central suggestion is that we should focus on networks
rather than on single brain regions. This is because brain
regions do not have functions in isolation, but rather in the
context of the networks to which they belong (cf. Pessoa 2008).
Furthermore, we should not expect functionally specialized net-
works to be neatly localizable anatomically. Functional specializ-
ation can be multilocal (Mundale 2002) rather than radically
localized: the brain regions whose joint activation plays a given
function can, in principle, be distributed across the brain.
Lindquist et al. are open to the possibility that there may be
“widely distributed” networks for discrete emotions, but argue
that their existence “would be consistent with a psychological
constructionist . . . view” (sect. 6.1, para. 4). I strongly disagree.
Constructivism posits that discrete emotions are not causal enti-
ties in their own right, but rather, effects of more basic psycho-
logical processes. The existence of networks for discrete
emotions would strike at the heart of this idea, vindicating
instead the natural kind proposal that discrete emotions have
ontological status as causal entities and are driven by distinctive,
though distributed, neural mechanisms.
Once we shift to a networks approach, a one-to-one mapping
between single brain regions and discrete emotions is no longer
the litmus test for functional specialization. Understood
broadly, functional specialization has to do with the existence
of physically discrete regions in the brain – possibly distribu-
ted – that play at a time a function that is not played by other
physically discrete regions. The point is that a functionally
specialized brain region X can play more than one function,
depending on which other regions it is co-activated with,
without this calling into question that X fulfills a specific func-
tion in the context of a given network at a given time.
Even brain regions commonly considered to be paradigms of
functional specialization can fulfill multiple functions depend-
ing on the networks with which they are affiliated. For
example, Broca’s area has long been considered functionally
specialized for language, but it is also involved in other func-
tions, such as movement preparation and action sequencing
(cf. Anderson 2007). As Lindquist et al. point out, even the
primary visual cortex contains “neurons that participate in
different neural assemblies associated with different functions”
(sect. 6.1, para. 1). Yet, we still consider it functionally special-
ized for vision.
This leads me to question the principle that “[s]upport for a
psychological constructionist view. . .would be found if the
same brain region(s) were involved in realizing instances of
several emotion categories – and, furthermore, if the brain
region(s) are more generally important to realizing a basic
psychological operation” (sect. 4, para. 1). If a brain region
can have a function in a network at a particular time without
being exclusively dedicated to that function at all times, it is
hard to see why some region X could not be functionally
specialized for, say, disgust – good candidates for this role
would be regions consistently and selectively activated by
disgust – despite the fact that X is not functionally specific to
disgust. The fact that a brain region may be involved in net-
works associated with other discrete emotions and with more
basic psychological processes is compatible with the fact that
at a specific time it is functionally specialized in producing
disgust (or another discrete emotion).
These remarks seem to suggest that proponents of natural kind
models should hypothesize a one-to-many mapping between
single brain regions and fear, anger, disgust, and other emotions.
Things are, in my view, more complicated, because our current
ontology of discrete emotions is most likely inappropriate for
the study of functional specialization. I have argued elsewhere
that folk emotion categories are too heterogeneous for scientific
purposes, and should be split into more homogenous subcate-
gories that capture theoretically distinct types of emotion, types
of fear, types of anger, and so forth (Scarantino, in press).
This is to say that the mapping between single brain regions
and fear, anger, disgust, and so on, may ultimately turn out to
be many-to-many. Not only could the (possibly distributed) net-
works functionally specialized for a given discrete emotion
include brain regions that play other functions in other emotional
and non-emotional networks (the one-to-many aspect), but there
could also be multiple brain networks functionally specialized for
anger, for fear, for disgust, and so on (the many-to-one aspect).
This would call into question the opportunity of using folk
emotion categories for the study of discrete emotions.
Whether these speculations will prove to be correct remains to
be empirically determined. What we can say at this stage is that
neuroimaging data have yet to tip the balance for either construc-
tivist or natural kind models, and that both approaches continue
to be worth pursuing in our efforts to understand the brain basis
of emotions.
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Neuroscience findings are consistent with
appraisal theories of emotion; but does the
brain “respect” constructionism?
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Abstract: I reject Lindquist et al.’s implicit claim that all emotion
theories other than constructionist ones subscribe to a “brain
locationist” approach. The neural mechanisms underlying relevance
detection, reward, attention, conceptualization, or language use are
consistent with many theories of emotion, in particular componential
appraisal theories. I also question the authors’ claim that the meta-
analysis they report provides support for the specific assumptions of
constructionist theories.
Lindquist et al. mostly use their impressive meta-analysis to con-
trast their constructionist approach with all other emotion the-
ories, which are credited with a “locationist” account (“discrete
emotion categories [. . .] are consistently and specifically localized
to architecturally defined brain locales or anatomical networks”;
see “Definitions” box in section 3). This is a gross misrepresenta-
tion of the architectures of classic emotion theories, many of
which suggest that emotion episodes are driven by complex inter-
actions of multiple mental and somatic systems (cognitive, moti-
vational, autonomic, motor) that are not specialized for emotion.
This precludes the assumption of emotion-specific brain centers.
In consequence, the authors’ fundamental premise is untenable,
the results of their meta-analysis being consistent with many
different emotion theories (Moors 2009).
This is particularly true for componential appraisal theories
(see Ellsworth & Scherer 2003; Roseman 2011; Roseman &
Smith 2001), which Lindquist et al. credit with a locationist
account (see sect. 2, para. 1). For example, the component
process model (CPM) of emotion (Scherer 1984; 1986; 2001;
2009b) postulates that the dynamic unfolding of emotion episodes
is driven by parallel appraisal processes at different levels of brain
organization that sequentially evaluate objects and events for their
novelty, intrinsic pleasantness, and goal conduciveness; and for
compatibility with self-concept, social norms or values, and the
individual’s coping potential. These appraisals are content criteria,
not specialized mechanisms for emotion, based on the general
information-processing machinery of the brain (perception,
association, schema matching, prediction error checking, categor-
ization, inference). For example, contrary to Lindquist et al.’s
claim (sect. 3, para. 5), novelty checking is not a new, unique,
emotion-specific mental operation – there are many studies on
novelty processing in cognitive (see Ranganath & Rainer 2003)
and affective neuroscience (Balderston et al. 2011).
The appraisal results cumulatively produce changes in
several subsystems of the organism, including the motivational
system (action tendencies, e.g., approach/avoidance), support
system (endocrine, autonomic, and somatic nervous systems),
and monitoring system (subjective feeling). These bodily
response patterns are fed back recursively into the appraisal
process through interoception. This appraisal-driven synchro-
nization of subsystems that are not specialized for emotion,
but have specific functions for the organism’s different needs,
constitutes the emotion episode. The monitoring system inte-
grates proprioceptive information about changes in different
systems, producing unique mental representations (qualia). If
the subsystem synchronization level is sufficiently high, the
emotion process may enter consciousness and engender categ-
orization (which can be nonlinguistic) and – if the context
requires communication of the emotion to others – labeling
with emotion words or metaphors (Grandjean et al. 2008;
Scherer 2009b). This architecture is “constructionist” in the
dictionary sense of the word.
Contrary to Lindquist et al.’s claim (sect. 2, para. 2) that an
appraisal approach hypothesizes that “dedicated cognitive mech-
anisms automatically make meaning of a stimulus and trigger
the corresponding discrete emotion,” the CPM includes all
levels of processing (from sensory motor to propositional) and
does not assume dedicated mechanisms or a limited number of
automatically triggered discrete emotions. On the contrary, the
CPM allows for an almost infinite number of different emotion
episodes, given the recursive, emergent character of the sequen-
tial-cumulative configuration of appraisal results and consequent
patterning of response systems (Scherer 1984). This architecture
also accounts for the prevalence of blended or mixed emotions
(e.g., see Scherer & Ceschi 2000; Siemer et al. 2007).
Also contrary to the authors’ claim (sect. 2, para. 2), several
attempts have been made to muster neuroscience support for
appraisal predictions (Sander et al. 2005; Scherer 1993;
Scherer & Peper 2001). Furthermore, many CPM hypotheses
have been experimentally tested using neuroscience methods.
For example, Grandjean and Scherer (2008), using EEG, chron-
ometrically confirmed the predicted sequence of novelty, intrin-
sic pleasantness, and goal-conduciveness checks. Dan Glauser
and Scherer (2008) showed that the conscious experience of
feeling an emotion is associated with specific brain wave oscil-
lations (see Scherer [2009b] for a recent overview of empirical
evidence for CPM predictions).
The authors’ meta-analysis lends further support to the CPM
(whose architecture makes it incompatible with locationist
assumptions). For example, low-level relevance detection in the
amygdala, interoceptive representation in the insula, integration
of subsystems in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) or networks rela-
tive to attention or conceptualization, are entirely consistent with
the model’s architecture. As most emotion theories assume,
implicitly or explicitly, that in many contexts, emotional experi-
ences are categorized, conceptualized, and labeled (see Scherer
2009b, pp. 1318–24), any evidence for brain mechanisms subser-
ving these operations is equally consistent with those theories.
Demonstration of the neural underpinnings of categorization or
conceptualization does not privilege any theory on why or when
categorizations and conceptualizations lead to specific effects.
One wonders whether the meta-analysis supports specific
claims of the authors’ theory, which assumes that a “conceptual
act” is needed to constitute the emotion. This “definitional act”
is immune to empirical evidence of any kind. Contrary to estab-
lished usage, it limits the term to conceptualized subjective
experience or feeling, thereby excluding objectively measurable
emotion episodes in nonhuman animals, nonverbal children,
and normal individuals who cannot or do not conceptualize
such episodes as emotion feelings.
Furthermore, the meta-analysis does not reveal stringent evi-
dence for “core affect,” presumed to be a fundamental feeling
architecture organized as an orthogonal valence × arousal
system. As valence is generally considered a fundamental orga-
nizing criterion for affectivity, any evidence for brain mechanisms
underlying valence processing is consistent with virtually all the-
ories of emotion. It does not lend further credence to the mono-
lithic “core affect” notion.
The authors admit that core affect might need to be broken
down into more basic mechanisms, such as approach- versus
avoidance-related states (sect. 6, para. 5). Such action tendencies
(Frijda 2007) are postulated by most emotion theories, and the
underlying brain mechanisms are among the first to have been
examined (Davidson 1993). The authors also state that the amyg-
dala “realizes” core affect (mostly when “the rest of the brain
cannot easily predict what sensations mean,” sect. 5.1, para. 2)
by detecting relevance (which they call “salience,” covering
only one aspect of relevance). This position, together with
emphasis on the brain’s “making meaning” of exteroceptive and
interoceptive information, comes close to a rudimentary
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componential appraisal theory, although vague references to
context-bound categorization and conceptualization do not facili-
tate development of testable nomothetic predictions.
Invariants of human emotion
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Abstract: Because of the complexity of human emotional responses,
invariants must be sought not in the responses themselves, but in their
generating mechanisms. Lindquist et al. show that functional
locationism is a theoretical dead end; their proposed mechanistic
framework is a first step toward better models of emotional behavior.
We caution, however, that emotions may still be quasi-natural
perceptual types.
Herb Simon (1990) proposed more than twenty years ago that the
problem of identifying invariants of human behavior is compli-
cated by the fact that people are adaptive systems with highly
flexible behavior. Invariants must therefore be sought not in
the behaviors themselves, but in the mechanisms that guide
the processes of individual adaptation: the mechanisms of intelli-
gence. This stance supported the search for mechanistic models
of cognition, in the form of computational models (Baars &
Franklin 2009; French 1995; Holland et al. 1986; Newell 1990;
Rumelhart et al. 1986; Simon 1979).
Researchers have become increasingly aware that emotions
cannot be considered separable from cognition (Damasio 2000;
Dolan 2002; LeDoux 1996; Phelps 2006). Emotional states are
the lens through which perceptions become thoughts, and
thoughts become actions. A more thorough understanding of
human behavior requires the incorporation of emotion into our
mechanistic models. We adapt Simon’s proposition thus: The
problem with identifying invariant emotional categories is com-
plicated by the fact that people are adaptive systems, whose
emotions are highly flexible. Invariants must therefore be
sought in the mechanisms that allow them to produce these feel-
ings – the mechanisms of affective responses.
Lindquist et al. show that locationism, and a strict adherence to
a natural kinds view of emotions, is likely a theoretical dead end.
More importantly, they seek to replace a modular view of
emotion states with a mechanistic model of how those states
come to be generated. The model they have proposed is vague,
perhaps necessarily so, as emotional categories are emergent
phenomena of a highly complex system. There may be flaws in
their model, and it may eventually be discarded in favor of a
better model. It is clear, however, that the incorporation of
emotions into a mechanistic understanding of cognition requires
a generative model of emotional states. The invariants of
emotions are to be found not in the discrete emotional categories,
but in mechanisms that generate emotional responses.
A functionalist perspective of emotions as natural kinds
assumes, at minimum, that each emotion (or “family of
emotions”; Ekman 1992) is controlled by an independent cogni-
tive system, even if those systems are not locationally isolated.
This is an organizational blueprint which is attractive in its
clarity and simplicity, but which strikes us as unlikely. The
brain’s cognitive architecture is a system of vast complexity
shaped by millions of years of evolution. It is unlikely that the
emergence of each emotion involved a separate evolutionary tra-
jectory, each with its own selection pressures and phylogenetic
path. Instead, we consider far more plausible the evolution of a
generative, multipurpose emotion system. This is supported by
the principle that it is much easier to evolve a self-organizing
complex system that can adapt to varied environments than to
specify a unique module for every contingency (Kauffman
1995; Schank 2002).
Although emotions may not represent natural kinds in terms of
brain organization, we caution against the complete dismissal of
the idea of basic affective categories; emotions may exist as
quasi-natural perceptual kinds without necessitating functional
locationism. There is cross-cultural recognition of the meaning
of emotional expressions (Ekman 1989), even if these expressions
must be exaggerated to be identified (Barrett 2006a). This may
reflect more about the perception of emotions than about their
expression. Humans are natural pattern classifiers, and the
ability to readily detect broad emotion categories from facial
expressions makes sense from an adaptationist perspective
(Daly & Wilson 1995).
Social animals are well served by the quick assessment of
meaning behind others’ emotional expressions, even if fast
mapping means a loss of nuanced information. The sight of a con-
federate running towards you with a look of panicked horror
yields an altogether different reaction on your part than a look
of joyful excitement. We think it unlikely that emotional cat-
egories are largely driven by language, as proposed by Lindquist
et al., as well as by Barrett and colleagues previously (Barrett
et al. 2007b). Rapid identification of emotional cues is clearly
adaptive, possibly even more for individuals without language,
and moreover is present in nonhuman primates (Tate et al.
2006). If recurring families of cues become strongly associated
with certain types of responses, evolution may select for
enhanced recognition of those cues on the part of the observer,
and, if successful transmission is adaptive, more precise pro-
duction on the part of the transmitter (Bateson 2004; Maynard
Smith & Harper 2003). Therefore, rapid identification of impor-
tant emotional cues may embody quasi-natural kinds as emergent
properties of fast-acting response systems, and it seems to us that
this hypothesis has not been damaged by Lindquist et al.’s
analysis.
Finally, we hope that this target article represents the first step
toward rigorously tested generative models of emotion. Although
we can say little about this here, understanding the nature of
emotions is critically important for producing explicit models of
human and animal social behavior, which is in turn crucial for
gaining insight into and predictions about our world.
A rapprochement between emotion and
cognition: Amygdala, emotion, and self-
relevance in episodic-autobiographical
memory
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. remark that not all fear instances lead to
heightened amygdalar activity and, instead, point to roles of the
amygdala in detecting “motivationally salient “or “emotionally
impactful” stimuli. By reviewing research on the amygdala’s functions
in episodic-autobiographical memory, we further emphasize the
involvement of the amygdala in coding the subjective relevance and
extracting the biological and social significance of the stimuli.
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As Lindquist et al. describe, oscillations between localization and
anti-localization of functions characterize brain research. Locali-
zationists argue that circumscribed brain lesions can abolish a
function throughout a life-span. Frequently cited is the patient
H.M. who, after undergoing bilateral resection of the medial
temporal lobes, developed life-long anterograde amnesia (Mar-
kowitsch & Staniloiu, in press). Functional neuroimaging data
also point to specialized regions being selectively activated
during face processing (Kanwisher 2010). At the other pole of
the dialectics, Chow (1967) argued that if a lesion in a brain
region has no particular effect on a function, it cannot be con-
cluded that this region is irrelevant for that function in non-
damaged individuals. Second, if a lesion does influence the per-
formance of a task, this does not mean that that region is the only
structure involved in the task. And last, and perhaps most impor-
tant, brain tissue damage cannot clarify the function of a brain
area, because it destroys what it aims to study – that brain
area. Functional imaging studies, showing that widespread
regions in the brain are activated even when performed tasks
are simple, and electrophysiological experiments (Bartlett &
John 1973; John 1972) support views of the brain acting in a
Gestalt-like fashion.
Generally, no brain region can act alone in vivo, and, especially
for more complex functions, a multitude of brain regions act in
concert or within a neural network (Cramon & Markowitsch
1992; Fink et al. 1996; Markowitsch 1994; Schulte-Ru¨ther et al.
2010; Staniloiu &Markowitsch 2010). This was already suggested
by Papez in 1937 in his seminal paper entitled “A proposed
mechanism of emotion” (Papez [1937], overlooked by the Lind-
quist et al. in the target article). Processing of episodic-autobio-
graphical memories requires attention and concentration, self-
reflection and emotional colorization (Markowitsch & Staniloiu,
in press) (see our Fig. 1).
Emotional evaluation and tagging are important for both for-
mation and retrieval of episodic-autobiographical memories,
and they engage limbic system regions (Markowitsch 1999).
Within these regions, the amygdala constitutes a cornerstone as
it represents the major hub for channeling sensory information
of biological or social personal significance to storage in networks
located primarily in neocortical areas. Behavioral studies per-
formed in patients with Urbach-Wiethe disease, a rare genetic
condition leading to bilateral calcification of the amygdala
(Cahill et al. 1995; Markowitsch et al. 1994) emphasize the role
of the amygdala for evaluating the salience of newly incoming
information and extracting those portions which appear worth
being remembered.
Several combined neuroimaging and behavioral studies of
healthy subjects or patients showed amygdalar engagement in
episodic-autobiographical mnemonic processing. Brain
mapping of the time course of episodic-autobiographical
memory retrieval revealed modulation of amygdala activity by
judgments of emotional intensity of autobiographical memory.
This occurred early in the process of retrieval, before (healthy)
participants in the study signaled the full assemblage of autobio-
graphical memories (Daselaar et al. 2008). This finding is congru-
ent with the proposed role of the amygdala in charging sensory
information with appropriate emotional cues, in order to guide
successful searching for and retrieval of emotionally significant
events (Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011).
Not all functional neuroimaging investigations of episodic-
autobiographical memory retrieval evidenced amygdalar acti-
vation, due to differences in memory-testing methodology,
imaging techniques’ limitations, lack of control for retrieval
perspective, or habituation of amygdala responses to emotion-
al material over time (Markowitsch & Staniloiu 2011). An
increase in right amygdalar activity was found in subjects
who retrieved episodic-autobiographical memories from a
first person perspective, in comparison to those who retrieved
them from a third person perspective (Eich et al. 2009),
suggesting a higher degree of subjectively perceived emotion-
ality associated with the first type of memories. Neuroimaging
studies showed activation of the amygdala as a function of
personal relevance or self-involvement of the recalled
material. One study comparing the retrieval of autobiographi-
cal episodes with the retrieval of fictitious “episodes” revealed
activation of the amygdala only during the recall of personal –
that is, authentic – events, whereas the recall of fictitious
material activated the retrosplenial/precuneus area only (Mar-
kowitsch et al. 2000). Personal relevance enhanced amygdala
activity during the recall of the frightening event of September
11, 2001 (Sharot et al. 2007).
These results suggest that the amygdala has functions in coding
the subjective relevance and social and biological salience of the
stimuli, which might be reflected in its structure and hodology.
The amygdaloid nuclei are heavily connected with subcortical
and cortical areas, including regions involved in self-referential
Figure 1 (Staniloiu and Markowitsch). A schematic sketch of a neural net composed of three interacting subsets.
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processing, such as the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex. From the
neocortex, fibers arising from the multisensory posterior associ-
ation cortex, but in part also from primary sensory regions (olfac-
tion), project to the amygdala. Subsequently, the amygdala
receives largely preprocessed sensory input, which then provides
a basis for the amgdala to extract the personal biological and
social significance of the environment. Nevertheless, the amyg-
dala is not the only structure which plays a role in this process
of evaluation. A working tandem may, for example, exist
between the amygdala and septal nuclei. A damaged amygdala
dampens emotional evaluation (Siebert et al. 2003) whereas
damaged septal nuclei enhance it (Cramon & Markowitsch
2000). A patient with septal damage, for example, could not tol-
erate listening to an emotional story with negatively valenced
content, because of overwhelming perceived emotionality
(Cramon et al. 1993).
In conclusion, our findings from patients with Urbach-Wiethe
disease and from studying episodic-autobiographical memory
with various functional imaging techniques in different popu-
lations, support Lindquist et al.’s view that the amygdala is not
simply an emotional brain structure, but integrates emotion
with cognition. This view was, in our case, significantly shaped
by work with patients with relatively selective amygdala lesions.
This work enabled verifying hypotheses, which may not have
been possible by simply resorting to data from imaging studies.
Despite using various mathematical models to interpret func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging data, it is still difficult to
infer causality from function–structure correlations obtained
with brain imaging; therefore, additional experimental tech-
niques (e.g., transcranial magnetic stimulation) may need to be
used to confirm whether a brain region is necessary or specific
for a given function.
Feeling the strain: Predicting the third
dimension of core affect
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Abstract: This commentary (1) raises the question about the possible
conflation of core affect with the neural representation of interoceptive
changes in regard to whether biological value is subpersonal or must be
experienced, and (2) proposes that Wundt’s third dimension of core
affect – strain-relaxation – can be accounted for in the target model
under a generalised predictive model of attention.
I am very much in sympathy with the model of emotion pre-
sented by Lindquist et al. in the target article, which successfully
manages to integrate psychological data on emotion with current
neuroscientific findings, and provides the possibility of ground-
ing phenomenological accounts of intentionality and mood in
the biology of affect. My points in this commentary are therefore
not intended as criticisms of the model. I offer instead a clarifi-
catory question, and a proposal for developing the model
further.
I start by flagging a concern about the possible conflation of
core affect with the representations of afferent homeostatic infor-
mation. Core affect is an explicitly psychological phenomenon,
yet the target text is sometimes ambiguous as to whether it
denotes: (1) a psychological feeling state, (2) the representation
of interoceptive information, or (3) the actual bodily state. For
example, take this statement from the discussion of situated con-
ceptualisation in section 3:
In emotion, we hypothesize that this psychological operation makes a
prediction about what caused core affective changes within one’s
own body or what caused the affective cues [. . .] in another person.
(sect. 3, para. 6).
Here, “one’s own body” must either mean the physiological body
or the brain. The first option appears to conflate core affect (the
feeling of physiological changes) with affect (the physiological
changes themselves). The second option implies the quoted
statement should read, “a prediction about what caused core
affective changes which arise as a result of changes in one’s
body being represented in the brain.” But if so, then it is
unclear whether the prediction underpinning the situated con-
ceptualisation is supposed to concern bodily changes, the rep-
resentation of those changes, or the feeling of those changes.
Some clarification here would be helpful.
Although I agree that core affect is grounded in interoception,
conflating the two risks obscuring the mechanisms for represent-
ing biological value; is it (1) core affect – the feeling of the inter-
oceptive information – that is linked to sensory information, or
(2) the neural representation of interoceptive information? It
might be suggested that the feeling of the interoceptive
changes just is the representation of those changes, but it
seems unlikely that this is what the authors are claiming, since
this would mean that their use of “feeling” did not necessarily
imply that this information was experienced. While this is not
an unprecedented use of the term (see Damasio 1999), the
authors state specifically in the target article that core affect is
a psychological phenomenon which always presents itself in
experience, either in the foreground or the background. This
raises an important question: Is the biological value that is
being imposed on the environment as a result of situated concep-
tualisation an experienced value or can it be restricted to some
sub-personal domain?
The second question that I want to raise concerns the dimen-
sions of core affect. Barrett has argued elsewhere (Barrett &
Bliss-Moreau 2009) that Wundt’s original dimensions of affect
should be translated as valence, arousal, and intensity. But
Barrett and Bliss-Moreau reject intensity as a dimension,
arguing that it is realised by the ends of the dimensions of
valence and arousal. While Wundt does speak of intensity and
quality in regard to affective and sensational systems, he does
not do so in such a way as to suggest that these are the dimen-
sions of affect (see Wundt 1897, sect. 3). Wundt’s dimensions of
feelings are: (1) pleasurable and unpleasurable; (2) arousing
and subduing; and (3) strain and relaxation (Wundt 1897,
sect. 7.7). Although (1) and (2) neatly map on to valence and
arousal respectively, as Barrett and Bliss-Moreau suggest, I
do not think that (3) maps on to intensity. I suggest rather
that, where arousal is a distinct affective dimension likely to
be grounded in the afferent wing of the continuous – but
varying – activity of the sympathetic nervous system, and
valence may be grounded in the motor aspect of the homeo-
static/interoceptive loop (accounting for its relation to
approach/withdrawal states), Wundt’s third dimension of
affect can be grounded in the force with which prediction
error is being reduced.
According to the generalised predictive coding framework for
neuroscience (Bar 2009a; Friston 2009; Friston & Kiebel 2009),
unexpected sensations are intrinsically motivating in virtue of the
nervous system’s function being to reduce error in predictions.
According to such a story, any sensation that was not predicted
will inherently motivate the system either to move and act, or
to update its hypothesis concerning the cause of the predicted
sensations. Action and/or hypothesis change are mandated
until there is no error and the sensation corresponds to that
which was predicted. Feldman and Friston (2010) argue that
attention may be the process of optimising the post-synaptic
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responsiveness of the units reporting prediction errors. What this
means in practice is that if the system regards some sensory infor-
mation as high-grade (hence reliable), it can increase the gain on
the error-units reporting prediction error, thus giving added
weight to that sensory data. In such a case, the units encoding
that error become highly responsive (synaptic gain). This
means they exert a greater force by which to resolve prediction
errors. The searchlight of attention thus gets progressively finer
until all prediction errors have been resolved, or a greater error
arises elsewhere.
I propose that the directions of strain and relaxation corre-
spond to the force and resolution of synaptic gain as evidenced
in attention and the corresponding affective experience of
being drawn towards that which captures our attention, or
releases us. This fits Lindquist et al.’s compelling model of
many-layered predictions generating situated conceptualisations.
It also neatly incorporates attentional phenomena into the more
basic operations of prediction and corresponding experience
within the domain of core affect.
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Abstract: Parental brain responses to baby stimuli constitute a unique
model to study brain-basis frameworks of emotion. Results for baby-cry
and picture stimuli may fit with both locationist and psychological
constructionist hypotheses. Furthermore, the utility of either model
may depend on postpartum timing and relationship. Endocrine effects
may also be critical for accurate models to assess mental health risk and
treatment.
To differ with Lindquist et al., perhaps both locationist and con-
structionist frameworks for the brain basis of parental emotion
have utility, depending on stimulus parameters, timing, and
relationship. For example, consider the baby-cry, a single
primal signal that for an infant, not capable of complex interactive
social signaling, must serve to attract the attention of new parents
at the risk of adverse parental responses or drawing predators
(Soltis 2004; Swain et al. 2004). Thus far, there is evidence that
the parental brain basis of baby-cry-elicited emotions may fit
with locationism; involving a simple set of circuits, including
the amygdala and insula. Several groups have been studying
the brain basis of maternal response to baby-cry and related
behaviors within a relatively locationist framework (Swain et al.
2007). Initially, the thalamocingulate circuit for emotion
response and regulation in mammals was supported (Lorber-
baum et al. 2002; MacLean 1990), but several other brain
regions, including parts of the amygdala, insula, and striatum/
nucleus accumbens (NA) have also been shown to respond to
baby-cry (Swain et al. 2011). Responses in the medial frontal
cortex and striatum also predict parental mood and anxiety
(Swain et al. 2008).
However, as the infant develops nuanced social signals in the
context of a growing attachment, psychological constructionist
frameworks to understand parental brain responses to baby
stimuli, in accordance with Lindquist et al., may be more appro-
priate, in which emotions can be elicited that are intimately tied
to prior experiences and conceptualization. For example, early
life events may influence current brain activity in cortical
regions, that have not been the subject of rodent literature.
Some such connections have recently been discussed with
respect to maternal sensitivity. (For thorough reviews, see
Barrett & Fleming 2011; Swain 2011). In support of such
early-life effects on complex brain functions, a recent study has
shown that maternal brain structure and functional responses
to the mother’s own baby’s crying in the early postpartum
period varied according to mothers’ perceived maternal care
quality in their own childhood in accord with a constructionist
framework (Kim et al. 2010b). In this study, mothers who
reported having received greater maternal care in childhood
showed higher gray matter density, in a range of higher cortical
and executive function areas, including the insula, superior and
middle frontal gyri, orbital gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and
fusiform gyrus.
Strikingly, some of these morphological and functional
changes in the maternal brain are also associated with the con-
current conceptualization of positive maternal thoughts toward
their babies (Kim et al. 2010a). In this first prospective longitudi-
nal study, gray matter volume increased over the first few months
postpartum (from 2–4 weeks to 3–4 months) in the insula, pre-
frontal cortex, parietal lobes, and midbrain areas. Further work is
required to elaborate the constructionist framework of relation
between concurrent positive thoughts about one’s baby and
increased gray matter volume in multiple core affect regions of
the hypothalamus, substantia nigra, and amygdala, or to
support locationist approaches for certain experimental para-
digms (Kim et al. 2010a).
In evaluating locationist versus constructionist frameworks of
the brain basis of emotion, a meta-analysis of brain imaging
studies may be informed by the critical contributions of certain
hormones just beginning to be included in such studies. For
example, we contend that multiple hormonal systems related to
parental motivation, including oxytocin, must be considered in
frameworks of the brain basis of emotion. The neurohormone
oxytocin, for example, is one of the major factors that accounts
for variations in regulating parental emotions during parent–
infant interactions (Feldman et al. 2010). Another aspect of a
new mother’s emotion regulation is her recent mode of delivery,
such that vaginal versus cesarean deliveries are associated with
higher oxytocin (Marchini et al. 1988). Consistent with this,
mothers who have had vaginal deliveries show greater brain
responses to baby-cries in the insula, striatum, and anterior cin-
gulate cortex (Swain et al. 2008) than do mothers who have had
cesarean deliveries. Furthermore, regardless of delivery type,
mothers known to show higher oxytocin during breastfeeding
(Nissen et al. 1996), also have higher brain responses to their
own baby’s crying than do formula-feeding mothers, in the
insula, striatum, amygdala, and superior frontal gyrus (Kim
et al. 2011). Although requiring replication, these experiments
support a constructionist framework that includes hormone
levels – in addition to maternal brain responses in the cingulate,
striatum, and hypothalamus when shown baby pictures, some of
which responses vary with individual differences in oxytocin and
concurrent attachment (Strathearn et al. 2009).
Indeed, the key dimension of hormone responses in develop-
ing a comprehensive framework for understanding the brain
basis of emotions is underlined by a causal relationship
between oxytocin and women’s brain responses, in two recent
studies. First, in a randomized control trial (Riem et al. 2011),
experimentally elevated oxytocin versus placebo resulted in
increased responses to the cries of unrelated babies, in the
inferior frontal gyrus and insula, and decreased responses in
the right amygdala. This study shows that oxytocin may modulate
maternal behaviors, that is, enhance positive motivation by sensi-
tizing care-related insula activity and reduce negative motivation
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by desensitizing anxiety-related amygdala responses. Second, in a
study by Naber et al. (2010), administration of oxytocin increased
sensitive parental emotions and behaviors, assessed by video-
taped play session. In fact, infant pictures by themselves have
been shown to exert similar modulation of maternal brains
(Bartels & Zeki 2004; Strathearn et al. 2008).
The use of baby-cry to stimulate emotions in parents may
present some challenges to the psychological constructionist fra-
mework, and require locationism for certain paradigms. Perhaps
then also, locationism may still be useful in understanding the
effects of interventions – such as for complex multi-system and
time-delayed effects. Indeed, some recent studies interpret
brain imaging data on basic face responses (Canli et al. 2005)
or intervention effects in emotion response circuits according
to a locationist model, whether using structural or functional
approaches (Chua et al. 2011; Peterson & Weissman 2011).
Ultimately, more research, probably including endocrine
parameters, is needed to clarify the utility of locationist versus
constructionist frameworks according to different paradigms.
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Abstract: Emotional reactions are rather flexible, due to the schema-like
organization of complex socio-emotional situations. Some data on
emotion development, and on certain pathological conditions such as
alexithymia, give further support for the psychological constructivist view
put forward by Lindquist et al. Narrative organization is a key
component of this schematic organization. The self-related nature of
narrative organization provides scaffolding to the contextual dependency
of emotions.
Lindquist et al. very clearly argue for a psychologically con-
structed vision of emotion by their re-analysis of the enormous
and still growing neuroimaging literature on emotions, and by
challenging the locationist views. Our aim is to recall that argu-
ments for contextual flexibility and social determination are to
be found as well in the literature on emotion development and
cultural determination.
Emotions in norm transmission. In the transmission of cultural
norms regarding emotion behavior, emotions are set in a
reinforcement scene in socialization. Caregivers may react to
the emotion expressions of infants and children with reward,
punishment, overriding, neglect, or magnification (O’Neal &
Magai 2005). Positive parental response to emotion provides
models for adaptive emotion regulation strategies (Gottman
et al. 1997), helping children to refine and rehearse emotion
management skills. However, undesired emotion expression
may be met with rejection, or criticism, from parents who do
not foster the ability to identify and communicate emotions, or
who may encourage the suppression of emotion, or the use of
avoidant or aggressive emotion regulation strategies (Eisenberg
et al. 1996; Gergely & Watson 1999; Kench & Irwin 2000). As
a consequence, undesired positive or negative emotions may
not be differentiated properly, remaining undifferentiated, or
become associated with another emotion. Primary emotion-
related self–other representations resulting from this process
(Gergely & Unoka 2008) are embedded in wider contextual nar-
rative structures. These in turn create autobiographical self-rep-
resentations (Bera´n & Unoka 2005), correlated with the
activation of distributed networks in the brain (Conway 2005).
Narratives and emotions. Several studies, such as the one by
Oppenheim et al. (1997), have shown that narrative organization,
as revealed in the joint story-telling of 4–5-years-old children and
their parents, correlates with emotional integrity. However, the
formation of contextual narrative structures of emotions may
result in pathological outcomes when affected by strict cultural
norms regarding emotion display (e.g., Allan & Gilbert 2002;
Chaplin et al. 2005; Le et al. 2002), specific caregiver–child tem-
perament constellations (e.g., Coplan et al. 2009), and caregiver
pathologies of emotion regulation (e.g., Gergely & Unoka 2008;
Silk et al. 2011). In the latter case, the caregiver, due to his/
her own mental disorder (e.g., depression, psychosis, personality
disorders) is unable to help the child learn to regulate his/her
own emotional responses.
Culture plays a central role in shaping how emotions are
experienced and expressed. Certain cultures or subcultures
restrict the open experience and expression of emotions, which
may result in the pathology of alexithymia: a difficulty in identify-
ing one’s feelings and distinguishing them from bodily sensations,
as well as a difficulty in communicating one’s emotions to others
(Le et al. 2002). Alexithymia was found to be associated with dif-
ficulties in detection of the facial expression of anger, sadness,
and fear (Prkachin et al. 2009). Alexithymia was also negatively
correlated with activation to sad and happy faces in several
brain regions (Reker et al. 2010), which are described by Lind-
quist et al. as the brain regions forming part of the distributed
network realizing core affect. Hence, as a consequence of this
type of socialization, negative emotions may remain undifferen-
tiated, and this is correlated with a less-differentiated brain acti-
vation pattern, which would show up in fMRI studies.
Anger expression determined by social ranking is another point
in the differentiation of emotions in social contexts. Occurrence
of complex negative affect patterns is evident in sensitivity to
social put-downs (Gilbert & Miles 2000): feeling anxious or dis-
tressed about being put down is highly correlated with feeling
angry/irritated. Allan and Gilbert (2002) found that self-percep-
tions of inferior rank and feeling trapped affects anger suppres-
sion. The rank of the target also affects anger expression:
People who respond angrily to social put-downs tend to suppress
their anger more when they are frustrated by a higher-rank
target, compared to a lower-rank one. This result is in accord
with animal studies of aggression which show marked variations
in aggression expressed up and down the ranks (Archer 1988).
In response to the stimulus of an angry facial expression in an
fMRI study, the brain reactions of persons within a rigid rank-
relational schema will be different for a person of lower-rank
compared to one of higher-rank. People with a submissive self-
schema in their narrative self-representation would react with
fear, whereas those with a dominant self-schema would react
with anger. Thus, in addition to emotion activation, a facial-
expression stimulus activates a social relational self–other
schema – an interactional pattern, which activates different
neural networks of the brain. The representation of rank order
and the appropriate reaction to the facial expression of the
angry other is embedded in narrative self-representations,
which are further complicated by cultural norms concerning
appropriate emotion expression.
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Parental reactions to child emotions also play an important
socializing role in the development of children’s emotional self-
regulation (Eisenberg et al. 1996). Mothers with a history of
childhood depression are less likely than mothers without such
history to respond in supportive ways to children’s negative
emotions, and are more likely to magnify, punish, or neglect
negative emotions (Silk et al. 2011). These parental responses
one year later were associated with children’s internalizing symp-
toms, which suggest that in the development of internalizing
pathologies, atypical socialization of emotion may play a role.
Thus, if the caregiver rejects the child’s display of a negative
emotion, such as anger, then it may become associated with
other emotions, such as fear, separation anxiety, or guilt, due to
their contextual embeddedness in narrative structures. The
anger schema of such individuals includes fear, and related
self-to-other and other-to-self affective representations (Gergely
& Unoka 2008).
Internalization disorders, avoidant attachment style, and adult
avoidant and dependent personality disorders are examples of
such an association of emotions. These emotion scripts raise
the methodological problem that the emotion activated in the
experimental setting will consist of the quick activation of two
emotions – anger and fear, for instance, since they share a
common neural network. Consequently, because of the low tem-
poral resolution of fMRI, the neural correlates of the two
emotions can hardly be differentiated.
All of these factors suggest that the psychological constructi-
vism suggested by Lindquist et al. can be given a more detailed
socio-cultural interpretation in this respect. The relativistic and
contextual interpretation provided for the brain basis for
emotions could converge with developmental and clinical contex-
tual interpretations.
Neuronal deactivation is equally important for
understanding emotional processing
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Abstract: In their analyses of the neural correlates of discrete
emotionality, Lindquist et al. do not consider the numerous drawbacks
to inferring psychological processes based on currently available
cognitive neurometric technology. The authors also disproportionately
emphasize the relevance of neuronal activation over deactivation,
which, in our opinion, limits the scope and utility of their conclusions.
Although we commend Lindquist et al. for addressing several
ambitious areas of inquiry, including neural activation of discrete
emotions, we have several reservations with the authors’ empiri-
cal assumptions, and with their subsequent conclusions, which
leave us with more questions than answers. One concern is that
the authors’ treatment did not incorporate the numerous draw-
backs to inferring psychological processes based on currently
available cognitive neurometric technology. Conventional brain
imaging devices, for instance, have relatively poor temporal res-
olution as compared to actual electrical transfer and inter-neur-
onal communication. The inability to precisely monitor the
temporal sequence of localized brain activity combined with
the spatial limitations of these techniques severely limits the
ability to measure how environmental energy (e.g., task-
induced stimuli) is transformed into psychological energy. More-
over, individuals show great variability in anatomical positioning
(Amunts et al. 2004), and it remains unclear just how and to what
extent the types of data that are relied upon to infer brain acti-
vation (e.g., relative oxygen blood flow) are representative of,
and can be used to map the structure, stages, and feedback of,
neural networks.
Another important limitation of the authors’ current analyses
(and of the broader cognitive neuroscience literature as a
whole) is the disproportionate emphasis on measuring brain acti-
vation versus brain deactivation. These efforts are based, in part,
on the perspective that psychological functioning (both excitatory
and inhibitory firing) requires activation processes, and that the
absence of neural activity implies the nonexistence of psychologi-
cal functioning. However, it is well established that certain beha-
viors, such as lying still with one’s eyes closed or passively viewing
a visual stimulus – standard baseline control conditions in neu-
roimaging experiments – are associated with decreased regional
brain activity (Raichle et al. 2001). Investigations of the visual and
auditory cortices have likewise shown reciprocal deactivation
when the other region is activated (Laurienti et al. 2002; Lewis
et al. 2000). Tomasi and colleagues (2006) interpret cross-
modal inhibition as intentional deactivation of contra-brain
regions, so as to decrease interference from non-relevant
neural processes (Tomasi et al. 2006). Lindquist et al. do not con-
sider the concept of intentional deactivation in their analyses, nor
do they consider how regions, such as the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC), which make tradeoffs between facilitating either
cognitive or emotional processing (only one function is possible
at any given time) may have affected their results (Drevets &
Raichle 1998). Task difficulty, possibly related to differential
remote memory retrieval, influences ACC activity (Paus et al.
1998), and tasks that require greater cognitive demands may con-
found analyses intended to measure emotional processing.
In other words, brain deactivation may provide just as impor-
tant information as activation patterns provide for understanding
emotion-processing mechanisms (see also Davidson 1998; David-
son & Irwin 1999). Consider the case of amygdala activation,
which is a well-established concomitant of threat processing
and subsequent elicitation of fear and disgust responses, as the
authors show. What the authors fail to address, however, is the
importance of amygdala deactivation, which the authors also
show is indicative of experiencing anger and joy. This makes
sense, as both anger and joy are demonstrative of empowerment,
and therefore systematically occur in response to the appraisal of
non-threatening stimuli (Vigil 2009). Lesion and neuroimaging
studies show that amygdala activation is necessary for detecting
distrust, and when the amygdala is deactivated or impaired, indi-
viduals are more likely to infer trustworthiness and benign attri-
butes in others (e.g., Adolphs et al. 1998; Engell et al. 2007;
Winston et al. 2002; Zald 2003). It is therefore likely that the inhi-
bition or absence of amygdala activity may facilitate specialized
and functional elements of social cognition, particularly in
social situations that favor cooperative over avoidant behavioral
strategies.
Unfortunately, we are uninspired by the utility of the authors’
currently described “conceptual act model” of discrete emotion-
ality, which can arguably be interpreted as another form of “loca-
tionist” model, substituting broader psychological constructs
(e.g., memories, knowledge) for the more specific constructs
(e.g., natural kinds) that the authors argue against. Moreover,
the authors’ core hypothesis that “people make meaning” out of
physiological states, subsequently resulting in emotional experi-
ences, is indistinguishable from an embodied-simulation model
of emotional processing (e.g., see Niedenthal et al. 2010),
which we have argued against elsewhere (Vigil & Coulombe
2010). In particular, we showed that the mere evaluations of
core trait impressions of trustworthiness and capacity are both
necessary and sufficient for predicting interpersonal dispositions
(e.g., to affiliate or avoid; see e.g., Cacioppo et al. 1999; Gray
1994; Lang et al. 1990) and discrete emotional reactions (e.g.,
felt disgust vs. sympathy) towards others (see also, e.g., Fiske
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et al. 2006; Rosenberg et al. 1968; Todorov 2008; Vigil 2009; Woj-
ciszke 2005). Therefore, the recourse to prior experience and
personal meaning of a given context may not always be necessary
for explaining how and why emotional and broader affective-
behavioral processing occurs.
Lindquist et al. have built their argument such that if criteria
for the locationist argument are not met, it is assumed to be
support for the psychological constructionist perspective. This
is misleading, and fails to recognize other possible explanations.
One alternative explanation, of many, is H. C. Barrett’s (2005)
analogy that cognitive modules use a template matching system
similar to that used by enzymes. In modular models of human
cognition it is not necessary that brain activity be localized to
specific areas across participants due to factors such as plasticity
and the brain’s reorganizational capabilities in response to injury
(e.g., H. C. Barrett 2005; H. C. Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Mar-
shall 1984; Robertson & Murre 1999). Modularity is a central
concept of the computational model of the mind, and although
there is disagreement as to the extent to which the mind is
modular, there is broad agreement that it is at least somewhat
modularized (e.g., Barrett & Kurzban 2006; Hagen 2005).
Future research that can incorporate multi-dimensional tech-
niques, such as activation-based techniques (e.g., neuroimaging)
and disruption-based techniques (e.g., temporary lesion
methods), will eventually elucidate the form and function of dis-
crete emotionality, as well as guide the development of clinical
applications for cognitive neuroscentific research (e.g., Pouratian
et al. 2003; Rorden & Karnath 2004).
Timing: A missing key ingredient in typical
fMRI studies of emotion
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001646
Christian E. Waugh and James A. Schirillo
Department of Psychology, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem,
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Abstract: Lindquist et al. provide a compelling summary of the brain
bases of the onset of emotion. Their conclusions, however, are
constrained by typical fMRI techniques that do not assess a key
ingredient in emotional experience – timing. We discuss the
importance of timing in theories of emotion as well as the implications
of neural temporal dynamics for psychological constructionism.
Lindquist et al. have advanced a very thoughtful review on the
brain bases of emotion garnered from neuroimaging. Their
summary should prove useful for investigators interested in
understanding the functions of the brain regions involved with
emotions. We also believe that the current state of neuroimaging
evidence provides fairly compelling support for their psychologi-
cal constructionist theory of emotions. We argue, however, that
the current state of neuroimaging evidence, while necessary, is
not sufficient to fully support their theory. Neuroimaging has
thus far only provided a snapshot of the initial onset of
emotion, while ignoring one of the most fundamental elements
of emotional experience – time.
Emotions happen over time: from the initial appraisal of an
emotional event that can occur within hundreds of milliseconds
(Schupp et al. 2000) to event-induced moods that can endure
for weeks (McCullough et al. 2007). Although often ignored
empirically, time is an important parameter in most major the-
ories of emotion. Process-models of emotion have emphasized
that emotions endure and change over time, and that temporal
approaches to understanding emotions should yield discoveries
about how emotions are fundamentally processed (Larsen et al.
2009). For example, it has been shown that longer enduring
emotional experiences can be predicted by the importance and
initial intensity of the emotion-eliciting situation (Verduyn et al.
2009). Beyond emotional reactivity, timing has also proved criti-
cal for understanding emotional regulation (Gross 2001).
Whether people enjoy the social, psychological, and physiological
benefits of cognitive reappraisal (vs. suppression) depends, in
part, on when they attempt to regulate their emotion (Gross
2001). Finally, and particularly relevant to the present target
article, it has been suggested that the timing of emotion is a
key mechanism underlying the neural bases of individual differ-
ences in emotional experience (Davidson 1998).
Despite the obvious importance of timing in understanding
emotional experience, it has been mostly ignored in neuroima-
ging studies. The reason is simple: Traditional functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) statistical techniques do not
estimate time. The overwhelming majority of fMRI analyses
model the data with canonical gamma-based hemodynamic
response functions (HRFs) (Friston et al. 1994). When these
canonical HRFs are used to model the data, only one par-
ameter – height – is allowed to vary. The temporal parameters
of the HRF, such as the delay and dispersion, are typically
fixed, which does not allow for the estimation of possible tem-
poral dynamics of the underlying blood oxygenation-level depen-
dent (BOLD) response. There is a delay from neural activity to
measurable BOLD response (Bandettini et al. 1993), so these
time-invariant HRFs only assess hypothetical neural activity
occurring in the first second after stimulus onset while failing
to account for significantly delayed neural responses or neural
responses of longer duration. This means that fMRI studies of
emotion in large part fail to capture the development of emotion-
al experience beyond the initial response to the emotional
stimulus.
Recent studies that have used time-varying HRFs show why
estimating temporal features of the BOLD response may prove
critical to test Lindquist et al.’s conclusions. In one study, we
used the summation of three inverse-logit curves as a time-
varying HRF (Lindquist &Wager 2007) to examine how the dur-
ation of BOLD activity relates to self-reported intensity of
emotional experience (Waugh et al. 2010). First, we found that
the insula exhibited extended duration of BOLD activity to
more intense negative images. Lindquist et al. have proposed
that the insula, as part of the core affect network, represents visc-
eral arousal. This suggests that although visceral arousal can
occur quickly, it can also be sustained for a significant period of
time and, perhaps, lead to sustained insula activation. Second,
we found that regions along the cortical midline, the medial pre-
frontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), also
exhibited extended duration of BOLD activity to intense negative
images. In conjunction with Lindquist et al.’s proposal that these
regions are associated with the situated conceptualization of
emotional experiences, this finding suggests that in intense
emotional situations these structures may stay active to continu-
ally monitor the meaning of the situation to the self. Indeed, in
another study examining neural responses during long periods
(2 minutes) of social evaluative threat, the mPFC was found
to stay active for the entire duration of the stress period
(Wager et al. 2009b).
These findings – that the insula and cortical midline exhibit
extended duration of activation during intense emotion – offer
an example of how estimating timing of emotion could support
or challenge Lindquist et al.’s psychological constructionist argu-
ment. One supporting argument would be that each of these
regions may be responsible for certain psychological constructs
that, although enduring over time, do not fundamentally
change. Thus, a snapshot of an emotion at any time point after
the initial onset could still be a construction of these separable
constructs. A potential challenge to this argument would be
that these systems do behave very differently over time. Although
the “making meaning” function of the cortical midline regions
may persist over time, the very meaning that this system
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generates may qualitatively change. Through these shifts in
meaning, the cortical midline could alter the network of active
regions by selectively enhancing or reducing the input from
regions according to the relevance of their associated psychologi-
cal constructs to the meaning being made about the situation. For
example, the network of constructs associated with the initial
response to a potential anger-eliciting situation (e.g., salience,
attention, motivation) may, over time, become shaped to corre-
spond to the increasing “anger-ness” of the situation (e.g., motiv-
ation, agency).
The above formulations are quite speculative; indeed, it is even
unclear whether, if correct, they would support Lindquist et al.’s
constructionist argument. Our purpose in presenting them is
merely to emphasize the importance of assessing temporal
characteristics of neural responses to emotion. Emotions
develop over time, and understanding precisely how they do so
will greatly improve our understanding of how they are con-
structed in the brain.
Need for more evolutionary and
developmental perspective on basic
emotional mechanisms
doi:10.1017/S0140525X11001658
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Abstract: Lindquist et al.’s meta-analysis focuses on adult humans; the
authors’ emotion model might be strengthened by considering research
on infants and animals, highlighting the importance of the limbic
system. Reliance on the James–Lange theory is questionable; emotions
typically occur instantaneously, with dubious dependence on bodily
feedback for affect. Stronger evidence for localization might be
obtained using more precise emotion terms and alterative localization
methods.
We think Lindquist et al.’s model would benefit from a more
evolutionary and developmental perspective (cf. Tinbergen
1951). Attention to emotion in infants and other species would
highlight the continuity in emotional mechanisms from ancestral
species and infants to adult humans. Then, more weight might be
given to limbic system mechanisms and less to cortical processes.
Certainly, people use the cortex to identify emotionally relevant
stimuli on the basis of conceptual learning and cognitive
interpretation, but the limbic system reacts emotionally to uncon-
ditioned stimuli such as tastes and facial expressions, to con-
ditioned stimuli, and to stimulus familiarity (Campos & Barrett
1984; Zajonc 1994).
The authors assert that “emotion words are essential to our
model” (sect. 3, para. 7) and claim that infants possess enough
language capacity to experience emotion, but many emotions
emerge by 9 months of age. Infant emotions, such as fear,
unfold through epigenetic programs according to a precise, uni-
versal timetable (LaFreniere 2000; 2010; Sroufe 1996) well
before the onset of language. Young infants rely mainly on sub-
cortical behavioral mechanisms, not language (infans, L.,
without speech), for registering and communicating their specific
emotional needs.
Likewise, vertebrates depend heavily on unlearned, limbic
system responses to execute specific emotional behaviors such
as fighting a rival (Butler & Hodos 2005; Tinbergen 1951). Iden-
tifying particular adaptive needs is not completely surrendered to
the vagaries of cognitive interpretation and experience. Reptiles,
lacking a neocortex and abstract cognitive abilities, nevertheless
possess emotional systems for flight, attack, and feeding. Specific
emotional behaviors and brain structures show considerable con-
tinuity across mammals (Panksepp 1998). Mammals possess
reward and punishment limbic areas (Olds & Milner 1954) hom-
ologous to structures that, when stimulated in conscious patients,
elicit reports of specific affects (anger: King 1961; fear: Gloor
1997; humor appreciation: Black 1982; Martin 1950). Specific
affects also arise during psychomotor seizures (Gloor 1997).
The fact that the brain often instantly registers specific affects
weakens the claim that interpretation is necessary for affective
experience. The authors refer to interpretation of sensory feed-
back from the body and endorse the James–Lange position
that affects occur after the motivated behavior and accompanying
visceral changes. Presumably, discrete affects evolved to direct
adaptive motivated behavior, so there would be little benefit
from telling the brain what it should do after it has acted. In
James’ example, why would fleeing a bear be necessary for fear
– if one froze in terror, would one not be afraid? People may
reflect on their fear after escaping, but typically report having
been terrorized immediately.
Cannon (1927) and Bard (1928) challenged James–Lange with
laboratory research showing that affect precedes visceral adjust-
ments. Visceral feedback takes several seconds – but affects are
instantaneous, so visceral feedback cannot be the primary
source of affect. In spinally transected experimental animals
and patients, behavioral responses and affective self-reports are
appropriate for the situation. Engaging in exercise with its visc-
eral changes does not elicit particular affects. Of course, bodily
input initiates some affects, such as low blood glucose or
stomach contractions eliciting hunger. But hunger is not trig-
gered following interpretation of feeding or visceral adjustments
to food intake.
Recent evidence supporting Cannon and Bard comes from
LeDoux (1996). A mammal receives emotionally salient infor-
mation through sensory systems that activate the thalamus.
There, a quick appraisal of the information takes place. If the
stimulus constitutes a conditioned or unconditioned stimulus
of, say, fear, a rat exhibits the panoply of fearful behaviors.
The central nucleus of the amygdala orchestrates the various
facets of the emotional response. The central gray activates the
overt behavior of freezing, and the hypothalamus initiates visc-
eral adjustments such as increased heart rate. But fear comes
first: the affectively sensitive amygdala presumably registers
fear before these behavioral and visceral events occur.
LeDoux’s model does not include feedback from the voluntary
muscles or viscera to the limbic system. With the neocortex
removed, a rat will still respond to appropriate fear releasers
or conditioned stimuli. With the neocortex intact, it makes
finer discriminations of these stimuli; it may not exhibit fear of
a tone different from that which it was conditioned to fear.
The neocortex also allows finer motoric responses. So the neo-
cortex only refines emotional behavior, but is not the essential
mechanism, which is limbic.
But why is so much of the brain, including the neocortex, acti-
vated by an emotional stimulus? Observable behavior consists of
addressing specific emotional needs seriatim. Like other animals,
we feed, sleep, mate, defend ourselves, compete, and so forth
through the day. We use our neocortex to perform these beha-
viors more efficiently, but our behavior is motivated by the
limbic system. Because it is for the fulfillment of biological
needs that, arguably, our brains evolved, large areas of the
brain, including language areas, are mobilized by emotional
stimuli, especially verbal ones. We selectively attend to, recall,
and react to emotionally salient stimuli. These reactions
include not only affect but also visceral, hormonal, expressional,
cognitive, mnemonic, and overt behavioral responses. This wide-
spread activation of the brain makes it difficult to pinpoint affec-
tive experience, especially given the technical difficulties of
neuroimaging subcortical structures. Affects may be better
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localized by brain stimulation, experimental lesions, and clinical
research.
Another problem is that the brain structures studied are highly
differentiated. The amygdala has 15 nuclei (Gloor 1997) and is
implicated in aggression and sexual behavior, not just fear. The
orbitofrontal cortex is involved in pride and shame (Fuster
1997), as well as anger. Finer anatomical analysis might reveal
more emotional specificity.
Also problematical are the emotion terms in Lindquist et al.’s
meta-analysis. Whereas the amygdala is activated in fear, fear of
giving a speech deactivates the amygdala. This is understandable
if one thinks of the amygdala as mediating fear of bodily harm,
not fear of any unpleasant outcome, such as embarrassment in
this case (which might activate the orbitofrontal cortex). Many
researchers relied on Ekman and Friesen’s (1971) list of six
emotions with universal facial expressions. Other emotions
have no distinct facial expression, as Ekman (1994a) acknowl-
edged, and some facial expressions – happiness and sadness –
can be observed following any pleasant or unpleasant experience.
More specific localization might result from using more precise
emotion terms.
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What are emotions and how are they created in
the brain?
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Abstract: In our response, we clarify important theoretical
differences between basic emotion and psychological
construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of
the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires
brain localization, whether localization can be observed with
better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions
exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of
whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are
supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by
elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.
Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have
debated the nature of emotion for centuries because it
touches on our most precious questions. Do emotions
show us to be the same or different from the rest of the
animal kingdom? Do we respond automatically and
reflexively to the world or do we have free will? Is it poss-
ible to have an objective science of subjective phenomena?
How do we map psychological descriptions to physical
measurements? These basic issues are at the foundation
of the commentaries on our target article. We are grateful
for the thought-provoking commentaries that provide us
with the opportunity to clarify misconceptions, rectify
ambiguities, address points of contention, and discuss
exciting suggestions for applications and future directions
of our model.
R1. Basic emotions versus psychological
construction: Theoretical clarification
For several centuries, mental philosophers debated
whether the human mind is populated by mental organs,
each producing a specific kind of mental content
(“faculty psychology”; e.g., Broca 1861/2003; Gall &
Spurzheim 1809), or whether it is organized as a set of
more basic, domain-general elements that together make
a variety of mental states (e.g., Hartley 1749; Herbart
1809; Thorndike 1923; for reviews, see Klein 1970; Uttal
2001). As psychology moved from philosophy to empirical
science, this debate was absorbed into its guiding theoreti-
cal assumptions, particularly in writings on the nature of
emotion. Some writers argued that certain emotion cat-
egories have the status of mental faculties: independent
and autonomous, hard-wired and innate, and psychologi-
cally elemental (e.g., Allport 1924; Lange 1885/1912;
McDougall 1908). In modern times, this approach has
become known as the basic emotion approach (e.g.,
Ekman 1972; 1992; Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Izard 1977;
1990; 2011; Lewis 2005; Panksepp 1998; 2007; Panksepp
& Watt 2011; Tracy et al. 2010) or the natural kind
approach (cf. Barrett 2006a). Others argued that emotions
were produced out of a more basic set of psychological
elements (e.g., Duffy 1934; James 1890; Wundt 1897/
1998). Recently, this approach has become known as the
psychological construction approach to emotion (e.g.,
Barrett 2006b; Russell 2003; for a discussion, see
Gendron & Barrett 2009).
Just as there is variety in any category, both basic
emotion and psychological construction models come in
a variety of flavors (Table R1). These nuances can make
the emotion literature difficult to understand for those
who are not steeped in its history and debates. Most rel-
evant to the discussion at hand, there is disagreement
within the basic emotion approach about what makes
certain emotions (but not others) basic (also see Ortony
& Turner 1990). Some hold a strong localization hypoth-
esis, such that all the emotional episodes belonging to a
single emotion category (e.g., fear) are caused by neural
responses in an anatomically defined location (e.g.,
Calder 2003; Davis 1992; Ekman 1999; O¨hman &
Mineka 2001). Other models hypothesize that each basic
emotion should be localized to the firing of a (typically)
subcortical circuit (e.g., Izard 2011; Panksepp 1998). Still
others believe that emotions need not be localized in the
brain to be natural kinds (e.g., Ekman & Cordaro, 2011;
Lewis 2005). These latter models hold other hypotheses
about what makes emotions biologically basic with natu-
rally defined boundaries (e.g., synchronized patterns of
autonomic response, specific facial expressions, etc.), and
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Table R1. Assumptions and testable hypotheses in Basic Emotion and Psychological Construction Models
Features
Basic Emotion Psychological Construction
Position Commentators Position Commentators
1. Timing A Emotions are bounded mental events that
unfold linearly over time.
Sander
Scherer
Waugh & Schirillo
Vigil et al.
Emotions are not events with a clear start,
middle and end. Core affect is constantly
changing in a steady stream, as is
conceptualization, and the two (along with
other ingredients) influence one another
according to a constraint-satisfaction logic.
2. Uniqueness H Each emotion category refers to a unique
mental state. These states are mental
faculties – they are different in kind
from one another, and from cognitions
and perceptions.
Gardiner
Sander
Scherer
Vigil et al.
Emotion, cognition, and perception are mental
categories that are not respected by the brain;
they are ontologically subjective categories
that a Western mind uses to classify its own
mental states. Minds in other cultures parse
their mental states in using other categories.
Perlovsky
Pessoa
Smaldino & Schank
3. Modularity H Emotions are triggered in an obligatory
way once a stimulus or its interpretation
occur.
Caruana & Gallesse
Gardiner
Jablonka & Ginsburg
Sander
Scherer
Swain & Ho
Vigil et al.
Waugh & Schirillo
Weisfeld & LaFreniere
Emotions are constructed. This construction can
be initiated by a shift in core affect or priming
some conceptualization. Sometimes changes
in core affect are conceptualized as emotion
and at other times they are conceptualized as
some other kind of mental state. A mind can
have the capacity to emote without emotions
being distinct kinds of mechanisms.
Cramer et al.
Deshpande et al.
Humeny et al.
4. Behavior A Emotions are behavioral adaptations to
specific environmental challenges.
Caruana & Gallesse
Jablonka & Ginsburg
Weiseld & LaFreniere
Emotions are defined as behaviors when the goal
is to highlight how human and nonhuman
animals are similar. animals experience affect.
This is a definitional move that cannot be
empirically tested (we can test whether
behavioral adaptations exist across species, but
not that they are the proper definition of
emotion). Ontologically reducing emotions to
behavioral adaptations limits the scientific
understanding of emotion in humans.
5. Diagnostic
Suites
H Emotions have unique and specific
manifestations, such as sets of facial
actions that signal the internal state of
the emoter, physiological patterns, or
neurochemical signatures. These
synchronized, coordinated “suites” of
Buck
Button et al.
Caruana & Gallesse
de Gelder &
Vandenbucke
Jablonka & Ginsburg
Emotion categories (e.g., anger, sadness, fear) do
not occur with consistent, specific patterns of
facial actions, peripheral physiology, or
neurochemicals. Facial actions can be used to
symbolize an emotion.
Humeny et al.
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Table R1 (Continued)
Features
Basic Emotion Psychological Construction
Position Commentators Position Commentators
response can be used to diagnose the
presence of an emotion.
Quirin & Lane
Scherer
Smaldino & Schank
Weisfeld & LaFreniere
6. Variability H Variation of responses within a single
emotion category is due to
measurement error or regulation after
the fact.
de Gelder &
Vandenbucke
Murphy et al.
Scarantino
Vigil et al.
Weisfeld & LaFreniere
Variability within a single emotion category is the
rule, not the exception. In emotion (e.g.,
anger), people feel and do many things.
Responses are tuned to the situational context
(and physiology follows behavior).
Button et al.
Humeny et al.
Smaldino & Schank
Unoka et al.
7. Consciousness H Emotions arise from automatic
mechanisms and can be unconscious,
although the experience of emotion can
occur in humans.
Kirov et al.
Swain & Ho
Conceptual knowledge shapes core affect
automatically, although it can be applied
through conscious deliberate means. The
resulting mental state is always consciously
experienced. Sometimes emotion is
experienced as a property of the world (e.g., a
person is offensive, a situation is threatening,
etc. At other times, an emotion can be
explicitly labeled with an emotion word and
experienced as one’s reaction to the world.
Quirin & Lane
8. Localization H Emotions are consistently associated with
specific islands of brain activation. . ..
Caruana & Gallesse
Kirov et al.
Weisfeld & LaFreniere
Emotions do not correspond in consistent and
specific ways to increased activity within
specific brain locations.
Cramer et al.
de Gelder &
Vandenbucke
Deshpande et al.
Humeny et al.
Stanilou & Markowitsch
Sander
Smaldino & Schank
Vigil et al.
H . . .or activation in specific, inheritable
brain circuits or networks
Hamann
Murphy et al.
Rothenberger
Scarantino
Swain & Ho
An emotion, like all mental states, occurs as a
brain state that is a dynamic convergence of
interacting networks.
Deshpande et al.
Hechtman et al.
Pessoa
9. Evolution A Emotions are inherited adaptations that
human and nonhuman animals share.
de Gelder &
Vandenbucke
The architecture of the human mind is surely
sculpted by important evolutionary factors,
but it is highly unlikely that each emotion
emerged as its own mechanism, with its own
Perlovsky
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we discuss the empirical status of these other hypotheses
later in section R2. For the rest of the present section, we
use Table R1 to launch a discussion of the commentaries
that deal with basic emotion ideas or to contrast them to
psychological construction. During this discussion, we
emphasize how the two approaches compare in their
assumptions and definitions (ideas that are not empiri-
cally verifiable; e.g., “emotions are behaviors”) as well
as their hypotheses (ideas that can be tested with data;
e.g., “emotions are coordinated sets of physiology,
action, and feeling”).
R1.1. False dichotomies
By claiming that emotions are evolutionary adaptations
(de Gelder & Vandenbulcke; Jablonka & Ginsburg;
Smaldino & Schank; Weisfeld & LaFreniere),
researchers often falsely assume that the basic emotion
approach is the evolutionary approach and that psycho-
logical construction does not consider evolution as impor-
tant. In reality, both approaches assume that the human
mind was sculpted by evolutionary forces, but at issue is
what, exactly, evolved (e.g., emotions or the more basic
psychological ingredients that create emotions?).
Similarly, it is tempting to assume that the basic
emotion approach is a natural science approach,
whereas the psychological construction approach
engages in extreme relativism (de Gelder & Vanden-
bulcke). Our model tries to traverse the biology–psy-
chology divide by taking the position that (1)
psychological elements can be mapped to activity in the
nervous system (but probably not at the gross anatomical
level or in a 1:1 manner); (2) the biological function of an
individual brain region can always be described by its
anatomical connections, but its psychological function
should also include its functional connections (or
neural context; McIntosh 2000); and (3) emotion cat-
egories, as complex psychological categories, are not
psychological functions – they are collections of psycho-
logical events that are best explained as combinations of
more basic psychological building blocks. These building
blocks might be localized at the level of an anatomical or
functional network. The psychological ingredients we
have proposed in the target article and response to com-
mentaries (core affect, conceptualization, language,
executive attention, and sensory perception) are a first
approximation, and we expect that these ingredients
will be refined with future research.
A related idea is that the basic emotion approach is
scientifically advantageous because it is easier to empiri-
cally disconfirm (e.g., a locationist hypothesis) when com-
pared to the more flexible psychological construction
approach (Hamann). The psychological construction fra-
mework is flexible by design, however, to explicitly
account for the observed variability in emotional respond-
ing (Barrett 2009a). Given that we outlined our model in
print only five years ago, and that psychological construc-
tion, as a definable scientific approach to emotion, has only
been articulated within the last decade (e.g., Barrett
2006a; Russell 2003),1 it is not surprising that more evi-
dence is needed before we can be confident of its validity
(see sect. R3.1). Furthermore, psychological construction
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is more challenging to test precisely because we must
measure variability (rather than looking for a small set of
stable outcomes) and we must show that this variability is
scientifically meaningful and not due to error. That said, it
is not the case that any set of hypotheses will do. The a
priori hypothesis at issue in our target article was that the
same brain regions would be consistently active during a
range of emotional experiences and perceptions, as we
found in our meta-analysis. In other papers, we hypothesize
that these regions become functionally coupled into mul-
tiple, large-scale networks and that these interconnected
networks are the relevant functional units that constitute
the human mind (see Barrett 2009a). We have further pro-
posed that these networks dynamically configure during an
instance of emotion (e.g., an instance of anger), but that the
precise configuration would be tied to a specific situational
context, rather than a broad psychological category (e.g.,
anger) (Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011).
It is also easy to assume that basic emotion approaches
find scientific value in categories like anger, disgust, fear,
and so forth, but that psychological construction models
do not (de Gelder & Vandenbulcke; Smaldino &
Schank). Indeed, it is often assumed that psychological
construction models merely reduce discrete emotions to
simple affective dimensions of valence and arousal (de
Gelder & Vandenbulcke; Buck; Scherer). But psychologi-
cal construction is an explicit attempt to integrate dimen-
sional and categorical approaches to emotion. All
psychological construction models assume that, at their
core, emotional experience and perceptions contain a rep-
resentation of the somatovisceral state of the body2 (a point
that both Stapleton and Sander question).3 Bodily rep-
resentations are then made meaningful as instances of dis-
crete emotion (or as cognitions, perceptions, or even
physical symptoms) (cf. Barrett 2009b). We hypothesize
that these mental categories themselves are not given by
nature, but live in the mind of the perceiver: we predict
that there is no reliable, objective distinction between
emotions, cognitions, perceptions, or physical symptoms
as types of mental categories, although the individual
instances within a category will vary (Barrett 2009b;
Barrett & Bar 2009; Duncan & Barrett 2007; Pessoa
2008; also see Pessoa’s commentary). The instances of
these categories are therefore important phenomena to
be explained, but emotions, cognitions, perceptions, or
physical symptoms are not causes or processes.
Because a key feature of psychological construction is
the hypothesis that changing body representations are
transformed into a discrete emotion via some kind of
meaning-making process,4 there is a temptation to
assume that this meaning-making is deliberate, effortful,
and the act of conscious labeling (Quirin & Lane;
Scherer; Smaldino & Schank; Weisfeld & LaFre-
niere), whereas the basic emotion hypothesis is that
emotions are automatically generated. Yet our psychologi-
cal construction approach hypothesizes that conceptual
knowledge shapes sensations from the body automatically,
effortlessly, and continuously, just as top-down conceptual
knowledge turns wavelengths of light into images
and objects, and air vibrations into voices, music, and
noises. Of course, there are pre-conceptual aspects to per-
ception by any reasonable definition of conception. But
without conceptual knowledge, people are “experientially
blind.”
R1.2. Mistaken similarities
Several commentators assumed that our psychological
construction approach relies on Descartes’ machine meta-
phor by inferring that psychological ingredients are encap-
sulated but interacting parts (see de Gelder &
Vandenbulcke; Pessoa; Vigil, Dukes, & Coulombe
[Vigil et al.]). Basic emotion models certainly use this
metaphor in assuming that emotions work like mechan-
isms in a machine. Our model does not rely on traditional
mechanistic models of the mind, however, and instead
incorporates assumptions about constraint satisfaction
(Barrett 2011a; Barrett et al. 2007d) (see Fig. R1). In con-
straint satisfaction, two or more processes have a nonlinear
influence on one another, such that they exert mutual
influence (Read et al. 1997) (but see Lewis [2005] for a
basic emotion approach that utilizes similar concepts
rather than a machine metaphor).5
A basic emotion approach usually ontologically reduces
(i.e., redefines) emotions to their causes (brain locations or
circuits) or parts (a behavior, e.g., Jablonka & Ginsburg,
Weisfeld & LaFreniere). It is tempting to assume that
psychological construction models also necessarily reduce
emotions to their ingredients (de Gelder & Vanden-
bulcke), and indeed, some do (e.g., Duffy 1957; James
1884; Russell 2003). Our model, however, makes explicit
use of the concept of emergence (see Barrett 2006b;
2011a; also see Wundt 1897), and so we explicitly assume
that emotions cannot be merely redefined as their ingredi-
ents (cf. Gross & Barrett 2011). Instead, our model causally
reduces emotions to neural firing (cf. Barrett et al. 2007d).
Furthermore, in our model, psychological ingredients
are descriptions of what brain networks are doing at a
psychological level as they combine to produce emergent
mental phenomena (such as instances of anger, memory,
beliefs, etc.; see Figure R2). The concept of “psychological
primitive” might be useful to describe a basic level of
psychological operation (e.g., conceptualization) without
reducing it to something biological (e.g., functional con-
nectivity between midline cortical areas). As time goes
on, research will reveal whether these psychological
descriptions are “primitive” or whether something even
more psychologically basic is needed.
R1.3. Other theoretical approaches
Commentators Scherer and Sander argue that we had left
out the appraisal approach to understanding the nature and
function of emotion. As we noted in our target article, we did
not include a discussion of appraisal models because they
typically do not contain targeted hypotheses about whether
emotions are generated in specific locations, anatomically
defined circuits, or domain-general interacting networks.
Furthermore, we did not include appraisal approaches in
Table R1 because these models come in two definable var-
ieties (causal and constitutive appraisal models; discussed
in Barrett et al. 2007c) that make it difficult to assimilate
into a single theoretical approach. Causal variants assume
appraisals have the power to coordinate and synchronize
all aspects of an emotional response (Grandjean & Scherer
2008; Scherer 2009a; and Scherer’s commentary here) and
are therefore more similar to basic emotion approaches.
Constitutive models treat appraisals as descriptions of
experience during emotional episodes and are much closer
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to psychological construction accounts (e.g., Clore & Ortony
2000; 2008) (cf. Gross & Barrett 2011).
Our psychological construction approach can also be
differentiated from other models in the emotion literature
with which it shares a passing resemblance. In response to
Vigil et al., we point out that our psychological construc-
tion view (which relies on the idea of embodied, situated
conceptualization) is distinct from other embodied
Figure R1. Our psychological constructionist model posits that core affect (red), sensory input from the world (black), and conceptual
knowledge (including language – blue) mutually constrain one another to produce an emergent state that can be measured as a discrete
emotion (purple). In a given instance of emotion (e.g., anger), the constellation of measures will take one pattern, and in another
instance, it take a different pattern. A color version of this image can be viewed in the online version of this target article at: http://
www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
Figure R2. Intrinsic networks derived from resting state functional connectivity analyses that used peaks from Vytal and Hamann’s
(2010) meta-analytic anger, disgust, fear, and sadness contrasts as seeds. Yellow indicates that 4/4 networks overlap spatially in that
area. Light orange indicates spatial overlap for 3/4 networks. Orange indicates spatial overlap for 2/4 networks. Red indicates no
spatial overlap. A color version of this image can be viewed at http://www.journals.cambridge.org/bbs.
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simulation models (e.g., Damasio 2000; Niedenthal 2007)
that assume emotions are biologically basic categories with
distinct somatic markers. In response to Quirin & Lane,
we note that our model is also distinct from Lane’s cogni-
tive-developmental model of emotional awareness (Lane
& Schwartz 1987) in which language is used to systemati-
cally differentiate global affective responses (for a more
detailed discussion, see Lindquist & Barrett 2008b).
R2. The empirical status of the basic emotion
approach
Having clarified these theoretical points, we now address
commentaries that focus on the empirical status of the
basic emotion approach. Several commentators have
suggested that emotion categories can indeed be localized
to specific brain locations, but that evidence to this effect
was obscured by weaknesses in fMRI techniques, pro-
blems with our meta-analytic approach, or other variables.
Others argue that evidence for basic emotion is best
observed in responses other than those occurring in the
brain. In this section, we address both types of issues.
R2.1. Emotions can be localized to speciﬁc brain
locations
R2.1.1. Emotions might be localized to brain locations
were it not for problems with the temporal resolution of
fMRI. Several commentators raise the question of
whether fMRI methods provide a suitable test of the
brain basis of emotion, because they have poor temporal
resolution. We agree that finer temporal resolution
would be advantageous in studying the psychological func-
tions of the brain, although we point to brain stimulation
studies that also fail to find evidence that emotions can
be localized to particular brain locations (sect. R2.3.4).
These commentaries raise a deeper issue, however:
writers hold beliefs about the timing of emotion that are
a matter of definition and cannot be empirically tested.
The suitability of fMRI for studying emotion comes
down to how one defines emotion in the first place.
One underlying premise in some commentaries is that
emotions are quick events that cannot be captured by
fMRI’s poor temporal resolution and the limits of a slow
hemodynamic response (Unoka, Bera´n, & Ple´h
[Unoka et al.]; Vigil et al.; Weisfeld & LaFrenier).
The concern is that “emotion centers” trigger very
quickly after encountering a stimulus and regulatory
brain areas fire only after emotion centers. If this were
the case, then the Blood Oxygen Level-Dependent
(BOLD) response might be too slow to capture emotion
generation and regulation as separate events. Both pro-
duction and regulation would be mistakenly included in
the same contrast map, leading to the wrong conclusion
about the nature of emotion. Unfortunately, it is not poss-
ible to empirically test how short an emotion is, but logi-
cally, it might not make sense to define emotion as a
brief, exclusively feedforward event. Consider, for
example, that almost instantly after a visual stimulus is pre-
sented, there is dynamic feedback and re-entrant proces-
sing between cortical and subcortical regions (Duncan &
Barrett 2007; Lamme & Roelfsema 2000; Pessoa &
Adolphs 2010; but see, de Gelder et al. 2011) that make
it impractical to separate purely bottom-up and top-
down influences in vision. Similarly, it might not make
sense to try and separate an initial response from regulat-
ory processes in emotion, as these distinctions might be
more subjective and based on when they occur in time
relative to stimulus onset, rather than on mechanistic
differences (cf. Gross & Barrett 2011).
By contrast, other commentators (Waugh & Schirillo)
believe that fMRI is problematic because emotions are
episodes that evolve over time, and fMRI only captures
the first second of neural response after stimulus onset.
Timing is admittedly an important source of information.
Yet, as reported in Waugh et al. (2010), the differences
between the findings from their time-sensitive inverse
logit modeling and the traditional (gamma) hemodynamic
response function (HRF) modeling were not substantial
enough to invalidate the studies summarized in our
meta-analysis, meaning that it is possible to learn some-
thing about emotion from standard BOLD analyses. It is
always possible that unmeasured variables such as time
will more clearly differentiate emotion categories from
one another, but the burden of proof is on those who
wish to find such effects (i.e., the basic emotion view is
not the null hypothesis).
A related concern was raised by Vigil et al., who are
skeptical that changes in BOLD signal can be used to
map the dynamics of neural activation. This is not a new
point in the debate on whether neuroimaging can contrib-
ute to an understanding of the human mind. Although
active investigation is ongoing and necessary, BOLD
signals during fMRI do, in fact, match measures of inte-
grated synaptic activity in the vast majority of cases, as evi-
denced by both direct studies (e.g., Logothetis et al. 2001)
and convergence between animal studies and human
meta-analyses across many fields (see Van Snellenberg &
Wager 2009). Furthermore, every research technique
has some kind of limitation. Electrophysiology is suspect
because it does not measure or model neurochemistry.
Neurochemical measurements do not consider electrical
activity in detail. Lesion studies provide limited information
about normative function. All nonhuman animal studies are
limited because their subjects do not have human brains,
which differ substantially in structure and connectivity
(see Streider 2005). All human studies are limited
because the available measurements are coarse and the
potential for direct brain manipulation is limited. Neuroi-
maging data are thus useful to the extent that they converge
with other methods and/or provide information of practical
value, and in this regard, our meta-analysis provides one
useful source of information. It is notable that our meta-
analytic findings are consistent with meta-analyses and sum-
maries of research in other measurement domains (in the
face and body) that also fail to find strong support for the
hypothesis that emotion categories are natural kinds (e.g.,
Bachorowski & Owren 1995; Barrett 2006b; Barrett et al.
2007a; Barrett et al. 2011; Cacioppo et al. 2000; Ortony &
Turner 1990; Mauss & Robinson 2009; Russell et al.
2003), while at the same time being broadly consistent
with a psychological construction approach to emotion
(see sect. R3).
R2.1.2. fMRI does not have the spatial resolution to
identify brain locations for emotion. Several commenta-
tors believe that fMRI has insufficient spatial resolution
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to reveal emotion locations in the brain, on the assumption
that emotion circuits reside in subcortical nuclei (Buck;
Quirin & Lane; Weisfeld & LaFreniere) that are diffi-
cult to image with normal levels of resolution. It is an
empirical question whether imaging methods with better
spatial precision could localize different emotion cat-
egories to changes in midbrain and brainstem nuclei or
sets of nuclei, but several observations make us predict
that such an outcome is unlikely. First, although subcorti-
cal neurons are necessary for certain behavioral adap-
tations (e.g., freezing, fleeing, fighting) in nonhuman
animals, it is not clear that there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between these adaptations and emotion categories
(see sect. R2.3.1.). Second, some subcortical structures
that are important to emotion (e.g., lateral hypothalamus)
have a more diffuse anatomical structure in the adult
human brain than in an infant human or nonhuman
animal brain (Saper 2012), making it difficult to find
clear localization. Third, existing evidence is not consistent
with the hypothesis that finer levels of spatial resolution
reveal the brain localization for different emotion cat-
egories. For example, in single cell recordings within the
rhesus monkey brain, neurons throughout the amygdala
respond preferentially to the screams of other monkeys
but also respond to coos (positive sounds) and sounds indi-
cating aggression (Kuraoka & Nakamura 2007). Taken
together, studies like this suggest that no matter the
degree of spatial resolution, the brain very likely does
not contain “anger” neurons or “fear” neurons.
Perhaps most importantly, the hypothesis that emotions
are subcortically generated and merely regulated by the
cortex is based on an outmoded view of brain evolution
(for an extended discussion, see Barrett et al. 2007a).
Buck is correct when he writes that our meta-analysis
identifies many of the brain structures discussed by
Papez (1937) and MacLean (1952). But like all models
of brain organization that rely on a phylogenetic scale,
MacLean’s triune brain concept is not correct (Striedter
2005). Some of the changes in connectivity that occurred
during human evolution (e.g., the long-range connections
between the isocortex and subcortical and spinal cord
autonomic nuclei described in An et al. 1998; O¨ngu¨r &
Price 2000) produce the kind of re-entrant processing
that is more consistent with a psychological construction
account.
R2.1.3. Pairwise comparisons within our meta-analysis
would have revealed evidence for emotion localizations.
Commentator Hamann believes that we would have
found better evidence for biologically basic emotion cat-
egories in our meta-analysis if we had performed pairwise
comparisons between all categories. Vytal and Hamann
(2010) performed these comparisons and found, as we
did, that emotion categories were consistently but not
specifically associated with increased activity in certain
brain regions. For example, they report that both anger,
when compared to sadness, and disgust when compared
to happiness, were associated with increased activation
in a region within the left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47).
Although the peaks themselves do not overlap, they are
representative of broader clusters that do overlap. A
similar point can be made for activity reported for the
left insula, right insula, right basal ganglia, and amygdala
in Vytal and Hamann’s (2010) meta-analysis. Their
findings, like ours, are therefore more consistent with
our psychological construction approach that emotional
experiences and perceptions are complex instances built
from configurations of building blocks.
R2.1.4. Neural deactivations might help to identify brain
locations for emotion. Commentators Vigil et al. argue
that neural deactivations (which we did not include in
our meta-analytic summaries) could potentially give evi-
dence of cross-modal inhibition between brain areas that
would reveal support for a locationist view of emotion.
We agree that deactivations will contribute to a more com-
plete picture of the brain basis of emotion, and we
welcome further research that demonstrates their utility
in meta-analytic summaries. One conceptual issue that
must be addressed, however, is what the deactivations
are relative to (i.e., whether there is really a baseline
state of the brain; Stark & Squire 2001). “Rest,” for
example, means that the brain is not being probed by an
external stimulus, but during “rest” a host of different
mental processes are in play, including episodic memory
retrieval and self-reflection (Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010).
On a more specific point, Vigil et al. misinterpreted our
logistic regressions as showing that the amygdala was deac-
tivated during anger perception. In fact, the logistic
regressions indicated whether a variable was associated
with an increase (positive beta) or decrease (negative
beta) in activation frequency. Therefore, the finding that
anger perception had a negative beta value means that it
predicted a “0” for amygdala activation (versus predicting
a “1”), meaning that anger perception was associated with
less frequent activation of the left amygdala than other
emotion categories on average.
R2.1.5. Evidence of emotion locations is obscured by
less than perfect brain imaging studies that contribute
to the meta-analytic summaries. Although we agree
with de Gelder & Vandenbulcke on the “garbage in –
garbage out” rule for meta-analysis, there are two major
ways that the “meta-analytic whole” is greater than the
sum of its parts (i.e., the individual studies). First, meta-
analysis can weed out false positives (which are frequent
in neuroimaging studies; see Wager et al. 2007; Yarkoni
2009) and focus interpretation on the activations that are
consistently observed. Second, meta-analyses can
provide a picture of whether the consistent activation is
specific to one emotion category or another, which individ-
ual studies can rarely, if ever, do (i.e., it is rare to find
studies that include five categories of experienced
emotions).
R2.1.6. Individual differences might obscure evidence
for brain locations for emotion. Commentators
Murphy, Ewbank, & Calder [Murphy et al.] suggest
that variation in person-level variables such as personality
might impair researchers’ ability to find consistent and
specific increases in brain activity associated with discrete
emotions. It is always a possibility that a third, un-modeled
variable is adding more noise to signal, thereby preventing
researchers from finding an effect. Still, according to a
basic emotion view, the mechanisms and experiences of
emotion are supposed to be universal (Ekman 1972;
1992; Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Izard 2011). The idea
that personality produces variation in emotional
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experience and perception is more consistent with a
psychological construction approach. For example,
almost two decades ago, our lab documented individual
differences in the specificity with which people use
emotion words to describe experience (termed “emotional
granularity”; Barrett 1998; 2004; Feldman 1995) even
though researchers often assume that anger, disgust,
sadness, and other emotions are basic in a Roschian
(1973) sense. For some people, however, pleasant and
unpleasant appear to be more cognitively basic categories.
For others, subordinate categories like frustration and agi-
tation, and depressed, morose, anxious terrified, and so on,
might be cognitively basic (Lindquist & Barrett 2008b).
Although the neural responses realizing emotion might
differ for people who differ in emotional granularity (an
idea which has not yet been tested), the available evidence
makes us skeptical that any of these categories are biologi-
cally basic and respected by the brain.
R2.1.7. Other “better” emotion categories might allow
evidence of brain localization. Several commentators
speculate on a variety of ways to classify emotion cat-
egories, premised on the assumption that there must be
certain classes of emotions that will have special biological
status: “animal/basic” versus “human/complex” emotions
(Jablonka & Ginsburg; Perlovsky); “universal” versus
“non-universal” emotions (Weisfeld & LaFreniere);
“social” versus “non-social emotions” (Jablonka & Gins-
burg); or “pure” versus “blended”/“mixed” emotions
(Scherer). Weisfeld & LaFreniere further speculate that
we chose to study the brain basis of anger, disgust, fear,
happiness, and sadness because these are the categories
with specific facial expressions. In fact, we chose these cat-
egories because amidst disagreement about which
emotions are supposed to be biologically basic (Ortony
& Turner 1990), most basic emotion researchers agree
that these five are supposed to be inborn, universally
experienced, and species-general (e.g., Ekman 1972;
1994b; Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Izard 1977; 2011).
Thus, these emotion categories would be most likely to
show strong localization if it exists.
Scarantino argues that anger, disgust, fear, happiness,
and sadness categories are each too heterogeneous to
yield evidence for locationism (in agreement with our
psychological construction approach), and instead pro-
poses that emotion researchers should refine each cat-
egory into more homogenous subordinate categories
(e.g., different types of anger) that would yield better evi-
dence for locationism. Scarantino does not offer any con-
crete suggestions for how to identify these categories a
priori, however. One promising possibility is that context
plays an important role in characterizing meaningful sub-
ordinate categories (Barrett 2006a; Barrett et al. 2007b;
Barrett et al. 2011). For example, a recent neuroimaging
study from our group asked participants to construct a
variety of experiences within two different emotion cat-
egories ( fear vs. anger) across two different contexts (phys-
ical vs. social contexts). The neural representations for fear
and anger largely overlapped, but there were distinctive
neural responses for physical versus social instances
(Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011). Context also seems to
be important when searching for peripheral physiological
correlates of emotion (Kreibig 2010). It thus may be
fruitful to think of context itself as a sort of ingredient in
emotion.
R2.1.8. Emotions can be localized to networks rather
than gross anatomical regions. Once a 1:1 correspon-
dence between gross anatomical regions and emotion cat-
egories is ruled out, a number of other possibilities for
localizing emotions remain. For example, commentators
Hamann, Murphy et al., Rothenberger, Scarantino,
and Swain & Ho all suggest that each emotion category
is a natural kind if it is consistently associated with
increased activity within a network of brain regions,
rather than within a specific anatomically bounded set of
voxels in one gross anatomical location. Indeed, the field
of cognitive neuroscience has been moving steadily
towards the conclusion that psychological functions are
best described at the level of networks than at the level
of individual brain regions. Our commentators do not con-
sider the distinction, however, between a hard-wired, ana-
tomical network and a dynamic functional network that is
generated on the fly during an emotional experience or
perception. This distinction is crucial for evaluating a
basic emotion versus a psychological construction
approach. It is tempting to claim evidence for basic
emotions by merely showing that any pattern of brain acti-
vation distinguishes the instances of emotion category
from another (e.g., as did Vytal & Hamann 2010);
however, merely showing some difference is not sufficient
support for the basic emotion view. A key hypothesis of the
basic emotion approach is that emotions are innate, and
this could mean that emotion networks, whether they
are local or widely distributed, should be anatomically
defined, intrinsic to the human brain, and present in
other animals. A dynamic, functional network could be
supportive of a weak version of basic emotions, but only
to the extent that is consistently and specifically active
during instances of a single emotion category.
One means of testing whether emotion categories can be
localized to stable networks is to investigate “resting state”
networks, which are evidenced as correlational patterns in
low-frequency BOLD signal fluctuations across a set of
voxels when participants are not being probed by an external
stimulus. These data reveal a number of large-scale distrib-
uted networks that are anatomically constrained and intrin-
sic to the human brain (Buckner 2010; Deco et al. 2011; Fox
& Raichle 2007; Vincent et al. 2007). A number of brain net-
works have been repeatedly identified and the task-related
activity in these networks has been observed in tasks that
involve attention, default mental activity, and motivational
salience (Smith et al. 2009; Seeley et al. 2007; Vincent
et al. 2007). Dozens of these studies have now been pub-
lished, and no one has identified anything that remotely
looks like basic emotion networks. Instead, emotion-
related tasks appear to engage the “default” network
(Andrews-Hanna et al. 2010) or what we have called the
“conceptual” network. The degree of connectivity within a
“body representation network” (with hubs in the ventral
anterior insula and pregenual anterior cingulate cortex
[ACC]) is correlated with individual differences in negative
affect (Seeley et al. 2007) and the intensity of affective
experience in response to negative images (Touroutoglou
et al., in press). In a recent analysis, we took the peaks
that were consistently activated for each emotion category
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in Vytal and Hamann’s (2010) meta-analysis and used them
as seeds in a functional connectivity analysis of resting state
data. Each seed/set of seeds produced an intrinsic network,
but these networks largely overlapped for all the negative
emotion categories (e.g., anger, disgust, fear, sadness);
overlap was greatest in the ventral anterior insula, lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and
thalamus (Touroutoglou et al., in preparation; and see our
Figure 2 on page 127). Rather than providing evidence for
unique networks for basic emotions, these findings are con-
sistent with our hypothesis about core affect.
R2.2. Localization is not required for the brain basis of
natural kinds of emotion
Some commentators have criticized our characterization
of the basic emotion view by arguing that such models
do not require emotions to be localized to specific brain
regions. Strictly speaking, they are correct – for an
emotion category to be a natural kind, it must have firm
boundaries in biology that exist independently of percep-
tion and there are two ways of fulfilling this criterion
(Barrett 2006a; Barrett et al. 2007a). First, all instances
of a category must be caused by the same biological mech-
anism (i.e., they must be homologous) or second, all
instances must share a distinctive marker or collection of
properties (i.e., they must be analogous). When testing
for analogy, it is crucial that the measurements are objec-
tive and independent from a perceiver (e.g., facial electro-
myographic measurements are preferable to judgments of
facial action; electrical changes in muscular or autonomic
systems are preferable to judgments of behavior). Many
writers define emotions as “basic” based on some version
of both homology and analogy (e.g., Allport 1924; McDou-
gall 1908/1926; Panksepp 1998; Tomkins 1962; 1963;
Tracy et al. 2010), whereas some focus on homology
(Ekman & Cordaro 2011; Griffiths 1997; Izard 2011) and
others focus on analogy (e.g., Buck; Levenson 1994;
2003; Lewis 2005; Roseman 2011). Our meta-analytic find-
ings, along with our review of the brain stimulation litera-
ture (Barrett et al. 2007a), do not support the hypothesis
that emotion categories are natural kinds by homology.
Many more empirical reviews demonstrate that emotions
cannot be considered natural kinds by analogy (in chrono-
logical order: James 1890/1998; Duffy 1934; Hunt 1941;
Mandler 1975; Ortony & Turner 1990; Turner & Ortony
1992; Cacioppo et al. 2000; Russell 2003; Barrett 2006a;
Barrett et al. 2007a; Kagan 2007; Mauss & Robinson
2009). Although several individual studies report that
emotion categories can be distinguished by different
responses, many other studies do not support such
claims, usually because no differences are found beyond
valence and/or arousal (Barrett 2006a). Even the studies
that do find differences fail to produce evidence that
emotions are natural kinds by analogy, because the
precise pattern of differences does not replicate from
study to study.
R2.2.1. The production of facial actions will reveal
natural kinds of emotion. Commentators Caruana &
Gallese, de Gelder & Vandenbulcke, and Vigil et al.
all write that each emotion category has its own universal
expression. This is a deeply held belief in psychology, but
for many years now there is evidence to the contrary. Con-
genitally blind infants (Fraiberg 1977) and children (Galati
et al. 2001; Roch-Levecq 2006) who are not able to learn
visually produce only a limited number of the predicted
facial actions that are supposed to occur in prototypic
emotional expressions; they almost never produce an
entire configuration of the predicted facial action units
(but then again neither do sighted adults; Galati et al.
1997). Careful laboratory studies show that 4-month-olds
do not produce specific facial displays for anger, fear,
disgust, and sadness (e.g., Bennett et al. 2002; 2004; for a
review, see Camras & Fatani 2008; Camras & Shutter
2010) although infant facial actions give evidence of
valence and arousal (Dinehart et al. 2005). Even 11-
month-old infants fail to produce the predicted facial
actions in response to an emotional event (e.g., in contexts
designed to elicit anger and fear) (Camras et al. 2007).
Although some researchers continue to adhere to the
hypothesis that expressions develop according to pre-pro-
grammed timetables of emotional development (e.g.,
LaFreniere 2000; 2010; Sroufe 1997; and Weisfeld &
LaFreniere in their commentary), many developmental-
ists now adopt a more flexible functionalist or dynamical
systems approach to emotional development (e.g.,
Bennett et al. 2002; 2004; Camras & Fatani 2008, Camras
& Witherington 2005, Dickson et al. 1998; Saarni et al.
2006) that does not require emotions to be natural kinds.
The infant findings are consistent with emotion pro-
duction findings showing that adults do not routinely
produce specific expressions in the laboratory when they
are expected to (using objective measures of facial electro-
myography; Cacioppo et al. 2000). One hypothesis is that
facial actions are thus symbols for communication rather
than signals of the emoter’s internal state (cf. Barrett
2011b; Fridlund 1994), because they occur largely when
other people are present or implied (Fernandez-Dols &
Ruiz-Belda 1995; Fridlund 1994). This research also
echoes what has been observed with nonhuman animals.
Nonhuman primates, for example, do not automatically
produce vocal expressions unless they are in social contexts
(Seyfarth & Cheney 2003). Of course, the field still awaits
careful ethological study (beyond Eibl-Eibesfeldt’s work)
to explore whether humans actually make specific
expressions in real-life instances of emotion.
R2.2.2. The perception of facial actions will reveal
natural kinds of emotion. Commentators Buck and
Button, Lewis, &Munafo` [Button et al.] and Smaldino
& Schank write that emotional expressions can be univer-
sally recognized, and this is often used as a criterion for
showing that biologically basic emotions exist. Again,
there is a considerable amount of research to the contrary.
Studies that claim evidence for emotion perception in
infants and children usually confuse affect (pleasant or
unpleasant states with some degree of arousal) and dis-
crete emotions (anger, sadness, fear, disgust, etc.). (Inci-
dentally, a similar point can be made about research
assessing event related potentials [ERPs] in response to
emotional faces; see Barrett et al. 2007b for a discussion).
For example, 5-month-old infants look longer at startled
(or scowling, or pouting) faces after habituating to
smiling faces (e.g., Bornstein & Arterberry 2003), but
this increased looking time only gives evidence that
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infants can distinguish between faces of different valence.
Infants look longer at a pouting face after habituation to
scowling faces (or vice versa) (e.g., Flom & Bahrick
2007), but this gives evidence that infants can categorize
the faces in terms of arousal. Studies find that infants
tend to show biased attention to fearful caricatures
above other categories (e.g., Bornstein & Arterberry
2003), but this finding could be driven by the fact that
infants rarely see people making these facial configur-
ations. For example, infants look equally long at unusual
facial configurations and fearful caricatures (DiCorcia &
Urry, in preparation). Finally, it is important to rule out
that infants perceive structural differences in faces
without knowing what they mean. Seventeen-week-olds
distinguish between faces showing teeth, whether those
faces are from the same emotion category (e.g., both
happy faces) or not (e.g., a happy and an angry face)
(Caron et al. 1985). These findings with infants are consist-
ent with the emotion perception findings with young chil-
dren showing that children are unable to recognize
emotion in faces until they have learned the associated
emotion concept (for reviews, see Russell & Widen
2002; Widen & Russell 2008a; 2008b).
It is also not clear that nonhuman primates perceive dis-
crete emotions. Claims have been made that nonhuman
primates perceive discrete emotions based on findings
from match-to-sample experiments in which animals
select a face that matches a target face (i.e., perceptual
matching). Chimpanzees are able to match a negative
target face (e.g., “bared teeth”) when the face stimuli
choices includes one matching negative face (i.e., a
“bared teeth”) and one neutral face (Parr et al. 1998). Per-
formance is inconsistent, however, when the stimuli
choices are both negative faces (e.g., a “bared teeth face”
with a “scream face”; Parr et al. 1998). Rhesus macaque
monkeys also have the greatest success when they are
able to differentiate between two stimuli choices based
on affective (positive or negative) value. Macaques are
able to correctly select the match for a positive face (i.e.,
“play face”) on approximately 80% of trials when the two
stimuli choices are a “play face” and either a neutral or a
negative face (Parr & Heintz 2009). In contrast, matching
accuracy of negative faces is extremely low (50%) and
inconsistent when the choices are other negative faces,
the positive face (“play face”), or neutral faces (Parr &
Heintz 2009). These findings suggest that nonhuman pri-
mates are readily able to distinguish faces that communi-
cate affective signal from those that do not, but the data
do not provide clear evidence that chimpanzees are cate-
gorizing faces in terms of their discrete emotional content.
Adults automatically perceive emotions on the face, but
with a lot of conceptual input. Humans are “natural
pattern classifiers” (to use Smaldino & Schank’s words)
and we routinely include many sources of information as
part of the patterns, including context and top-down con-
ceptual knowledge (see Barrett et al. 2007b; 2011). For
instance, studies showing that people from different cul-
tures can universally recognize certain prototypic
expressions (e.g., Ekman et al. 1987) have methodological
features that produce high levels of emotion perception
accuracy (Russell 1994). For example, the best results
are achieved when perceivers are presented with a posed
facial depiction of emotion (e.g., a scowling face) along
with a list of between two and six emotion words, and
then are asked to choose which word best matches the
face. When emotion words are removed from the exper-
iment or when perceivers are unable to process their
meaning, people are significantly impaired in their ability
to perceive emotion, even in faces that are supposed to
be the clearest examples of emotional expressions (e.g.,
Fugate et al. 2010; Gendron et al., in press; Lindquist
et al. 2006; Naab & Russell 2007; Roberson et al. 1999;
Russell et al. 1993; for reviews, see Barrett et al. 2007b;
2011; Roberson et al. 2010; Russell 1994).
R2.2.3. Neurochemicals will reveal natural kinds of
emotion. According to Buck, discrete emotional feelings
arise from combinations or “cocktails” of neurochemicals.
This is an interesting speculation, and provides an avenue
for new hypothesis generation within a psychological con-
struction approach. The difference between our view and
Buck’s view, however, is that he believes anger, happiness,
fear, and so forth have special ontological status (Buck
1999) in that each correspond to the secretion of a particu-
lar pattern of neuropeptides. We know of no research to
date that has systematically evaluated whether emotional
experiences are linked to specific patterns of neurochemi-
cal secretion in a consistent and specific way, although
there is evidence against Buck’s assertion that specific
neurochemicals correspond to “primary affects” (e.g., see
Berridge & Robinson 1998; Horvitz 2000; 2002; Salamone
et al. 2005; 2007; 2009; Schultz et al. 1993; Wise 2005; for a
review, see Barrett et al. 2007a). As Swain & Ho suggest,
future research should address the relationship between
brain activity and hormone secretion.
R2.3. Other data that might reveal evidence for emotions
as natural kinds
R2.3.1. Research using nonhuman animals provides
evidence for natural kinds of emotion in the brain.
Commentators Jablonka & Ginsburg present the idea
that neural circuitry for behavior provides evidence for the
brain basis of emotion. As we note in Table R1, this is a defi-
nition, based on assumptions about the continuity between
humans and other animals, but it is not a testable hypothesis.
Careful behavioral neuroscience research shows that there
are specific neural circuits that control behavioral adap-
tations (highly heritable, species-general actions that an
animal performs to survive or reproduce), but this work
does not necessarily provide evidence to support the claim
that emotion categories are natural kinds. For instance,
years of careful study have confirmed that the amygdala
plays a crucial role in several behavioral adaptations involved
in responding to threat (e.g, freezing in response to a tone
that was previously paired with an electric shock: Fanselow
& Poulos 2005; Fendt & Fanselow 1999; LeDoux 2007;
enhanced startle response as a function of a threatening or
negative stimulus: e.g., Davis 1992). Yet, as we note in our
target article, an animal can show many behavioral adap-
tations in response to a threat, and not all of them involve
freezing or potentiated startle. Rats avoid the location of
uncertain threat when they are free to move around, such
as in a testing chamber with several arms (e.g., Vazdarjanova
& McGaugh 1998). Rats will “defensively tread” by kicking
bedding towards a threatening object (e.g., Kopchia et al.
1992; Reynolds & Berridge 2008). At other times, a rat
will attack a threatening object by attempting to jump on it
Response/Lindquist et al.: The brain basis of emotion
182 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2012) 35:3
https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X11001531
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:25:29, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
and bite it (e.g., Blanchard et al. 1989). Each of these actions
(freezing, potentiated startle, avoidance, defensive treading,
and aggression) is dependent on different circuitry. Given
this heterogeneity, it is difficult to claim that nonhuman
animal research has identified the brain basis of fear,
unless we are willing to assume that there are many fear cir-
cuits. Even then, how do we know for sure that defensive
aggression is fear (rather than anger), or that freezing to
an uncertain threat is fear (vs. surprise)?
R2.3.2. Brain activity during sleep reveals evidence of
emotion locations in the brain. Commentators Kirov,
Brand, Kolev, & Yordanova (Kirov et al.) claim that a
psychological construction view of emotion is discon-
firmed by the observation that people have increased
activity in limbic regions during sleep and that they
report emotions during dreams, even in the absence of
activity in networks supporting executive attention. It is
known that wakeful cognition can influence reports of
dreams (e.g., people used to report dreaming in black
and white before color television was invented), so one
obvious issue in Kirov et al.’s logic is that people are
awake when they report those experiences. Hence, the
possibility remains that people add conceptual detail in
retrospect while reporting on the strong affective feelings
that were evoked during dreams. The deeper point is that
situated conceptualizations do not require executive atten-
tion, as Kirov et al. presume; rather, controlled attention is
required to suppress extraneous conceptual detail and
keep the contents of emotional experience from being dys-
regulated from the situation (or disjointed and odd as often
occurs in dreams). The fact that people dream (i.e.,
retrieve stored representations from the past and
combine them in novel ways) is a testament to the fact
that a dreaming brain is creating situated conceptualiz-
ations. Indeed, the brain regions making up the “default”
network are active during sleep (although they appear to
fire differently when a person is asleep than when
awake; Horovitz et al. 2009). Finally, a key aspect of our
psychological construction approach is that individual
brain regions do not have a single psychological function;
therefore, it is possible that, for example, the amygdala is
not triggering emotion in sleep, or even processing
novelty or salience per se, but instead is serving a function
to produce and maintain REM sleep (e.g., Calvo et al.
1987; Sanford et al. 1995; Smith & Young 1980). Indeed,
it is argued that limbic areas are involved in sleep
because they are involved in consolidation of learned
material (Maquet 2000), or perhaps even learned emotion-
al material (Nishida et al. 2009) during REM periods.
R2.3.3. Clinical data might provide evidence of emotion
locations in the brain. Although Button et al., Murphy
et al., Swain & Ho, and Rothenberger all find value in
our psychological construction approach, they each
suggest that studies of clinical patients might provide evi-
dence for the existence of biologically basic emotions.
Although we agree that any account of the brain basis of
emotion must include evidence from individuals who are
suffering from disrupted emotional life due to psycho-
pathology, there are a number of reasons to be skeptical
that clinical data will reveal natural kind emotion categories
when basic research does not. First, many psychiatric diag-
nostic categories have strong co-morbidity or share similar
symptoms such as dysregulated affect, problems with con-
ceptualization, of deficits in executive function. Second,
many involve disturbances in the same brain regions.
Third, and perhapsmost importantly, many scientists recog-
nize that current psychiatric diagnostic categories, like other
complex psychological categories (e.g., anger, sadness, fear),
are heterogeneous and the products of more general causes
that might go awry (Cramer, Kendler, & Borsboom
[Cramer et al.]). A paradigm shift is occurring in exper-
imental psychopathology towards a transdiagnostic
approach that attempts to identify the psychological and
biological building blocks that are common to many types
of psychopathology (e.g., Fairholme et al. 2010; Harvey
et al. 2004; Kendler & Parnas 2008; Sanislow et al. 2010),
and psychological construction accounts of mental illness
are starting to appear (Kring 2008; Suvak & Barrett 2011).
R2.3.4. Deep brain stimulation or neuropsychological
findings give evidence of emotion locations in the
brain. Commentators Caruana & Gallese, Staniloiu &
Markowitsch, Hamman, Murphy et al., and Weisfeld
& LaFreniere all point to the importance of brain stimu-
lation and/or neuropsychological findings for evaluating the
brain basis of emotion. Because of space limitations, we
cannot report a comprehensive review of this literature,
although we have reviewed it elsewhere (Barrett et al.
2007a). A careful look at the literature, however, indicates
that the findings are more consistent with psychological
construction than with locationism (in particular, see
Halgren et al. 1978; Sem-Jacobson 1968; Valenstein
1974). For example, after their careful brain stimulation
study, Halgren et al. (1978) concluded, “There is no appar-
ent tendency for any category of mental phenomena to be
evoked more easily from any particular site” (p. 97). More
recent studies of brain stimulation provide similar con-
clusions (e.g., see Blomstedt et al. [2008] on the link
between depression and stimulation of the subthalamic
nucleus [STN], in combination with other studies showing
that stimulation of the STN is not specific to depression
[Bejjani et al. 1999; 2000; Doshi et al. 2002; Kulisevsky
et al. 2002; Limousin et al. 1995; Romito et al. 2002]).
R3. The empirical status of the psychological
construction approach
In this section, we discuss how scientific evidence supports
the psychological construction approach, clarifying where
its key hypotheses are supported by our meta-analytic find-
ings and where future research is required.
R3.1. Utility of meta-analysis for testing psychological
constructionism
Commentators de Gelder & Vandenbulcke raise the
question of whether a meta-analysis of neuroimaging
research is a useful way to evaluate the brain basis of
emotion. They are concerned that methodological variation
across individual studies might limit the degree of consist-
ency that can be observed in meta-analytic summaries.
Although this might be true, it is important to remember
that we did find some consistency in the brain activations
for each emotion category; the issue is that the activations
were not specific to any emotion category. This pattern of
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results (consistency with no specificity) is made more dra-
matic by the fact that most studies targeted the most
typical instances of emotional experience and perception.
Since context influences the neural representation of
emotion (Wilson-Mendenhall et al. 2011), it is very likely
that a reasonable sample of everyday instances of experience
and perception would produce less consistent activations.
Nonetheless, we agree with Deshpande, Sathian, Hu, &
Buckhalt (Deshpande et al.) and Pessoa that psychologi-
cal construction would be better tested using network-based
approaches. Concepts and methods from neuroinformatics
and systems neuroscience are a natural avenue for a psycho-
logical construction approach. Formal classification tech-
niques, such as those used in statistical (or “machine”)
learning, could in principle be used to discover which
kinds of psychological categories are most consistently and
specifically respected in the brain (Mitchell et al. 2008;
Yarkoni et al. 2011), potentially providing new tests of loca-
tionist versus constructionist approaches to emotion.
Hamann wonders whether our meta-analytic results
provide sufficient evidence for a psychological construction
approach to emotion, but of course no single analysis within
a single measurement domain is ever sufficient. The fact
that all methods have limitations makes it important to
use multiple types of methods to test principled a priori
hypotheses. We have tested our psychological construction-
ist view of emotion in our own laboratory by utilizing behav-
ioral studies of normal adults (e.g., Fugate et al. 2010;
Gendron et al., in press; Lindquist & Barrett 2008a; Lind-
quist et al. 2006; Lindquist et al., in preparation) and of
lesion patients (e.g., Lindquist et al., under review), as
well as individual neuroimaging studies (e.g., Wilson-Men-
denhall et al. 2011). We look forward to a time when there
are findings from more experiments to draw on.
Scherer wonders whether our meta-analytic results
support an appraisal rather than a psychological construction
model of emotion. He raises a series of theoretically deep
questions about the nature of psychological causation and
explanation. In Scherer’s view, appraisals are psychological
events (or checks) that are implemented by (or one might
say, constructed by) domain-general mechanisms (such as
executive function, categorization, minimizing prediction
error, etc.). Since our hypothesis is that emotions are con-
structed from such mechanisms, this provides a valuable
opportunity to explore the conceptual similarity between
our two models. If appraisals describe what it is like to have
a particular type of experience (i.e., are the “contents” of
experience), as Scherer claims in his commentary, then
there is very little difference in the predictions offered by
our psychological construction view and his appraisal view,
although Scherer would need to be clear about what his
extra level of psychological description (i.e., the appraisals)
contributes in terms of theoretical or predictive power. If
appraisals, describe processes that cause emotions (i.e., are
causal mechanisms) (see Grandjean & Scherer 2008;
Sander et al. 2005; Scherer 2009a), however, then it is necess-
ary to empirically evaluate which psychological descriptions
are most effective – our ingredients or Scherer’s appraisals.
R3.2. Other evidence consistent with psychological
constructionism
We were excited to read that commentators found a
psychological constructionist approach to be consistent
with and generative for their own work. For example,
Jablonka & Ginsburg discuss the important role of
language in emotion, suggesting that language develop-
ment and the ability to communicate emotions have con-
tributed to humans’ evolutionary success. Quirin &
Lane also cite the importance of language in emotion,
noting that in their view, language helps to differentiate
a general, nonspecific affective response into complex, dis-
crete emotional experiences. Gardiner points to fascinat-
ing research on emotional responses to music that are
consistent with our psychological construction approach.
Staniloiu & Markowitsch point out that psychological
construction is consistent with neuropsychological and
neuroimaging research on episodic-autobiographical
memory, while a number of other commentators
(Cramer et al.; Humeny, Kelly, & Brook [Humeny
et al.]; Rothenberger; Unoka et al.) point to the simi-
larities between psychological construction and a trans-
diagnostic approach to psychopathology.
Other commentators see our psychological ingredients
as a useful avenue for understanding cross-cultural differ-
ences in emotion. Cross-cultural studies are important to
our psychological constructionist model because they
will help reveal whether core affect, conceptualization,
executive attention, and language are universal psychologi-
cal ingredients of the mind. For instance, Unoka et al.
argue that there are clear cross-cultural differences in
emotion knowledge that can shape how individuals from
different cultures experience core affect. Hechtman,
Pornpattananangkul, & Chiao (Hechtman et al.)
suggest that the ingredients of core affect, conceptualiz-
ation, and executive attention have the power to explain
differences in brain activity observed among individuals
of different cultures. One question that we find particu-
larly interesting is whether there is cultural variation in
certain emotion categories that might be basic in a cogni-
tive (Rosch 1973) rather than in a biological sense.
“Minimal universality” (cf. Russell 1995) might exist
because many cultures were subject to similar selection
pressures (e.g., living in large groups) and hence devel-
oped similar emotion concepts (Barrett 2006b). Other
emotion concepts will differ cross-culturally. Even the
same emotion categories can contain different content
across cultures (e.g., sadness is an experience of physical
agony in Russian but loss in English; Wierzbicka 2009;
for reviews, see Mesquita & Frijda 1992; Mesquita &
Walker 2003; Russell 1991; Wierzbicka 1992).
R4. Closing remarks
Our meta-analysis tested a simple version of faculty psy-
chology: whether emotion categories map to consistent acti-
vations in specific locales of the brain. Our meta-analysis,
along with some of the other research cited in our response,
puts this view to rest. Although the meta-analysis was not
optimized for testing a psychological construction view of
emotion, its findings were largely consistent with this
approach. Over time, the approach will continue to be
refined, and understanding of the neural dynamics that
create mental states will progress. For now, the psychologi-
cal construction approach is useful because it dissolves old
controversies, makes sense of persistent puzzles in the
empirical literature (e.g., Barrett 2006a; 2009a), and
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sometimes generates hypotheses that violate commonsense.
For example, as Scherer correctly observes, the hypothesis
that language is required for emotion experiences and per-
ceptions means that animals, infants, or people without
language would not experience or perceive discrete
emotions (although we believe that they experience core
affect) (see Lindquist et al. [under review] for an empirical
example). Whereas Scherer sees this as a critique of our
model, we view it as an interesting implication. In our
view, the existence of emotion itself depends on the percei-
ver. To a human perceiver, who has a concept for anger, a
growling dog is angry. From the dog’s perspective, anger
does not exist; a dog is engaging in a behavioral adaptation
that is yoked to the specific context. But try telling a pet
owner that his dog does not experience anger – it is like
telling someone that the sky isn’t really blue. Perceptions
are powerful precisely because they usually mask the mech-
anisms that produce them.
NOTES
1. The roots of psychological constructionism date back to the begin-
ning of psychology, however (see Gendron & Barrett 2009).
2. The exact nature of this bodily activation is sometimes described as
raw somatic, visceral, vascular and motor cues (James 1884), arousal
(Duffy 1957; Mandler 1975; 1990; Schachter & Singer 1962), or the
mental representation of these cues as affect (Wundt 1897; Harlow &
Stagner 1932; Hunt 1941) or core affect (Barrett 2006b; Barrett &
Bliss-Moreau 2009; Russell 2003; Russell & Barrett 1999).
3. Stapleton wonders how bodily information and affect are related.
Since the time of Wundt and James, psychologists and physiologists
have been arguing about this very issue (for an empirical assessment of
their relation, see Barrett et al. 2004; Wiens 2005). Sander wonders
how affect can occur before the experience of novelty, but empirical evi-
dence from our laboratory suggests that both affect and novelty are pro-
cessed in the same neural circuitry, suggesting that they are not
sequential properties of experience (e.g., Moriguchi et al. 2011; Weierich
et al. 2010). The arousal regulated by the amygdala can be experienced as
either affective feelings or novelty.
4. Candidates for meaning making include ideas (Wundt 1897), social
affiliation (Schachter & Singer 1962), attribution (Russell 2003) or, as we
propose in our model, conceptualization and categorization (Barrett 2006a;
2009b; Barrett et al. 2007a; 2007b; Lindquist & Barrett 2008a; 2008b).
5. Relatedly, the basic emotion approach usually assumes that
emotions unfold in a linear fashion (an object triggers a dedicated brain
location or circuit, which produces coordinated changes in behavior, per-
ipheral physiology, and so on), and it is often assumed that psychological
construction proposes a linear sequence as well (first a change in core
affect, then this change is made meaningful by some additional process,
like categorization). We do not propose any such linear sequencing,
however. Although there are certainly instances where humans conceptu-
alize core affect after the fact (i.e., disambiguating a feeling in the pit of
the stomach as hunger vs. nervousness), there are also instances where
category knowledge (primed by the situation) causes a shift in core
affect. Most often, core affect and conceptualization are mutually
constraining one another based on the situation (see Figure R1).
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